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Introduction
Emily P. Hoffman
Western Michigan University

As the twentieth century comes to a close, educational quality and
financing have emerged as among the most important social and eco
nomic issues of concern to this nation. The Economics of Education
refers to the study of how resources are allocated to achieve educa
tional goals. Questions of equity, efficiency, and effectiveness have
been addressed to all levels of formal education—from early childhood
education to higher education. This series of papers by prominent
economists who have specialized in educational issues brings an eco
nomic perspective to several major questions being asked of the educa
tional system in this country and contributes to the national debate.
Three of the papers address elementary and secondary education.
The thrust of the Henry M. Levin paper is to examine the educational
opportunities afforded "at risk" children at the primary level and to
describe an alternative approach being tested in a number of locations
across the country. Eric A. Hanushek takes on the issue of whether or
not equity in public support of elementary and secondary schooling
will improve student outcomes. Robert H. Meyer points out that per
formance-based incentives for elementary and secondary schools must
be carefully considered and implemented.
Two of the papers focus on higher education issues. Estelle James
and Nabeel Alsalam examine the economic payoffs to various higher
education choices. They address the question of whether an institu
tion's reputation "pays off in the labor market for individuals who
graduate from it. W. Lee Hansen documents the cyclical nature of the
mission of higher education as it has swung from emphases on equity
of access to quality and back again.
In the final paper, Mary Jean Bowman philosophizes about the
dynamics of educational policy and practice. Curriculums and instruc
tional approaches that are state of the art today may be obsolete tomor
row. Therefore, as policymakers grapple with quality and financing
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issues, they need to identify and heed the fundamental and unchanging
purposes of education.
In "Economics of Education for At-Risk Students," Levin expresses
his concern over the high student dropout rates from our current school
system. As a remedy, he offers and explains his accelerated schooling
concept. Levin defines at-risk students as those who are unlikely to
succeed in existing schools—over half of whom do not graduate—
because they do not have the background on which success in that
school system is based.
Levin feels that schools have taken the wrong approach in their
attempts to help the weak student; he charges that the prevalent reme
dial or compensatory education with repetitive drill slows learning of
at-risk students. He feels that the current system of remedial education
does this by lowering the expectations of the teachers, which lowers
the achievements of the students. Indeed, both the teachers and the stu
dents are stigmatized by the remedial labelling. Levin believes that
failing students need to be challenged and accelerated, not given reme
dial work. Levin finds that the methods that work well with gifted stu
dents also work well with at-risk students—high expectations and
stimulating material results in success for at-risk students.
Levin recommends three major changes in the American school sys
tem to allow the development of accelerated education. First, the
schools must have a clear objective of bringing at-risk children into the
mainstream of education, not allowing them to languish in the backwa
ter. Second, there must be school-site empowerment. This means that
the decisions affecting the operation of the school must not be passed
down from a remote central administration, but must be made by those
directly involved in the educational process—the school administra
tors, the teachers, the parents, even the students. Of course, there must
be some overall system of accountability, with rewards commensurate
with performance. Third, the schools must build on the strengths of the
teachers, the parents, and the students—not dwell on their weaknesses
as an excuse for failure.
Levin describes the Stanford Accelerated Schools Project, where the
methods that he proposes have been tried. He reviews the pattern of
success of these "accelerated schools," which rely on an enrichment
strategy rather than the "dumbed-down" rote repetition of conventional
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remedial education. He claims that these methods result in a high rate
of learning by at-risk students, citing examples of impressive gains in
achievement test levels among students from the most deprived socioeconomic background in schools that have adopted the methods he has
developed. Amazingly, this progress was achieved by reorganizing the
schools, not by increasing the expenditures per pupil.
Levin presents estimates of the proportion of students who are atrisk, and the implications of this for the future quality of our labor
force. Besides the general societal benefits, Levin claims that the mon
etary benefits, in terms of less need for social services, combined with
higher incomes and the resulting higher tax revenues, more than com
pensate for the costs of the accelerated school programs. He summa
rizes cost-benefit studies of investments in at-risk students and finds a
range of $3 to $6 in benefits for each $1 in'cost.
If the changes Levin recommends can be widely adopted and the
pattern of success can be repeated, all of us—students, parents, teach
ers, taxpayers, employers, every member of society—will be much
better off.
In "Can Equity Be Separated from Efficiency in School Finance
Debates," Eric Hanushek contends that just spending more money on
the existing school system does not guarantee improved student
achievement. He tries to apply the economic concept of "production
function," which might be more familiarly known as a cost-quality or
input-output approach to student performance. He shows that the con
cept of "equity" is not easily defined; as a result, courts, politicians,
school officials, and public debate have, by default, tended to accept
"expenditure per pupil" as a measure of equity. Hanushek points out,
however, that unless the school system operates efficiently, there is no
direct link between expenditures and results.
Hanushek has analyzed the results of 187 prior studies that
attempted to relate some objective measure of student output to charac
teristics of the educational system that were related to costs. He finds
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, "the research reveals no strong
or systematic relationship between school expenditure and student per
formance." His point is not that money doesn't count, but that "unless
some way is found to change the districts that would squander addi
tional funds into districts that would use them effectively, added
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resources are not likely to lead to any improvement in average perfor
mance."
Hanushek analyzes data from the state of Alabama, which ranks
among the lowest in educational expenditures. Alabama has a state
wide Basic Competency Test (BCT), which allows comparisons to be
made between school districts on a uniform basis. He estimates the
effects of increasing per-pupil expenditures on passing rates for the
BCT when controlling for sociodemographic variables (such as family
background and rural/urban school district). Bringing the expenditures
of all the below-median districts up to the state median level would
produce almost no change in the BCT passing rates. Bringing the
expenditures of all districts up to the level of the highest district in the
state (which would bring the state up to about the national mean)
would produce at most a 4 percent change in the BCT passing rates.
Hanusek offers a number of additional arguments against simply
making policy on the basis of expenditure differences. First, he notes
that any effort to lessen variation in expenditure is more likely to
increase than to decrease the total level of expenditure. Second, there is
no assurance that new funds will go to schools of poor children, since
property wealth and concentrations of poverty may exist in the same
district. Third, spending differences may not accurately reflect the real
resources a district is able to deliver, either because of cost differences
for inputs or because of differing needs of student populations. Fourth,
districts spend in response to the desires of the population and to popu
lation shifts, so their expenditure levels may increase or decrease over
time. Fifth, districts perceived to have superior schools will attract
home buyers and "bid up" the housing prices in the district relative to
otherwise identical housing in another district. Sixth, in many states,
issues other than property wealth—such as local preferences, differ
ences in student needs, curricular choices, cost differentials—deter
mine the pattern of expenditure. Seventh, while the tax rate provides an
indication of the price that residents pay to raise school funds, differ
ences in tax rates across communities do not necessarily reflect the
degree of educational equity.
Hanushek concludes that there is no easy way to improve student
performance. He believes that school finance reform that focuses on
achieving equal spending per student rather than efficient use of
resources will not guarantee improved performance of students. He
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admits that no definitive alternative seems sure to bring about improve
ment in the current school system. However, that is not an argument
for maintaining the status quo. Rather, Hanushek believes that having
some measure of student achievement affect educational expenditures
is the route to follow. Hanushek seems optimistic about merit pay for
teachers and school choice (such as a voucher system) as potential
reforms worth exploring.
Robert Meyer directly addresses the issue of performance measure
ment in "Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance? A
Critique of Common Educational Performance Indicators." Meyer
argues that accurate assessment of student progress is important
because administrators and teachers respond to the indications (and
resulting incentives) provided by the results of the assessment instru
ment. He demonstrates that the traditional methods of reporting scores
(typically as means or medians of entire school districts) from stan
dardized educational tests may be misleading when used as an assess
ment of school performance and student achievement. He shows that
using such measures as the basis for allocating school system resources
(such as merit pay plans for teachers) is not generally desirable, and
may even have perverse effects. In particular, these testing methods
foster "teaching to the test" at the expense of "real learning."
In agreement with many other critics of large-scale educational test
ing, Meyer feels that the prevalent pattern of multiple-choice tests that
focus on items of factual knowledge rewards rote learning, rather than
higher order thinking and the development of problem-solving skills.
Since traditional tests are not satisfactory instruments for determining
educational achievement, Meyer wants (as do many other critics) per
formance-based tests that will elicit the student's ability to perform
real-world tasks—for example, the road test for a driver's license. As
Meyer points out, each student's educational level at a particular
moment is the cumulative result of all prior schooling. Therefore, a
good measure of educational achievement must not suffer from the
three main defects in the traditional assessment measures: nonlocalization, overaggregation across grade levels, and contamination due to
mobility. Nonlocalization results from reporting the data from too large
an area (such as a school district, or even an entire state). He feels that
a good assessment measure must be localized so that it can be related
to the school (or even specific classroom) where the learning
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occurred—or failed to occur. Overaggregation is the failure to identify
what performance gains occurred at a particular grade level. Therefore,
performance levels must be measured frequently. Contamination
resulting from student mobility occurs when students transfer between
school systems. In that case, an assessment score would falsely
attribute to one school system the effects (good or bad) of another
school system.
Meyer proposes reporting the successes and/or failures of the school
system in terms of two related measures of performance: a value added
indicator and a gain indicator. The value added indicator would mea
sure only the amount a student learned in a particular class in a particu
lar year. This immediately avoids the localization, aggregation, and
contamination problems. The gain indicator would report the gain in
students' educational level over a period of time (ideally, a school year)
from all sources. Thus, the sum of all the value added indicators is
included, plus the contribution of nonschool factors (such as the socioeconomic characteristics of the student's home and community).
Meyer presents the results of several simulations that show the
effects of various patterns of student inflow and school effectiveness
on student educational gain and achievement. These graphs and tables
demonstrate the sensitivity of the apparent measurement of achieve
ment to prior conditions.
In conclusion, Meyer advocates more frequent and better testing,
the collection of data on student and family characteristics, and the
development of better statistical models.
In "College Choice, Academic Achievement, and Future Earnings,"
Estelle James and Nabeel Alsalam reinforce the old maxim that the
harder one works, the more successful one will be. It should be care
fully noted that "success" here is measured only in monetary terms,
namely, one's income seven to nine years after graduating from col
lege.
James and Alsalam studied a sample of 1,321 males selected from
the National Longitudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 and
the Postsecondary Education Transcript Study data sets. The men were
interviewed in 1986, having graduated from college seven to nine
years earlier. James and Alsalam used two statistical models to analyze
how the characteristics of both the students and the college they
attended affected earnings.
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In the first model, they compared the 285 colleges that had at least
two graduates in the sample. Considering only which college a student
graduated from served as a good predictor of that student's future earn
ings. James and Alsalam then added variables to the first model that
represented the initial characteristics of the students (such as high
school grades, SAT scores, family income), what they studied, and
how well they did in the college. This increased the predictive power
of the model, but greatly decreased the importance of the specific col
lege attended.
The second model included the characteristics (such as private/pub
lic, large/small, SAT scores of students) of all of the 499 individual
colleges represented in the data. This almost eliminated the predictive
power of which college the student attended. Including the variables
for the characteristics of the students and what they studied and how
well they performed academically again increased the predictive
power of the model and greatly reduced the importance of the specific
college attended.
In sum, James and Alsalam agree with Meyer in that there is both a
value added and a gross output (Meyer's "gain") in higher education.
What the world perceives—and generally, is willing to pay for—is the
"finished product." While there is a component of indirect screening in
a particular student's choice of a particular college, what the student
does while attending that college—the skills acquired and/or devel
oped—are the best indicator of future financial success.
W. Lee Hansen, in "The Financial Squeeze on Higher Education
Institutions and Students: The Balance Between Quality and Access,"
discusses trends since World War II in the shifting emphasis between
the quality of higher education and the ease of access to it. He posits
that the goals of the American higher education system are influenced
by many forces, both from within and from without.
A noteworthy feature of Hansen's study is that "quality" is measured
in terms of financial inputs to education, not academic outputs.
Accordingly, "quality" is not the amount students are learning, but the
amount of money spent on faculty salaries and related instructional
costs. Correspondingly, "access" here means affordability—whether or
not students are able to meet the expenses of attending college.
Hansen calculates monetary proxies that quantify both access and
quality. The sum of tuition plus fees, less the total amount of financial
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aid, serves as the proxy for access. The sum of all instruction-related
costs, adjusted by subtracting the costs of nonteaching programs (such
as the extension programs of the land-grant state university systems
and sponsored research projects at the major universities) serves as the
proxy for quality.
As Hansen observes, scholars from many disciplines have studied
patterns of change in society. He particularly refers to previous work
c*n cycles by Arthur Schlesinger. The general tendency seems to be for
society to move towards an extreme position, but to then reverse
course and head for the opposite extreme, much as the swinging of a
pendulum. As evidence for the cycles, Hansen presents tables that
show the ebb and flow of the costs of higher education and the sources
of student financial support for nine periods from 1947 to 1989.
Analyzing this data, Hansen finds long-run swings between empha
sis on access (e.g., the GI bill) and emphasis on quality (e.g., curricu
lum reforms) in higher education. He finds four of these swings in the
last half-century. In the first one, which ran from the late 1930s until
the early 1950s, the main thrust was on access to college, with the GI
bill providing the ultimate example of this. The next period, from the
mid-1950s to the mid-1960s, was an era of enormous expansion in
higher education. There was great emphasis on the quality of American
higher education, particularly in the areas of engineering and science,
brought on by the "space race" with the USSR. In the following period,
from the mid-1960s to the beginning of the 1980s, emphasis shifted
back to expanding access to higher education, as exemplified by the
various federal student aid programs initiated in this period.
The fourth period, which began in the early 1980s and continues to
the present, differs from the previous ones. There now appears to be
concern about both access to and quality of higher education. Hansen
concludes that the conflict now is over the "cost-effectiveness" of
higher education, and how the costs are to be apportioned among the
students and their families, voluntary contributors to higher education,
and taxpayers on the local, state, and federal levels.
The most important of the trends that he found is that students and
their families are being asked to pay an increasing share of the cost of
higher education, rising from 26 percent after World War II to 41 per
cent by the late 1980s. Hansen offers two plausible explanations for
this. One is that the rising demands for other publicly provided ser-
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vices (such as welfare and medical care) have increasingly competed
with higher education for support from government and private
sources. Another possibility is that it increasingly appears to our soci
ety that the benefits of higher education (at least in the form of higher
incomes) accrue more to the individual than to society; therefore, the
greater beneficiary should pay a greater share of the costs.
The last paper in this collection, "The Economics of Education in a
World of Change" by Mary Jean Bowman, is quite different from the
preceding five. Rather than reporting on research in a particular area of
the economics of education, she takes a philosophical approach,
exploring more the "what" and "why" of education, in contrast to the
"hows" of method and financing of the other papers.
Bowman has a long and distinguished career—indeed, when she
began her studies of economics, the subject was much more the qualitativeness of political economy rather than the quantitative path that
economics currently follows. Perhaps this makes her more qualified to
step back—to see the forest, rather than concentrating on the trees. In
trying to predict what kind of education will be most suitable to pre
pare for a future in which the only certainty seems to be change, it is
probably better to take the longest view, rather than try to extrapolate,
no matter how carefully, from the trends of the present.
Bowman's central thesis is the importance of exploring change for
meaningful analysis in the economics of education. She begins with
clarification of the meanings and scope in this context of "education"
and "economics of education," going on to specify the kinds of change
and the implications of change as they affect and are affected by educa
tion in industrialized societies.
Bowman defines education in a broad sense as "learning," which
includes but is not limited to "schooling." In considering the very
important, and very difficult, problem of how students can best be pre
pared for the future, she discusses whether general, vocational, or spe
cialized education is most appropriate for coping with the change and
uncertain expectations that seem inevitable in the future. She argues
for general education, which should provide all students with a solid
foundation of both literacy and numeracy. While specific curricula of
vocational or specialized education may become obsolete, a sound
general education will facilitate lifelong learning—the learning that
occurs after graduating from school—which will provide the knowl-
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edge needed in one's employment. She says, "a world of change calls
for learning both within and outside of schools. It calls for general edu
cation in preparation for future learning, for specializations that can
cope with change, and for both applied and theoretical learning."
Bowman considers the general learning that should take place in the
home and in the preschool years to be of the greatest importance. Not
only must children be prepared for formal schooling, but perhaps even
more important, children must be socialized in terms of attitudes and
behavior in order for them to succeed in the world. She contends that,
due to deficiencies in learning in some homes and the perverse trends
(such as increased illicit drug abuse) in today's society that work as dis
incentives to education, schools must, by default, become socializing
agencies for many children.
The allocation of resources to educate children for a world that dif
fers in many ways from the one in which we grew up involves many
complex issues. While the papers in this volume do not provide
answers to all of the problems, it is hoped that the application of an
economic perspective will add a useful dimension to the dialogue.

The Economics of Education
for At-Risk Students
Henry M. Levin
Stanford University

The nation currently faces an immense crisis in addressing the edu
cation of at-risk students—pupils who are unlikely to succeed in exist
ing schools. Such students currently comprise over one-third of all
elementary and secondary school students, and their numbers are rising
absolutely and proportionately over time. At-risk students are about
two years behind grade level in school achievement by sixth grade and
perform at about the eighth-grade level if they graduate from high
school. Over half do not graduate. Their poor educational performance
does not provide them with the skills needed for labor market success
and further training, a situation with serious consequences for the
economy.
At-risk students are defined as those who are unlikely to succeed in
school as these institutions are currently constituted because they do
not have the experiences in the home, family, and community on which
school success is based. Given the existing curriculum and instruc
tional practices, schools are not neutral arenas in which all types of stu
dent backgrounds lead to success. Students who come from middleclass and nonminority backgrounds, with both parents present in their
lives, and who speak a standard version of English are much more
likely to succeed educationally than those from impoverished, minor
ity, immigrant, nonstandard English-speaking, and single-parent back
grounds. At-risk students are caught in a mismatch between their home
situations and what schools require for success. An effective set of pol
icies to improve educational outcomes for at-risk students requires
addressing both the in-school and out-of-school experiences of these
children.
This article will focus on the contributions that economic analysis
can provide in addressing the educational needs of at-risk students. The
first part will present information on the demography and educational
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status of at-risk students and some economic consequences. The sec
ond will offer a summary of what is known about the economic returns
to investments in these populations. The final part of the paper will
present a new microeconomic approach to the schooling of these
youngsters, which has shown promise.

A Crisis of At-Risk Students

The challenge of addressing the needs of at-risk students is impor
tant because they are a large and growing portion of student enroll
ments in the United States, and their poor educational performance has
important consequences for the economy and society. It is widely
viewed that high school completion represents a minimum qualifica
tion for the vast majority of jobs in the U.S. labor force and for eligibil
ity for further training. Students from minority and low-income
backgrounds are far more likely to fail to complete high school than
other groups, and the proportion of both minorities and children from
impoverished circumstances is increasing among the school popula
tion.
Among members of the labor force between 25 and 29 years old in
1985, only about 14 percent had failed to complete high school or its
equivalent (U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census
1987). But the figure among blacks was 19 percent and among Hispanics it was almost 40 percent. Both among minorities and whites, per
sons from families of low socioeconomic status have considerably
higher dropout rates than those from more advantaged backgrounds
(Rumberger 1983). Similar patterns exist for academic achievement, in
which those from low socioeconomic backgrounds and of minority sta
tus show considerably lower test scores than their white and nondisadvantaged counterparts (Smith and O'Day 1991).
The fact that populations of school children who are minorities or
from low-income families, especially where the parents have not com
pleted high school, represent a substantial and increasing portion of
school enrollments is a particularly ominous situation. From 1970 to
1980, U.S. public school enrollments from the preprimary level to
twelfth grade declined from about 46 million to 41 million students.
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During the same time period, minority enrollments rose from about 9.5
million to about 11 million, or from about 21 to 27 percent of the total
(National Center for Educational Statistics 1984, p. 16). By the year
2020, it is expected that minority children will represent almost half of
all children aged 17 and under (Pallas, Natriello, and McDill 1989), a
figure that has already been reached in California and Texas. Minority
students comprise three-quarters or more of the enrollments of many of
the largest cities of the nation, including New York, Chicago, Los
Angeles, Philadelphia, Miami (Dade Country), and Detroit (McNett
1983). Minority enrollments have been increasing at a more rapid pace
than the general population because of considerably higher birth rates
and immigration—both legal and undocumented—that have been
unprecedented in recent decades. Both factors create rapid growth, par
ticularly among school-age populations. Immigrant and other minority
populations tend to be young and of childbearing age, in contrast to an
older, nonminority population.
When poverty is used as an indicator for "at-risk" populations, a
similar pattern emerges. Between 1969 and 1979 the proportion of
children in poverty stayed at about 16 percent; but it rose precipitously
to 22 percent by 1983 and is projected to reach 27 percent of the chil
dren 17 years and under by 2020 (Koretz and Ventresca 1984; Pallas,
Natriello, and McDill 1989). This is a rise from about 15 million to
over 20 million children in poverty. Between 1984 and 2020 the num
ber of children who are not living with both parents is expected to rise
by 30 percent from 16 million to over 21 million (Pallas, Natriello, and
McDill 1989). This is especially alarming, given that the real incomes
of single mothers with children fell in absolute terms by 13 percent
between 1970 and 1986 (Congressional Budget Office 1988).
Trends for other indicators of children at-risk have been moving in
the same direction. For example, Pallas, Natriello, and McDill (1989)
project that the number of children raised in families where the mother
has not completed high school will rise by 56 percent to over 21 mil
lion by 2020. Of particular importance are the low educational attain
ments of immigrants drawn from rural regions of some of the poorest
countries in the world. For example, of the largest single group of
immigrants into California—Mexicans—only about 28 percent had
more than an eighth-grade education in the early 1980s (Muller 1985,
p. 7).
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Not only are the numbers of at-risk students growing but there is
evidence that their degree of disadvantage is increasing, too. In the fall
of 1972 about 46 percent of Hispanic high school graduates partici
pated in postsecondary education immediately following graduation
(National Center for Education Statistics 1984, p. 160). By the fall of
1980 that proportion had fallen to 40 percent, despite the widespread
loosening of admissions standards during this period. While the partic
ipation rate in higher education of Hispanics from middle socioeconomic backgrounds fell by about 10 percent, the rate for Hispanics of
lower socioeconomic background fell by 22 percent. This is even more
surprising, given that the high school dropout rate for Hispanics rose
over the period, meaning that one would normally expect the high
school "survivors" to be better qualified. This drastic change in partici
pation over such a short period may have been occasioned by poorer
academic preparation and thus lower eligibility for postsecondary edu
cation or less adequate financial resources, both factors associated with
increasing disadvantage.
In summary, the evidence suggests that the proportion of at-risk stu
dents is high and increasing rapidly. Estimates derived from the vari
ous demographic analyses suggest that upward of one-third of all
students in kindergarten through twelfth grade are educationally disadvantaged or at-risk (Levin 1986). When achievement is used as a crite
rion, it appears that the number of educationally at-risk students may
be as high as 40 percent (Kennedy, Jung, and Orland 1986, pp. 62-63).
General Economic Implications
The rising numbers of at-risk students and their continuing failure to
succeed educationally will have important economic ramifications in at
least three areas: (1) quality of the entry-level labor force; (2) the cost
and quality of higher education; and (3) the cost of public services.
Quality of Entry-Level Labor Force
One consequence of the present educational status of at-risk stu
dents will be a serious deterioration in the quality of the labor force. As
long as persons from such backgrounds were a small minority of the
population, they could be absorbed by low-skill jobs or relegated to the
status of unemployment without direct consequences for the economy.
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High dropout rates, low test scores, and poor academic performance of
a group that will become a larger and larger portion of the school pop
ulation mean that a larger portion of the future labor force will be
undereducated for available jobs. Here we refer not only to managerial,
professional, and technical jobs, but even to the lower-level service
jobs that are increasingly important in the U.S. economy (Levin and
Rumberger 1987). Clerical workers, cashiers, and salesclerks all need
basic skills in oral and written communications, the acquisition of
which is hardly guaranteed in the schooling of the disadvantaged
(National Academy of Sciences 1984). A U.S. government study in
1976 found that while 13 percent of all 17-year-olds were classified as
functionally illiterate, the percentages of illiterates among Hispanics
and blacks were 56 and 44, respectively (National Assessment of Edu
cational Progress 1976). These and other test score results (Smith and
O'Day 1991) suggest that many at-risk students are not acquiring the
foundation that will enable them either to work productively in avail
able jobs or benefit from training that would increase productivity and
provide job mobility.
As at-risk populations become an increasing and even dominant
share of the labor force, their inadequate educational preparation will
be visited on the industries and states in which they work, affecting
their competitive positions and our national economic status. Employ
ers will suffer in terms of lagging productivity, higher training costs,
and competitive disadvantages that will result in lost sales and profits.
This problem will be especially severe for states with the largest
growth in the disadvantaged population, such as California and Texas,
where minorities already represent the majority of all students. It will
also be most serious in those industries that depend upon this popula
tion for their labor needs. As a result, state and federal governments
will suffer a declining tax base and a concomitant loss of tax revenues
that could be used to fund improvements in education and other ser
vices.
Cost and Quality of Higher Education
The implications for higher education are also severe. Even with
high dropout rates, an increasing proportion of high school graduates
will come from disadvantaged backgrounds. Without intervention at an
early stage in their education, these students will leave high school
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with serious learning deficits, which will prevent many of them from
benefiting from current levels of instruction in colleges and universi
ties.
High school graduation entitles the at-risk student to pursue postsecondary study in community colleges and many state universities. Even
if increasing numbers of disadvantaged students gain college entry,
their low achievement means that a high proportion of them will expe
rience academic failure and leave without a degree. Among the group
that entered college in 1972, only 13 percent of the Hispanics, 16 per
cent of the Native Americans, and 24 percent of the blacks completed a
bachelor's degree by 1976, compared to 34 percent of the whites
(Garibaldi 1986, p. 390). Although ultimate completion rates were
higher for all groups, differences remained, and it took longer—on
average—for minority students to complete their degrees.
One obvious response to this situation is to provide massive reme
dial functions to assist educationally disadvantaged students to reachlevels where they can benefit from conventional instruction. According
to a recent survey by the U.S. Department of Education in the early
1980s, one in every four freshmen was already enrolled in a remedial
mathematics course, and one in every six in remedial reading (Abra
ham 1988). A similar study for fifteen southern states in 1986 found
that about 36 percent of the freshmen in public institutions of higher
education in those states were taking at least one remedial course in
reading, writing, or mathematics (Abraham 1988).
High levels of college failures and dropouts and massive remedial
interventions have costly consequences to both students and institu
tions. Large numbers of failures mean wasted time for students and
wasted resources for colleges, not to mention the psychological costs
to students of not being able to "make it." Substantial remedial activi
ties require additional faculty, and student programs take longer, with a
greater cost in tuition and lost earnings during the extended training
period required. Also, as a college or university takes on remedial
functions, it is likely to approve some of these courses for degree
credit, which results in a watering down of the overall curriculum and
standards.
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Cost of Public Services
A final consequence of failing to address the challenge of at-risk
students will be the rising costs of public services as more and more
citizens are forced to rely upon public assistance and undereducated
teens, and adults pursue illegal activities to fill idle time and obtain
income. Many of the disadvantaged will continue to have difficulty
finding regular jobs as adults, so their families will need to depend
upon the availability of public assistance to survive. When one applies
a teenage unemployment rate of 40 percent or so to a larger and larger
group of school dropouts, there are likely to be increasing numbers of
undereducated youth taking their activities to the streets rather than to
the workplace.
Among a national sample of 19- to 23-year-olds in 1981, 72 percent
of the jobless, 79 percent of those on public assistance, and 68 percent
of those arrested in the previous year had scored below the average on
the AFQT measure of basic skills (Berlin and Sum 1988, p. 29).
Among 18- to 23-year-old males in 1981, those with a high school
diploma had a 94 percent lower probability of arrest; and among girls
aged 18 to 21 the high school graduates had a 54 percent lower proba
bility of having a baby out of wedlock (Berlin and Sum 1988, p. 42).
A study of black women in their mid-thirties in 1982 found that
each additional year of schooling was associated with a reduction of
about 7 percent in the probability of receiving public assistance
(Owens 1990). Moreover, participation in public assistance seems to
be becoming even more education-dependent over time; education had
twice the impact on the relation in 1982 as it did in 1967 (Owens
1990).
A projection of these outcomes on an expanding at-risk population
will not only make the United States a less desirable place to live, but
will increase the costs of police services and the criminal justice sys
tem. At the same time, the potential decline in economic activity cre
ated by an underprepared workforce will erode tax revenues. This
situation will place additional pressures on the middle class to pay
higher taxes for welfare and the system of criminal justice at the same
time that the economy is flagging. As such it will exacerbate the politi
cal conflict between haves and have-nots, as taxpayers resist raising
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taxes in the light of a faltering economy and mounting pressures for
higher expenditures.

Summary of General Economic Implications
To fail to address the present and future educational needs of at-risk
students will incur high social costs in terms of reduced productivity in
the labor force and higher education as well as rising costs of public
services. Education is not only linked to public assistance and criminal
justice, it is also linked to health, status, and a variety of other impor
tant social outcomes (Haveman and Wolfe 1984). In fact, when all the
identifiable outcomes associated with education are taken into account,
it has been estimated that the overall return on education is twice as
high as when only its effect on income is considered.
Benefit-cost Studies of Educational Investment
The knowledge that economic and social benefits can be achieved
by investing in at-risk student populations is not an adequate criterion
for investment. Although such investments are likely to result in con
siderable benefits, there are also likely to be considerable costs. From
an economic perspective, it is necessary to know whether benefits
exceed costs and whether they exceed them by magnitudes equal to or
greater than alternative social investments. In this section, we will
review the results of benefit-cost studies of educational investments
among those populations.

Programs for Reducing High School Dropout Rates
A number of economic studies have addressed the costs and benefits
of programs for reducing the rate of high school dropouts. In a classic
study on the subject, Weisbrod compared the impact of a St. Louis pro
gram designed to reduce the rate of dropouts among "dropout-prone"
high school students with the rate of dropouts in a control group of
similar students who did not have such a program (Weisbrod 1965).
The dropout prevention program was associated with a high school
completion rate that was about 7 percent higher than that of the control
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group. Weisbrod estimated the cost for each of the additional graduates
and contrasted it with the estimated income benefits of high school
graduation for these students. He found that the costs of the program
exceeded its benefits.
There are at least two reasons for believing that analyses of more
recent programs would show stronger benefits. Weisbrod used 1959
census data to estimate the additional incomes of the graduates.
Because of discrimination and other factors, the earnings of women
and minorities were a much smaller portion of white male earnings
some 30 years ago than they are today. Since the dropout-prone group
included considerable numbers of females and minorities, the benefits
were probably considerably understated relative to what would be
obtained with more recent data. Further, the earnings advantages of
high school graduates relative to dropouts have increased. Finally, the
program that Weisbrod evaluated was initiated over thirty years ago
when dropout prevention was in its infancy.
In contrast, a more recent study of dropout prevention found large
net benefits (Stern, Dayton, Paik, and Weisberg 1989). This evaluation
was based upon the success in reducing the number of dropouts at
eleven academies created in public high schools in California. These
academies comprised special programs or schools within the larger
high school setting and provided vocational training for careers in
which students stood a good chance of placement, as well as academic
training. Students were given special attention from their teachers and
the representatives of local employers. When students were matched
with a similar group of students in regular school programs, it was esti
mated that the academies had saved 29 persons who would have been
expected to drop out.
The marginal costs of the academy program, beyond those of the
regular school program for all 327 students, were compared to benefits
in terms of the additional earnings of the twenty-nine persons "saved"
from dropping out. The overall benefits of the program were found to
exceed overall costs by considerable amounts, the specifics depending
upon which assumptions were used regarding benefits. However, the
results also show that for some of the academies net benefits were pos
itive and for others negative—that is, costs exceeded benefits. This
suggests that a more refined evaluation of individual programs would
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be useful in arriving at an understanding of which programs were the
most promising on the basis of a benefit-cost analysis.
In contrast to studies of a single dropout program, Levin undertook
a national study on the economic consequences of high school dropouts (Levin 1972). Here he calculated the additional lifetime earnings
and tax revenues that would have been generated if the entire cohort of
25- to 34-year-old males in 1970 had graduated from high school. It
was assumed that even if existing dropouts had graduated they would
not have done as well as those who had actually graduated from high
school. Thus, additional earnings of dropouts who would be induced to
graduate were assumed to be only 75 percent of those of conventional
high school graduates. But it was also assumed that a portion of the
induced graduates would continue into higher education, with resulting
additional earnings from that source as well.
The total loss of lifetime earnings for this group as a result of failure
to complete at least high school was estimated at about $237 billion.
The additional cost for achieving this result was comprised of two
parts: first, the cost of the additional years of schooling undertaken by
members of the group; second, the cost of additional expenditures to
prevent dropping out. It was assumed that it would have been neces
sary to increase annual schooling expenditures on those at-risk of drop
ping out by 50 percent a year for all of their elementary and secondary
schooling to keep them in school until completion of high school. On
this basis, it was estimated that the total costs of achieving at least high
school graduation for all members of the cohort was about $40 billion,
producing a benefit of $6.00 for each dollar of cost. The additional life
time earnings would have generated about $71 billion in government
revenue or about $1.75 in tax revenues for each dollar in cost. The
study also estimated that inadequate education was contributing about
$6 billion a year to the costs of welfare and crime in 1970.
Robledo (1986) replicated this analysis more recently for that cohort
of Texan ninth graders in 1982-83 who were projected to drop out
before their anticipated graduation in 1986. They estimated the benefits
of a dropout prevention program as those attributable to savings in
public assistance, training and adult education, crime and incarcera
tion, unemployment insurance and job placement, and as higher earn
ings associated with the additional number of high school graduates.
Such benefits were calculated at $17.5 billion, and the costs to elimi-
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nate dropouts for this cohort were estimated at slightly less than $2 bil
lion or a ratio of $9 in benefits for each dollar of costs. Estimates of
additional tax revenues were 2.5 times greater than costs to the tax
payer.
Catterall (1987) did a similar type of analysis for persons who
dropped out of the Los Angeles high school class of 1985. He found
that because of high school dropouts, the Los Angeles class of 1985
was projected to generate over $3 billion less in lifetime economic
activity than if all of its members had graduated. In contrast, Catterall
suggested that the cost of investing successfully in dropout reduction
would be a mere fraction of this amount. Further, he found that Los
Angeles was addressing the dropout problem with specific programs
that were spending the equivalent of only about $50 per dropout, or
less than one-half of 1 percent of school spending, even though 40 per
cent of its students were not graduating.
Preschool and Higher Education

There is evidence that even preschool investments in at-risk popula
tions can reduce dropping out as well as provide other types of bene
fits. Barnett undertook a benefit-cost analysis of the Perry Preschool
Project in Ypsilanti, Michigan (Barnett 1985). The Perry Preschool
approach has been studied for two decades and has been used as a
model for hundreds of preschools for disadvantaged students across
the country, including the national Head Start program. Students who
had been enrolled in the preschool project were followed until age 19.
It was found that relative to a matched control group, enrollees in the
project experienced better school achievement, educational placement,
educational attainment, and employment. Monetary values for the ben
efits were calculated on the basis of the apparent effect of these advan
tages on the value of childcare during the programs; reduced school
expenditures for remediation, special services, and grade repetition;
reduced costs of crime, delinquency, and welfare; and higher earnings
and employment.
It was found that the benefits exceeded the costs by a large margin
under a wide range of assumptions. The one-year program showed
benefits of $7.00 for every dollar of costs, a benefit-cost ratio of about
7:1, and the two-year program showed a benefit-cost ratio of about
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3.6:1 (Bemieta-Clement et al. 1984, p. 60). About 80 percent of the net
benefits were received by taxpayers in the form of higher tax contribu
tions and lower expenditures on education, crime, and welfare and by
potential crime victims in the form of lower costs for property losses
and injuries.
A study of benefits and costs for financial aid to stimulate participa
tion in higher education for low-income students has also indicated
high benefits relative to costs for government investment (St. John and
Masten 1990). Here researchers compared tax revenues generated by
the additional income produced by the higher levels of college partici
pation among low-income students with the costs of financial aid that
induced these higher enrollments. The net present value of additional
tax revenues was four times as great as the cost of the aid program for
students in the high school class of 1980. That is, from the perspective
of the federal treasury, such programs had a benefit-cost ratio of 4:1.
These particular studies suggest that investments in at-risk students
yield high returns to society. Such social investments are highly worth
while in that their benefits exceed costs and that the margin by which
they exceed costs is competitive with or superior to that of other highly
productive investments. Of greatest importance is that higher tax reve
nues and reductions in the costs of social services more than compen
sate for the investments. In fact, in the case of the early childhood
intervention program established by the Perry Preschool, most of the
net benefits accrued to taxpayers (Barnett 1985).
Summary of Benefit-Cost Results
These benefit-cost results suggest that investments in the education
of students at risk of undereducation are likely to have high payoffs to
society. While each study can be questioned because of imperfect
information and the need to make assumptions on both the cost and
benefit sides of the equation, their overall pattern is remarkably consis
tent. This interpretation is buttressed by a recent study that found that
increased investment in schooling quality among states was consis
tently associated with higher earnings of the adults who were schooled
in those states, holding constant other influences (Card and Krueger
1992).
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Estimated benefits for educational interventions tend to be about
three to six times as high as estimated costs for at-risk students.
According to Haveman and Wolfe (1984), the consideration of returns
to human capital investments in the form of increases in earnings will
capture only about half of the total returns. Thus most of these esti
mates are subject to understatement because they tend to be limited to
the effects of educational investments on productivity and earnings and
do not capture the value of reductions in the costs of health, public
assistance, criminal justice, and a variety of other benefits. However,
recent work suggests that cross-sectional estimates tend to overstate
the benefits to human capital investments on behalf of the poor (Levin
and Kelley 1991). All of the estimates are based upon cross-sectional
evidence, with the exception of those based upon the preschool inter
vention. Since there is no direct evidence on the potential degree of
overstatement or understatement of these results, a reasonable assump
tion is that they are offsetting and that the estimates are a reasonable
first approximation of returns to investments on behalf of at-risk popu
lations.

The Microeconomics of Educational Reform

In the early 1980s, a rash of reports by national commissions and
other groups were published recommending national educational
reforms to improve economic competitiveness. The most important of
these was Nation at Risk, produced by the National Commission on
Excellence in Education (1983). Most of the recommendations of these
reports addressed changes in secondary school programs for collegebound students by calling for more academic courses with more rigor
ous standards at that level. But at-risk students were not even meeting
the "lower" standards that existed at that time and were dropping out in
response to academic demands. The reports said almost nothing about
improving school effectiveness prior to high school to make it possible
for at-risk students to meet both existing and higher standards.
Why were the reports of these commissions silent about at-risk stu
dents? In response to this question, I undertook a study on the demog
raphy, educational outcomes, and social consequences of this group of
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students (Levin 1986), the results of which are summarized in the first
section of this paper. As an extension of that study I began to explore
the production of schooling for this group of children (Levin 1988).
Surprisingly, I found that the educational process in schools attended
by these children was the cause of much of the problem rather than the
solution.
That research found that at-risk students started behind other stu
dents and lagged farther behind the educational mainstream the longer
that they were in school. And this problem did not appear to stem from
a lack of teacher dedication, a charge that has often been made. Para
doxically, it occurred because compensatory programs for the disadvantaged are designed to slow down the instruction of such students,
on the that assumption that at-risk students are less capable than others.
Such students are placed into less demanding instructional settings—
either by pulling them out of their regular classrooms or by adapting
the regular classroom to their "needs"—and offering remedial or com
pensatory educational services. While this approach appears to be both
rational and compassionate, it has exactly the opposite consequences.
First, it reduces learning expectations on the part of both the chil
dren and the educators assigned to teach them, and it stigmatizes both
groups with a label of inferiority. Second, it slows down the learning
process so that at-risk students fall farther and farther behind the main
stream, the longer that they are in school. Third, the approach to reme
diation is to provide repetitive practice of low-level basic exercises
through endless drill and practice. This educational experience is
empty and joyless because it fails to incorporate a rich curriculum, stu
dent involvement and discourse, interesting applications of concepts,
active problem solving, and learning activities that build on the
strengths of the students and their backgrounds. Finally, this remedial
approach does not draw sufficiently upon parental and community
resources, nor does it provide for the participation of school-based edu
cators to influence the programs that they must implement.
The study concluded that an effective approach to educating the disadvantaged must be characterized by high expectations, deadlines by
which such children will be performing in the educational mainstream,
stimulating instructional programs, planning by the educational staff
who will offer the program, and the use of all available resources,
including the parents of the students. This approach should incorporate
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a comprehensive set of strategies that mutually reinforce each other in
creating an organizational push toward raising the achievement of stu
dents to the level that we expect in the mainstream.
A key element in this strategy is accelerated schools, which were
designed by our Stanford Accelerated Schools Project to have exactly
the opposite consequences by bringing at-risk students into the educa
tional mainstream by the end of elementary school (Levin 1988). Our
premise was very basic: at-risk students must learn at a faster rate than
more privileged students—not at a slower rate that drags them farther
and farther behind. What is required is an enrichment strategy rather
than a remedial one.
I hypothesize that acceleration works as well for at-risk students as
it has for their better prepared counterparts. One recent study assigned
at-risk students at random to remedial, average, and honors classes in
seventh-grade mathematics. At the end of the year, the at-risk students
in the honors class—which provided pre-algebra instruction—out
shone at-risk students in the other two groups (Peterson 1989). Similar
results were found when at-risk students were provided with high-con
tent instruction that emphasized thinking ability and decision making
rather than basic skills (Knapp, Shields, and TXirnbull 1992).

Institutionalizing Change
Moving from an idea to institutional change is never an easy pro
cess. In order to develop a strategy for creating accelerated institutions,
we found that we would have to make three major changes in U.S.
schools, changes that were in deep conflict with current practices
(Levin 1988). These changes have deep economic roots in that they
require that: a clear objective function for the school (unity of purpose)
be established; those with de facto property rights exercise those rights
on behalf of children within a framework of incentives and account
ability (school-site empowerment with responsibility); and an appro
priate technology of schooling that will deliver results (building on
strengths) be employed.

Unity of Purpose
Most schools that educate at-risk students seem to lack any central
purpose. In economic terms they are firms without an objective func-
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tion. In this framework, traditional schools are better understood as a
composite of individuals and programs that seem largely disparate and
piecemeal with no central vision. Planning, implementation, and evalu
ation are typically done independently and by different groups. Teach
ers tend to see their responsibilities extending no farther than
maintaining good practices in self-contained classrooms, while reme
dial specialists work in isolation from each other and the regular school
program.
Acceleration requires the establishment and pursuit of a common
vision that serves as a focal point for the efforts of parents, teachers,
staff, and students. The vision of an accelerated school must focus on
bringing children into the mainstream, where they can more fully ben
efit from school experiences and opportunities. The development of
this vision requires the combined efforts and commitment of all parties
involved. Unity of purpose refers to both a vision or dream of what the
school can be and an action plan that will get the school there.
School-site Empowerment
Existing schools for at-risk students are largely dominated by deci
sions made by entities far removed from the school site and classroom.
Federal and state governments and central offices of school districts
have established a compendium of rules, regulations, directives, poli
cies, laws, guidelines, reporting requirements, and "approved" instruc
tional materials that serve to stifle educational decisions and initiative
at local school sites. It is little wonder that administrators, teachers,
parents, and students tend to blame factors "beyond their control" for
the poor educational outcomes of at-risk students. And, as the histori
cal record has shown, compliance with these policies ensures failure,
not success.
Accelerated schools are based on the concept of internal responsibil
ity, in which major decisions that will determine educational outcomes
are made by establishing a collective sense of efficacy and applying the
skills and organization to undertake the changes that are necessary. If
the school is to achieve its vision of educational success, administra
tors, teachers, other staff, parents, and students must participate in
making informed decisions regarding school activities. Important areas
of school-site decisions include some or all of the following: curricu
lum, instructional strategies, instructional materials, personnel, and
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allocation of resources inside of the school. Such decision making
requires active support from the district's central office in the form of
information, technical assistance, staff development, and evaluation, as
well as an overall system of accountability in which the school is
rewarded according to its performance.
Building on Strengths
Schools with large numbers of at-risk students tend to highlight the
weaknesses of their students, staff, funding, administrative support,
and so on, as an explanation for poor performance. A particularly
heavy emphasis is placed on the litany of what is wrong with at-risk
students and their parents. But good pedagogy begins with the
strengths and experiences of participants and builds on those strengths
rather than dwelling on the weaknesses. This means that schools must
shift from a technology of production that has shown consistent failure
to one that has shown superior results.
Accelerated schools seek out the strengths of their students and
other participants and use those strengths as foundations on which to
build their programs. In this respect, students are treated as gifted and
talented students, where strengths are identified which are then used as
a basis for providing enrichment and acceleration. The strengths of atrisk students are often overlooked because they are not as obvious as
those of middle-class students. But our research has shown that at-risk
children bring assets that can be used to accelerate the learning pro
cess. These include interest and curiosity in oral and artistic expres
sion, ability to learn through manipulation of appropriate learning
materials and interesting applications, the capability to delve eagerly
into intrinsically interesting tasks, and a capacity for learning to write
prior to mastering reading skills.
The process of building on strengths is not limited to students.
Accelerated schools also build on the strengths of parents, teachers,
and other school staff. Parents and teachers are largely underutilized
resources in most schools. Because they want their children to succeed,
parents can be powerful allies if they are placed in productive roles and
provided with the skills to work with their children. Teachers bring
gifts of insight, intuition, and organizational acumen to the instruc
tional process, gifts often untapped by the mechanical curricula so typ
ical of remedial programs. Accelerated schools acknowledge the gifts
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of teachers and parents and build on those strengths in fulfilling their
accelerated visions.
Combining the Principles
An accelerated school is not just a conventional school with new
principles or special programs grafted onto it. It is a dynamic environ
ment in which the entire school and its operations are transformed. The
emphasis is on the school as a whole, rather than on a particular grade,
curriculum, staff development approach, or other limited strategies.
The goal is high academic achievement for all students.
The three principles of unity of purpose, site-based empowerment,
and building on strengths are woven together in virtually all the activi
ties of the accelerated school. The school is governed by its staff, stu
dents, and parents, and priorities are pursued by task groups that follow
a systematic inquiry process for problem solving, implementation, and
evaluation.
Accelerated schools use a heavily language-based approach across
all subjects, even mathematics, with an early introduction to writing
and reading for meaning. Curricula reflect a sense of high expectations
and a tie to the students' cultures. Active learning experiences are pro
vided through independent projects, problem solving, and utilizing
new knowledge and skills in concrete situations. By applying academic
concepts and skills to real-life problems and events, students see the
usefulness of what they are learning.
The organization of accelerated schools allows for a broad range of
participants and a collaborative approach in which students' families
play a central role. Indeed, success depends on parents working with
staff and students, helping to make school decisions by participating in
the decision bodies of the school.
Some Results ofAccelerated Schools
The first two accelerated pilot schools were established in 1987 and
have been operating for five years. The total transition from a tradi
tional to an accelerated school takes about six years. Since that time
approximately three hundred additional schools, most of which are ele
mentary schools, with a recent extension to middle schools, have initi-
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ated the transition process. We have found that the transformation to an
accelerated school can be done primarily by reallocating existing
resources to free up staff time and make other provisions for staff
development and accelerated school activities. To my knowledge, none
of these schools has obtained additional funding beyond even 1 percent
of their budgets to pursue accelerated school activities. We believe that
the basic transformation to and operation of an accelerated school can
be done largely within existing resources. It should be noted that most
of the other national educational reforms that have shown success
require an additional cost of about $1,000 per student, in comparison
with about $20 to $30 per student for accelerated schools.
Early results have been extremely promising. The Daniel Webster
School in San Francisco enrolls a student body that is over 90 percent
minority and over 80 percent on public assistance. It was one of the.
bottom elementary schools in San Francisco in 1987, ranking sixtyfifth out of sixty-nine schools with test scores in mathematics. By 1991
the mathematics scores had risen to twenty-third in San Francisco,
among the top third of all schools. Students were performing above
grade level in mathematics at every grade. Test score gains in all three
areas tested—reading, language, and mathematics—were the highest
of all the schools in San Francisco. The Daniel Webster School was the
only school in San Francisco in which both black and Spanish-surname
students made more than a year of academic progress in one academic
year.
The Hollibrook Elementary School in Houston enrolls over one
thousand students, many of them recently arrived immigrants from
Central and South America. About 90 percent of the students are from
families below the poverty line. In 1988 the school's fifth graders were
about two years behind grade level in reading and language arts and
almost half a year behind grade level in mathematics. By the spring of
1991 Hollibrook fifth graders were performing at grade level in all sub
jects and one year above grade level in mathematics (McCarthy and
Still 1993).
Most of the accelerated schools have been established in the last two
years, so it is too early for them to have completed their transforma
tion. Nevertheless, the early results for these schools are also impres
sive, with improved attendance, parent participation, test scores,
student projects, and reduced behavior problems and vandalism.
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Investment in the education of at-risk students has a large payoff, and
we have the wherewithal to use that investment wisely in accelerated
schools. Indeed, those characteristics that make for an efficient firm
can be applied to schools to improve their efficiency substantially.
Given this evidence, it is surprising that many economists immediately
resort to a market approach in looking for economic strategies to
improve the education of at-risk students (Friedman 1962; Levin
1991). Typically, they cite the work of Chubb and Moe (1990) or Hoffer, Greeley, and Coleman (1987), which was reanalyzed by Willms
(1987), who found that students in Catholic schools were able to
achieve as much as a one-tenth of a standard deviation advantage over
similar students in public schools. But accelerated schools have shown
achievement gains of 1.5 standard deviations, or fifteen times that
large, without resorting to a change in educational finance to vouchers
or other systems that would require public funds for private schools.
No comparison between private and public schools has come close to
finding this effect.
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Can Equity Be Separated
from Efficiency
in School Finance Debates?
Eric A. Hanushek
University of Rochester
School finance discussions have concentrated on equity and rest on
a few elementary premises. Poor children, often residing in decaying
cities, do worse in terms of achievement, jobs, and overall success than
children from better environments. Schools are society's designated
institution to remedy this situation—but schools serving the disadvantaged are hampered in this task by a lack of sufficient resources. With
more funding, these schools could put in place the successful programs
that are available, and the cycle of poverty could be broken. It is only
equitable then to support poor schools at the level at which schools for
otherwise more advantaged students are financed. The more recent
variant of the discussion, focusing on an adequacy version of equity,
begins by noting the need for high quality education in order for an
individual to compete successfully in the labor market, and then turns
to a statement of how overall funding for schools must be increased to
provide everybody with acceptable opportunities.
These common arguments are simple, straightforward, and compel
ling. Unfortunately, they are also seriously flawed. The quest for equity
has generally pointed to policies that neither promote greater equity
nor help deal with the serious schooling problems facing the United
States.
For over two decades, courts and legislatures have been embroiled
in debate and controversy over the way in which local public schools
are financed. Interestingly, this has been an area where the states have
completely dominated policy deliberations, and the federal govern
ment has never played an important role. Indeed, as a direct result of
the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in San Antonio Independent School Dis*This is a revised and expanded version of Hanushek 1991.
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trict v. Rodriguez, the court discussion has been conducted exclusively
at the state level. Each state has followed a different course based on
the requirements of its state constitution, the preferences of its citizens
and legislators, and the wisdom of its courts. Nevertheless, while
sometimes obscured by the details of specific state actions, there are
common elements to the school finance policy developments in the
states.
One important lesson learned over time is that school finance court
cases, legislative decisions, and school policies in general are more
complicated than was previously thought. The framework for delibera
tions on school finance reform was developed in the 1960s and given
national attention through the landmark case in California, Serrano v.
Priest. This case, which has been transported elsewhere, set out what is
now the standard argument: 1 (1) Traditional funding of schools, which
relies heavily on local funds raised substantially by property taxes,
leads to large disparities in the education available to rich (suburban)
students and to poor (urban and rural) students; and (2) The inequities
in the quality of schooling resulting from the fiscal system must be cor
rected, and the courts are an obvious route to forcing the legislature to
provide the economically and educationally disadvantaged with better
schools.
An updated version of these arguments is found in Kozol (1991),
where the disparities in schools between some of the nation's best and
worst schools are described in vivid detail. Armed with this descriptive
information, Kozol proceeds directly to the policy conclusion that all
schools should be moved to duplicate the very best, a conclusion that
merges both the equity and the adequacy arguments.
We have now discovered that many of these simplistic views are
misleading, if not just plain wrong. The required actions involve more
fundamental adjustments than merely redirecting funds, and these fun
damental changes are difficult to implement directly from the court or
from the capitol. These complications are addressed in the subsequent
discussion.
This paper considers the overarching public policy issues involved
in searching for improved equity through altering school financing
arrangements, concentrating on the central policy issues that transcend
state boundaries. Moreover, it avoids all consideration of legal theories
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and interpretations that have surrounded the court cases except as they
intersect with larger matters of broader educational policy.
Most school finance discussion, as opposed to school policy discus
sion, has focused almost exclusively on variations in expenditure per
student. A variety of reasons can be cited to explain this emphasis.
First, expenditure levels are easily measured and easily modified by the
court or legislature. Second, it seems reasonable to presume that what a
school can offer in terms of quality or breadth is directly correlated
with the resources devoted to the task. Finally, even if there is some
doubt about how well money is currently being spent, money well
spent would surely make a difference. Each of these premises is rea
sonable if schools are operating efficiently.2 Given efficient school
operation, expenditure is a good index of performance. On the other
hand, if schools are not operating efficiently, the interpretation of
expenditure differences becomes totally ambiguous, because expendi
ture variations need no longer be directly correlated with variations in
school quality. Moreover, added funding of schools may lead to no
gains in student performance.
One fundamental observation underlies the discussion in this paper:
There is no systematic relationship between school expenditure and
student performance. This observation implies a significant level of
inefficiency in schools. Given that, legal arguments and policy deci
sions based on expenditure variations are simply suspect, at least from
an educational perspective. Indeed, many popular changes, both pro
posed and adopted, no longer look like "reform" but instead tend to
move us away from good policy.
School finance discussions have not totally ignored the potential pit
falls of concentrating on expenditure alone. After passing references to
issues of efficiency along with assertions that the research is ambigu
ous,3 pragmatism is frequently claimed as the underlying justification:
expenditure differences appear to be such a reasonable measure of dif
ferences in schools, and they are measurable.4 1 argue later that this
logic is likely to cause serious distortion in policies.
The plan of this paper is straightforward. It begins with a discussion
of the evidence about expenditure and school performance. It then con
siders how this evidence relates to court cases and overall judgments
about a state's schools. It concludes with an examination of how court
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cases, and the related legislative actions, relate to effective policies
toward schools.
What We Know About School Expenditure
Because the interpretation of expenditure differences is so central to
all discussions of school finance, this section provides evidence con
cerning the relationship between expenditure and student perfor
mance.5 It is simply not possible to ignore these data in setting school
policy when the objective is either to improve overall student perfor
mance or advance the cause of true educational equity.

Aggregate Data
Much of the current concern about the performance of our schools is
motivated by the fact that student performance has remained constant
or actually fallen during a period in which school spending has contin
ually increased. Figure 1 illustrates this by superimposing the trend in
student performance on the trend in educational expenditure. Real
expenditure per pupil has risen steadily and dramatically over the past
two decades. Specifically, after allowing for inflation, expenditure per
pupil more than doubled between 1967 and 1991; this corresponds to
about a 3.5 percent compound annual growth rate.6 At the same time,
performance as measured by Scholastic Aptitude Test (SAT) scores fell
to a level significantly below those attained during the mid-1960s.
Moreover, while there was some recovery from the 1979-80 trough,
the improvements of the early 1980s have now ceased.
There are reasons for quibbling about these specific statistics for
both achievement and spending. The measurement of performance by
SAT scores has been questioned because the test does not rely on a rep
resentative sample, because the test-taking population has changed
over time, and because the content of the test itself may have changed.
Analysis of these objections, however, indicates clearly that the
observed achievement decline is not simply an artifact of that specific
test. Further, declines have been registered on a variety of other tests
given over the same time (see Congressional Budget Office 1986,
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1987). Continued international evidence also places U.S. students
behind a surprisingly wide range of foreign students on math and sci
ence performance. For example, in tests of advanced algebra for
twelfth graders in 1982, U.S. students trail students from Hong Kong
to Hungary, bettering only the students from Thailand in fifteen coun
tries sampled (McKnight et al. 1987).7 Thus, there is no doubt that stu
dents are performing worse now than they did in the past, when
spending on schools was noticeably less.
Figure 1
Real School Expenditure and Achievement
1967-1991
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*/Current expenditure in 1992 dollars per student in average daily attendance (ADA).

Similarly, some have argued that the tasks facing schools have
changed over time so that the comparisons of expenditures are not
strictly appropriate. For example, increased expenditure may partly
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reflect attempts to educate more expensive students—handicapped stu
dents, immigrants, and other educationally disadvantaged. Again, how
ever, while these changes in student populations undoubtedly have
some influence on costs, they are insufficient to explain the substantial
aggregate increases that have transpired.
Moreover, it is important to note that the expenditure patterns reflect
a number of underlying adjustments, which mirror common policy rec
ommendations. Pupil-teacher ratios have fallen steadily for the past
three decades. While there were twenty-five students per teacher in
public elementary and secondary schools in 1965, there were fewer
than eighteen in 1985.8 Over the same period, the proportion of teach
ers holding a master's degree or above went from under a quarter to
over half. Median teacher experience also almost doubled, going from
eight years in 1966 to fifteen in 1986.9 The only aggregate input not to
follow this steady pattern is teacher salaries. Real teacher salaries, as
best we can tell, have cycled: average salaries rose through the 1960s,
fell back in the mid to late 1970s, and rose again during the 1980s. 10
The aggregate picture is clear. School spending has increased dra
matically since the mid-1960s, largely through the instituting of poli
cies that educational decision makers have proposed as a way of
improving student performance—reducing class sizes and upgrading
the education and experience of the teaching force. Yet student perfor
mance has actually fallen over the same period.
Individual- and School-Level Analyses

Although research into the determinants of students' achievement
takes various approaches, one of the most appealing and useful is what
economists call the production function approach, or in other disci
plines the input-output or cost-quality approach. In this approach,
attention is focused primarily on the relationship between school out
comes and measurable inputs into the educational process.
The origin of estimating input-output relations in schools is usually
traced to the monumental U.S. study, Equality of Educational Oppor
tunity, or what is more commonly known as the Coleman Report.
Explicitly designed to study equity, this report was the U.S. Office of
Education's response to a requirement of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
to investigate the extent of inequality (by race, religion, or national ori-

Can Equity Be Separated from Efficiency in School Finance Debates? 41

gin) in the nation's schools. The study's fundamental contribution was
to direct attention to the distribution of student performance—the out
puts with which I am concerned here. Instead of addressing questions
of inequality simply by producing an inventory of differences among
schools and teachers according to race and region of the country, the
Coleman Report sought to provide an understanding of which, if any,
of the observed differences in school resources were important for stu
dent learning. This very different perspective—the right one when stu
dent educational performance is the concern—set a standard in the
school policy debate. Unfortunately, in the subsequent financial equity
debate, this important innovation has been largely ignored.
The Coleman Report was widely interpreted as finding that schools
are not very important in determining student achievement. Families
and, to a lesser extent, peers were seen to be the primary determinants
of variations in performance. The findings were clearly controversial
and immediately led to a substantial research effort to compile addi
tional evidence about the relationship between school resources and
school performance.'}
The underlying model guiding the Coleman Report and most subse
quent studies is very straightforward. It postulates that the output of the
educational process—that is, the achievement of students—is related
directly to a series of inputs. Policy makers directly control some of
these inputs—for instance, the characteristics of schools, teachers, and
curricula. Other factors, such as families and friends plus the innate
endowments or learning capacities of the students, generally cannot be
affected by public policy. Further, although achievement is usually
measured at discrete points in time, the educational process is cumula
tive; past inputs affect students' current levels of achievement.
Based upon this model, statistical techniques, typically some form
of regression analysis, are employed to identify the specific determi
nants of achievement and to make inferences about the relative impor
tance of the various inputs into student performance. This summary
highlights the overall findings from the research.
These studies of educational production relationships measure out
put not only by student scores on standardized achievement tests but
also by other quantitative measures, such as student attitudes, school
attendance rates, and college continuation or dropout rates. The gen
eral interpretation is that they are all plausible indicators of future sue-
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cess in the labor market. This interpretation has been confirmed by
other research into labor market outcomes (see review in Hanushek,
Rivkin, and Jamison 1992).
Empirical specifications of production function models have varied
widely in details, but they have also had much in common. Family
inputs tend to be measured by sociodemographic characteristics of the
families, such as parental education, income, and family size. Peer
inputs, when included, are typically aggregate summaries of the socio
demographic characteristics of other students in the school. School
inputs include measures of the teachers' characteristics (education
level, experience, sex, race, and so forth), of the school's organization
(class sizes, facilities, administrative expenditure, and so forth), and of
district or community factors (for example, average expenditure lev
els). Except for the original Coleman Report, most empirical work has
relied on data, such as the normal administrative records of schools,
that were constructed for other purposes.
Empirical Results for Expenditure Effects
The production function approach has been broadly employed to
investigate the impact on school performance of the core factors deter
mining expenditure on education. Instructional expenditure makes up
about two-thirds of total school expenditures. Instructional expenditure
is in turn determined mostly by teacher salaries and class sizes. Finally,
in most U.S. school districts, teacher salaries are directly related to the
years of teaching experience and educational level of the teacher. Thus,
the basic determinants of instructional expenditure in a district are
teacher experience, teacher education, and class size. Most studies,
regardless of what other school characteristics might be included, ana
lyze the effect of these factors on outcomes. (These are also the factors
most likely to be found in any given data set, especially if the data
come from standard administrative records.)
Because the analyses have such common specifications, the effects
of the expenditure parameters can easily be tabulated. Here I present
data from a reasonably exhaustive search that uncovered 187 separate
"qualified studies" found in thirty-eight separate articles or books
through the middle of 1988. 12 These studies, while restricted to public
schools, cover all regions of the United States, different grade levels,
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different measures of performance, and different analytical and statisti
cal approaches. About one-third draw their data from a single school
district, while the remaining two-thirds compare school performance
across multiple districts. A majority of the studies (104) use individual
students as the unit of analysis, whereas the remainder rely upon
aggregate school-, district-, or state-level data. The studies are split
about evenly between primary schooling (grades one through six) and
secondary schooling (grades seven through twelve). Over 70 percent of
the studies measure school performance by some kind of standardized
test. However, those using nontest measures (such as dropout rates,
college continuation, attitudes, or performance after school) are for
obvious reasons concentrated in studies of secondary schooling. There
is no indication that differences in sample and study design lead to dif
ferences in conclusions. 13
According both to conventional wisdom and to generally observed
school policies, each factor should have a positive effect on student
achievement. More education and more experience on the part of the
teacher cost more and are presumed to improve individual student
learning; smaller classes (more teachers per student) are also expected
to be beneficial.14 More spending in general, higher teacher salaries,
better facilities, and better administration should also lead to better stu
dent performance. The quantitative magnitudes of estimated relation
ships are ignored at this point, and attention is focused on the direction
of any estimated effect.
The data in table 1 provide a picture of how well conventional wis
dom and common school policies hold up to analysis. The columns in
the table divide the available estimates by direction of effect and statis
tical significance. Since not all studies contain estimates of each expen
diture component, the first column simply indicates the total number of
estimates available. Thus, for example, 152 of the 187 studies include
an estimate of the effect of teacher-pupil ratios, or class sizes. Of the
152 estimates of the effects of class size, only 27 are statistically sig
nificant. Of these, only 14 show a statistically significant positive rela
tionship, whereas 13 display a negative relationship. 15 An additional
125 estimates show that class size is not significant at the 5 percent
level. 16 Nor does ignoring statistical significance help to confirm the
benefits of small classes, since the insignificant coefficients have the
"wrong" sign by a 46 to 34 margin. 17
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The entries for teacher education tell a similar story. The statistically
significant results are split between positive and negative relationships,
and in a vast majority of cases (100 out of 113) the estimated coeffi
cients are statistically insignificant. Forgetting about statistical signifi
cance and looking just at estimated signs again does not make a case
for the importance of added schooling for teachers. 18
Table 1. Summary of the Estimated Relationship Between Student
Performance and Various Components of School Expenditure
(187 studies)
Number Statistically
Statistically insignificant
significant
of
- Unknown
studies
Input
+
Total
+
46
45
152
13
Teacher/pupil
14
125
34
Teacher
32
education
113
100
31
37
8
5
Teacher
15
experience
140
44
31
10
40
90
Teacher salary
Expenditure/
pupil
Administrative
input
Facilities

69

11

4

54

16

14

24

65

13

3

49

25

13

11

61
74

7
7

1
5

53
62

14
17

15
14

24
31

SOURCE: Hanushek (1989).

Teacher experience is slightly different. A clear majority of esti
mated coefficients point in the expected direction, and about 29 percent
of the estimated coefficients are both statistically significant and of the
conventionally expected sign. But these results only appear strong rela
tive to the other school inputs; they are hardly overwhelming in an
absolute sense. Moreover, they are subject to interpretive questions.
Specifically, these positive correlations may result from senior teachers
having the ability to locate themselves in schools and classrooms with
good students. In other words, causation may run from achievement to
experience and not the other way around.
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Overall, the results are startlingly consistent. No compelling evi
dence emerges that teacher-pupil ratios, teacher education, or teacher
experience have the expected positive effects on student achievement.
There is no reason for confidence that hiring teachers with more educa
tion or having smaller classes will improve student performance. Evi
dence of the effect of teacher experience appears marginally more
convincing, at least when no consideration is given to the magnitude of
any relationship.
The remaining rows of table 1, summarizing information on other
expenditure components, including administration, facilities, teacher
salaries, and total expenditure per student,19 provide poorer evidence
on the relationship of resources and performance, but what evidence
does exist is consistent with the previous results. The quality of admin
istration is measured in a wide variety of ways, ranging from character
istics of the principal to noninstructional expenditure per pupil.
Similarly, the quality of facilities is identified through spending and
many specific physical characteristics. If only because of the prepon
derance of positive signs among the significant coefficients, adminis
tration appears marginally stronger in its relationship to student
achievement than facilities. Nevertheless, the available evidence on
both again fails to support convincingly the conventional wisdom.
Finally, and not surprisingly, explicit measures of teacher salaries
and expenditure per student do not indicate that they play an important
role in determining achievement. 20 After all, the underlying compo
nents of these expenditures were themselves unrelated to achievement.
While negative expenditure effects—in which funds are not only
unproductive but also harmful—are difficult to interpret, it is much
easier to believe that differences in spending have little or no impact on
student performance.
Without systematic tabulation of the results of the various studies, it
would be easy to conclude that the findings are inconsistent. But there
is a consistency, though it does not match the conventional wisdom.
The research reveals no strong or systematic relationship between
school expenditure and student performance. This is the case both
when expenditures are decomposed into their underlying determinants
and when they are considered in the aggregate. 21
Given the general biases toward the publication of statistically sig
nificant estimates, the paucity of results confirming the conventional
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wisdom is notable. The common calculation of statistical significance
is inappropriate when a series of sequential tests of alternative formu
lations of the achievement relationship is conducted. A sequential
approach built on the calculated statistical tests will yield biased esti
mates of significance. In reality, too many estimated parameters will be
judged to be significant. 22
These results reflect the structure and operating procedures of
schools observed in existing settings. A different organizational struc
ture with different incentives could produce very different results. For
example, almost every economist would support the position that
increasing teacher salaries would expand and improve the pool of
potential teachers. However, whether this improves the quality of
teaching depends on whether or not schools can systematically choose
and retain the best teachers from the pool. The results on salary differ
entials presented previously might be very different if schools faced a
greater incentive to produce student achievement and if mechanisms
for teacher selection were altered. In other words, there seems little
question that money could count. It just does not systematically do so
with the current organization of schools.
Moreover, the consistency criterion used to judge the results and the
potential for policy improvements does not suggest that money never
counts. The results are entirely compatible with the notion that some
schools use funds effectively and others do not. But unless some way is
found to change the districts that would squander additional funds into
districts that would use them effectively, added resources are not likely
to lead to any improvement in average performance. Good uses of
funds are balanced by bad uses within the current structure.
Other Inputs into Education
Since the publication of the Coleman Report, intense debate has sur
rounded the fundamental question of whether schools and teachers are
at all important to the educational performance of students. The Cole
man Report has been commonly interpreted as finding that variations
in school resources explain only a negligible portion of the variation in
student achievement. If this were true, it would not matter which par
ticular teacher a student had or which school a student attended—a
conclusion that most people would have difficulty accepting.
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The findings of direct analyses of differences among teachers are
unequivocal and indicate a very different conclusion: teachers and
schools differ dramatically in their effectiveness. A number of studies
provide analyses of the differential effectiveness of teachers and
schools based on estimation of the average gain in performance of each
teacher's (or school's) students. 23 These studies confirm that there are
striking differences in teacher performance as measured by average
gain in student achievement.
The faulty impressions about the nonimportance of teachers and
schools left by the Coleman Report and a number of subsequent stud
ies are the result of a confusion between measures of effectiveness and
true effectiveness itself. In other words, existing measures of the char
acteristics of teachers and schools are seriously flawed and thus are
poor indicators of true effectiveness; when these measurement errors
are avoided, schools are seen to have important effects on student per
formance.
These input-output analyses have also investigated a wide variety of
other school and nonschool factors. Although it is difficult to be spe
cific in any summary of other factors because the specifications of the
various inputs employed in the statistical analyses vary widely, three
generalizations are possible. First, family background is clearly very
important in explaining differences in achievement. Second, while
considerable attention has been given to the characteristics of peers or
other students within schools, the findings about their effects are
ambiguous. Finally, studies have examined many additional measures
of the effects of schools, teachers, curricula, and especially instruc
tional methods on achievement, but no simple characterization of good
teachers emerges.24
While not systematically addressed by existing research, one plausi
ble interpretation of the combined results of these studies is that an
important element of "skill" is involved in being a successful teacher.25
Skill refers simply to the ability of some teachers to promote higher
achievement among their students. The evidence previously presented
then indicates that it is currently impossible to identify, much less to
measure, components or elements of this skill with any precision.
Moreover, the direct evidence casts doubt on whether any form of
teacher training course could be organized to foster high skill levels in
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teachers. In simplest terms, if we cannot define or measure it, how can
we teach it?
Implications for Equity and School Finance Reform
I now turn to the application of this evidence to consideration of
school finance reform. Here I sketch some obvious and some less obvi
ous implications of the preceding findings. Again, while school finance
policy frequently contains many state-specific nuances, this discussion
concentrates on two common elements of "reform." Most school
finance reform programs, based on simplistic equity notions, assume
that a basic objective is to limit local variations in school expenditure
or, if variations are to exist, to insure that such variations are not
related to the property wealth of the district.
The Central Implication
The evidence on school performance indicates that variations in
school expenditure are exceedingly poor measures of the variations in
education provided to students. Most directly, when students' learning
is the concern, the conventional evidence about inter-district disparities
in spending does not identify where educational deficiencies are to be
found, and such evidence is generally irrelevant for either an equal pro
tection or an educational disparity court case.26 Such evidence about
expenditure simply does not indicate differential provision of educa
tion. Therefore, showing how expenditures vary, either absolutely or in
accordance with characteristics of districts and students, does not have
much use.
We must be quite precise about the interpretation of expenditure. As
previously noted, most economists, including myself, would readily
accept that differences in spending would be directly related to the
education provided if schools were operating efficiently. The previ
ously presented evidence indicates clearly, however, that assuming
efficiency in spending is entirely inappropriate.
While there are many alternative ways to define and measure educa
tional equity, only the most narrow of these would call for paying
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attention to expenditure variations in the face of the evidence that such
expenditure variations are unrelated to the education provided. The
standard employed would have to be a rigid one linked to dollars, with
total disregard for the quality of schooling received by students.
In other words, equity and efficiency are inextricably linked. It is not
possible to ignore efficiency issues under the guise of being concerned
solely with equity.
Other Implications
There is another side to this discussion: What is likely to happen if
we disregard the evidence on the interpretation of expenditure differ
ences and simply make policy on the basis of expenditure differences?
This consideration is prompted by a few arguments that are sometimes
heard, such as: "The educational problem of the poor is serious, and
equalizing expenditure cannot hurt;" or "We should at least give every
one the same chance to make mistakes." The policies flowing from
such notions do, unfortunately, have a down side to them.
First, a likely reaction to any move to lessen variation in expenditure
is to increase the total level of expenditure on schools. The reason is
simple: a state legislature, faced with a need to alter expenditure pat
terns, finds it much easier to redistribute a larger pie than a fixed pie. In
the school finance debate, this is frequently referred to as "leveling
up," or bringing the low-spending districts up to the spending levels of
the top districts. The arguments behind the policy are generally based
either on the need to do better or on pure political necessity. On the
other hand, because of the potential for disruption and the obvious
divisiveness of "leveling down," there is seldom much interest in this
idea. The previous evidence indicates, however, that added funds will
on average be dissipated on things that do not improve student
achievement (at least unless other, larger changes are also made).
Teachers, administrators, and perhaps taxpayers in some districts gain
ing funds will probably be happier, but the average state taxpayer and
parent will not find that the resulting changes do much more than
increase tax bills.
Second, there is no assurance that the new funds will go to the
schools of poor children. As indicated previously, one of the pervasive
views of finance "reform" is that poor children will be helped (or at
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least will have a better chance by virtue of greater funding). However,
reform schemes designed to follow district wealth patterns can lead to
unexpected outcomes because frequently there is not a strong relation
ship between district wealth and the concentration of student poverty.
Some states find that wealthier districts in terms of property wealth per
student also have concentrations of poorer families and children. New
York State provides a good illustration. Consider the six largest cities
in New York State: New York City, Buffalo, Rochester, Yonkers, Syra
cuse, and Albany. Albany and Yonkers have tax bases in which real
property per student is greater than the state average; New York City,
Rochester, and Syracuse have tax bases per student only slightly below
the state average; and Buffalo is left with a tax base 30 percent below
the state average. Yet all of these districts except Yonkers have poverty
rates for children above the state average. For example, while the aver
age poverty rate in New York State for children 18 or younger in 1980
was 19 percent, it was over 36 percent in New York City and over 30
percent in Buffalo.27 The largest districts in the state intervened (unsuc
cessfully) on the side of the plaintiffs in the Levittown case and intro
duced a new argument, municipal overburden,28 in order to protect
their funding. In other states, property wealth and poverty may be neg
atively correlated—that is, high property wealth tends to be found in
districts with a small poverty population, but even in these states the
overall pattern clearly does not hold jurisdiction by jurisdiction. 29
Therefore, while not inevitable, it is likely that many districts serving
poor children are hurt in spending terms by plans to neutralize expen
diture on the basis of district wealth. Moreover, because of a combina
tion of federal and state grants, districts with concentrations of poor
students frequently have above average spending, regardless of their,
property wealth or overall economic health. 30 Programs to limit varia
tions in expenditure could operate to cut back existing compensatory
spending for disadvantaged students.
Third, spending differences may not even accurately reflect the real
resources each district is able to deliver (i.e., the actual educational
inputs). This is the simple result of possible cost differentials facing
individual districts. That is, if districts face different prices for things
they might buy, from teachers to buildings and equipment, dollar varia
tions themselves do not indicate variations in available real resources.
As a simple example, if the schools in one city were less pleasant and
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desirable than those in other cities, it would be necessary to pay a
higher salary to hire a teacher of equal quality.31 An extension of this
notion involves districts faced with concentrations of students who are
more difficult to educate because of a variety of pre-existing educa
tional deficiencies. These, like cost differences for inputs, lead to
expenditure variations in districts behaving in an otherwise identical
manner. (Indeed, many state funding formulae recognize such issues
and attempt to adjust for input cost differences or for differences in stu
dent preparation, handicap status, and the like, even though the magni
tude of any real cost differences is poorly understood).
Fourth, districts themselves are not entities to which educational
policies should be geared. Individuals choose among districts when
they enter an area and move among districts after they live in an area.
In fact, there is extensive evidence that individuals make choices
among districts in part to satisfy their demands for various public ser
vices. Some people who place considerable weight on schooling search
for districts that seem to emphasize quality schooling. Others who
emphasize other goods or even low public expenditure seek districts
that provide an agreeable level and pattern of the services they are
looking for. Certainly this system has some drawbacks. Moving can be
expensive, and some might find it difficult to move to the districts they
would like, for example, because of housing prices, commuting costs,
or discrimination. Nevertheless, the fundamental fact for this discus
sion is that individuals generally have considerable latitude in choos
ing schools. They are not inextricably tied to a particular district and
are not doomed to whatever expenditure levels currently exist in a spe
cific district. Finally, individual districts change their expenditure in
line with the desires of the population and with population shifts, so
that districts may increase or decrease their expenditure over time. For
example, it is possible to trace the movement of district expenditure in
the State of Indiana between 1977 and 1987. Only forty-three of the
seventy-six top spending districts in 1977 remained in the top quartile
in 1987; only forty-two of the seventy-six bottom quartile districts
remained there from 1977 through 1987. Thus, policy discussions that
speak generally of the population as captives of districts with undesir
able spending patterns tend to miss an extremely important feature of
the political economy of local jurisdictions. (The special problems of
"mobility-constrained" groups, such as the poor, are discussed below).
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Fifth, the preferences and movements of citizens across district
boundaries have direct ramifications for the observed distribution of
property wealth. Specifically, districts that appear to offer a particularly
favorable tax and school quality package will appear relatively attrac
tive to many people. This will lead to a bidding up of housing prices in
such desirable jurisdictions, because they are in demand, other things
being equal. In fact, it is well documented that "otherwise identical"
houses will sell for different amounts because of citizens' evaluations
of the taxes and the schooling being offered. (See Tiebout 1956, Gates
1969, Rosen and Fullerton 1977, and Wendling 1981). Another way of
saying this is that some people pay for their schooling up front through
the capitalization of school advantages into the price of homes. Some
places that initially look attractive from the vantage point of the tax
rate alone are really less attractive because the low rate is multiplied
times a high valuation (relative to the other attributes of the home).
This has, among other things, a direct effect on the property tax base of
the community—something that is often entered into the discussion of
the "inequities" of the school finance system. Moreover, reform
changes in the funding formula of the state imply distributing some
what arbitrary capital gains and losses across the jurisdictions in the
state. Some places will be made more fiscally attractive and some less
by major changes in the financing laws, leading to changes in the capi
talization of fiscal differences.
Sixth, in most states spending levels reflect a wide variety of things,
including the preferences of the citizens. While it is common to argue
that local property wealth is the primary determinant of expenditure
differences, that simply is not the case. For example, even though New
Jersey and Indiana have relied on local property taxes to fund schools,
rough estimates indicate that less than a fifth of the variation in expen
diture would be eliminated by totally equating local property wealth
per student. 32 A combination of local preferences, differences in stu
dent needs, curricular choices, cost differentials, and a variety of other
factors completely dominate property wealth in the determination of
the pattern of expenditure.
Seventh, differences in tax rates across communities bear no direct
relationship to the degree of educational equity. Most importantly,
school finance reform has been based on perceived differences in the
quality of education available, and the quality of education is not
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related in any simple way to tax rates. The tax rate provides an indica
tion of the price that residents face to raise funds for schools, and high
tax rates might indicate that some districts find it more difficult than
others to raise funds through the property tax. But tax rates differ
according to a variety of factors, including community preferences,
community income and wealth, the amount of nonresidential wealth in
the tax base, and so forth. The pattern of tax rates may be an issue from
the standpoint of various notions of "taxpayer equity," but tax rates sel
dom have much to do with considerations of equity in education. Fur
ther, while the education clauses of state constitutions may require
states to provide certain levels of education, they never indicate that
school tax rates must be equalized across a state.
This list of likely ramifications underscores the point that simple
alterations in expenditure patterns can have consequential and undesir
able effects. What is already known about the educational process and
about behavior of local jurisdictions leads to the inescapable conclu
sion suggested in my introduction: the general assumptions behind
early school finance reform are misleading at best.
Magnitude of Expenditure Effects

The evidence presented in Table 1 did indicate that a majority of
studies found a positive relationship between aggregate expenditure
and student performance, albeit few statistically significant relation
ships. While this finding might suggest a potential for equity improve
ment by means of adding resources to low-spending districts, moving
to such policy deliberations requires consideration of the magnitude of
any expenditure effects. Specifically, how much could achievement in
low-spending districts be altered by an infusion of new resources?
Two alternative estimates, representing very different circum
stances, illustrate why the magnitude of performance change associ
ated with expenditure increases must enter into policy considerations.
First, Wendling and Cohen (1981) conducted a study of expenditure
effects in 1977-78 in New York State, the state with the second highest
rate of spending (behind Alaska) during that year.33 Second, new evi
dence for 1991 from the State of Alabama, with the 46th highest
spending rate in 1990, provides information about expenditure rela
tionships at low levels of expenditure.
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New York has consistently been at or near the top of spending on
schools across all states. Its average expenditure in 1978 was 45 per
cent above the average for the country. Wendling and Cohen (1981)
examine whether or not expenditure differences among districts in
New York matter for student achievement, and they conclude that
indeed expenditure is important. They analyze average third-grade
reading and mathematics achievement for 1,021 districts. While they
examine various model formulations and different groupings of dis
tricts,34 the results for the entire state are representative and provide a
clear indication of how expenditure relates to student performance.
The estimated effect of approved operating expenditure35 on student
performance is uniformly statistically significant, but the magnitude of
the estimates shows the difference between statistical significance and
policy significance. The estimated expenditure parameters are .001 and
.002 for third-grade reading and mathematics performance, respec
tively. This implies that a $1,000 increase in expenditure per student
yields an additional point on the reading test and an additional two
points on the mathematics test. While absolute scores are difficult to
interpret, some idea of magnitude can be gained by looking at move
ment in the distribution of spending and performance. An increase of
$1,000 is a 50 percent increase in state school spending and is 2.2 stan
dard deviations in expenditure within the sample of schools, but it
yields an increase in performance of only .2 to .3 standard deviations.
This is equivalent to moving the average student up to around the sixti
eth percentile or to moving a student starting at the 10th percentile to
the 15th percentile. In simple terms, attempting to increase perfor
mance through simple increases in expenditure is very expensive.
Alabama is a relatively low-spending state, falling at the other end
of the distribution from New York State. The state's highest-spending
district in 1991 (Mountain Brook) had total current expenditure per
student of $5,113. This is slightly below the mean level for the entire
nation in 1991, for which the preliminary estimates are $5,237. The
minimum spending in Alabama was about $2,900 per student. Thus,
variations in spending in Alabama should provide some insight into
whether or not there exists some threshold expenditure below which
changes in spending have strong and noticeable effects on achieve
ment—the issue that comes up in discussions of "adequacy" (Celis
1992).
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The statistical analysis attempts to explain variations across districts
in Alabama's Basic Competency Tests (BCTs). These are criterion-ref
erenced tests adopted by the state board of education to measure
whether or not students are accomplishing what was expected of them
according to the curriculum for different grade and subject areas (read
ing, mathematics, and language arts). The performance measure is the
percentage of a district's students meeting the minimum standards for
the specific tests ("passing"). 36 Weighted least squares regression anal
ysis is employed to estimate the effect of current expenditure per stu
dent in average daily attendance (ADA) on performance, while holding
constant the influence of family background and school district type
(i.e., city or county district). 37
The results of estimates for the State of Alabama can be easily sum
marized. Table 2 presents the estimated expenditure effects. None of
the nine estimated relationships is statistically significant at the 5 per
cent level, and one is even negative. 38
Table 2. Estimated Change in BCT Pass Rate for Expenditure Increase
of $1,000 per Student in Average Daily Attendance (ADA):
______Alabama, 1990-91___________________________
Read
gr3

Change in
percent
passing
t -ratio

0.568
0.51

Read
gr6

0.119
0.07

Read
gr9

2.733
1.95

Test and Grade
Math Math Math
gr 3
gr 6
gr9

2562
1.70

0.423
0.19

1.574
0.78

Lang
gr 3

Lang
gr 6

1.656 -0.133
1.00 -0.07

Lang
gr 9

2.565
1.54

NOTE: Estimates are the weighted least squares regression estimates of the determinants of per
cent passing the Alabama Basic Competency Test (BCT) for different subject areas and grades
for 127 school districts in 1990-91 (Hoover and Mt. Brook excluded). Estimates equations
include percent of students receiving free or reduced lunch; percent nonwhite; city school dis
trict indicator; and current expenditure per ADA. Weights are the number of students in average
daily attendance.
Abbreviations:
ADA: per student in Average Daily Attendance
BCT: Basic Competency Test

Table 3 presents the results of two alternative policy scenarios. The
first brings all of the spending of districts below the median in the state
up to the median. The second,, which is sometimes called "full leveling

Table 3. Predicted Change in State Pass Rates from Increased Spending: Alabama Districts, 1990-91
A. Partial leveling-up by bringing all low-spending districts to median (cost=$74 million)
Reading
Mathematics
Language
grade 3 grade 6 grade 9 grade 3 grade 6 grade 9 grade 3 grade 6 grade 9
1990-91 pass
rate
81.3
64.3
73.1
78.8
59.4
43.8
73.2
59.7
52.2
Change in pass
rate
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.0
0.2
0.2
-0.0
0.3
Projected pass
rate
81.4
64.3
73.4
79.1
59.4
44.0
73.4
59.7
52.5
B. Full leveling-up by bringing all districts to top (cost=$1.05 billion)
1990-91 pass
rate
81.3
64.3
73.1
78.8
59.4
43.8
73.2
59.7
52.2
Change in pass
rate
0.9
0.2
4.2
4.0
0.7
2.4
2.6
-0.2
4.0
Projected pass
rate
82.2
64.5
77.3
82.8
60.1
46.2
75.8
59.5
56.2
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up," brings all districts up to the level of the highest spending district
in the state. Bringing all states to the median expenditure level would
cost an additional $74 million (compared to total spending of $2.4 bil
lion). While this increase of 3 percent is not a large relative change in
expenditure, the top panel of table 3 indicates that it would yield
imperceptible changes in performance on most of the tests. The bottom
panel provides estimates of the achievement effects of full leveling
up—i.e., bringing all district spending up to that of Mountain Brook.
Such a policy would cost $1.05 billion and would yield at most a 4 per
centage point increase in students passing the BCT in the state. The net
impact of leveling up is shown in figure 2.
Figure 2
Alabama Performance with Leveling-Up

r»ad-3

read-6

read-9

math-3

math-6

math-9

lang-3

lang-6

lang-9

Test and Grade

Actual 1990-91

Added Achievement

The importance of these results is clear. A policy of bringing all dis
tricts to the top in spending would place Alabama schools at approxi
mately the mean for the nation, up dramatically from its current
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position in the national distribution of spending. But this increase of
the state's school spending by over one-third would have very small
effects on aggregate school performance, at least if the schools behave
in a way consistent with current practice. The resulting performance
would remain very far below the state's goals of a 95 percent passing
rate on the separate BCT tests.
There is also no evidence from analyzing the schools of Alabama
that there exists a minimum threshold for school spending. There is no
apparent range of stronger influence of spending on achievement than
is found for the entire set of schools.

Policy Alternatives

Concerns about the implications of school finance reform do not, of
course, vitiate the undeniable need to improve our public schools. The
deplorable conditions described in Kozol (1991) require addressing.
The intentions of finance reformers have been, in my opinion, good.
Only their approach is questionable. Three general factors lead to the
judgment that structural change is essential. First, in absolute terms
students are not performing up to expectations. Performance, as mea
sured by standardized tests over time, international comparisons of
tests, various measures of workplace performance, and common per
ceptions, is currently unacceptable. Second, as indicated by the previ
ous evidence, there is overwhelming evidence that the resources
devoted to schools—which have been both large and increasing-have
not been effectively used. Third, the significantly skewed distribution
of educational success, which leaves poor and minority students
behind the rest of the population, is incompatible with most people's
views on the goals of our society.
The previous sections of this paper indicate why "reform" as com
monly included in school finance considerations is unlikely to address
any of these causes of concern. The primary focus on the distribution
of state financial aid or the limits on local fiscal options distracts atten
tion from the issues of school organization, incentives for perfor
mance, and the goals of the system. Because of the contentiousness of
issues surrounding the distribution of funds, school finance debates
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have the potential for absorbing all energy related to school policy.
Thus, in addition to generally offering few solutions to the problems
previously identified, there is a significant opportunity cost in stalling
some of the fundamental restructuring that must proceed if we are to
deal with the current problems of schools. This problem of distraction,
of course, is not inevitable, but there are strong forces pushing in that
direction.
The concentration of courts and legislatures on finance reform while
skirting away from more fundamental policy considerations does fol
low a certain logic. Expenditures are readily measurable; there is a
plausible argument behind their importance; there is no obvious alter
native focus of policy; and operating on expenditure at least represents
doing something. In other words, there are serious problems, and it is
perceived that at least some attempt to remedy them should be under
taken.
This logic is supported by the lack of convincing evidence that any
specific approaches or policies will bring about significant improve
ments in student performance. As reviewed previously, no set of sim
ple changes involving either resources or programs shows a
consistently strong relationship with performance.
But that is just the problem. Concentrating solely on dollars or
resources does not confront the basic structural problems in the opera
tions of schools. For example, while Jonathan Kozol (1991) points to
the lack of achievement of impoverished students and calls for
increased funding, he ignores the fact that the increased funding will
be administered by the same school boards and administrators that he
railed against in Death at an Early Age (Kozol 1967). An alternative
approach, which suffers from many of the same problems, is to argue
that additional funds would not be utilized in old unproductive ways
but would be used in highly directed ways that insured achievement.
This approach is often accompanied by the description of a specific
program that has been shown to work in the few places where it has
been tried. The problem, of course, is that we really do not know in
general terms what will work, and the successful programs that have
been identified have not been broadly introduced by districts with the
funds to do so (for example, through general federal compensatory
education funding or more generous local support). There is simply no
reason to believe that a centrally directed system of increased funding
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relying on the simple identification of productive programs or spend
ing patterns would be more productive than what has been currently
observed.
An alternative formulation of educational policies avoids the pitfalls
of previous approaches and offers considerably more promise of
improvement. The alternative is moving to organizations and incentive
systems that directly reward performance. The current set of policies,
almost exclusively pursued, involves providing or requiring certain
inputs—expenditures, class sizes, teacher attributes, and the like.
These input policies are essentially pursued and continued without
regard to their effectiveness, either in the aggregate or in specific
instances. The proposed alternative is to concentrate on student perfor
mance instead of factors thought (or hoped) to be important in deter
mining student performance.
Various systems have been used or suggested to promote perfor
mance-based policies, including merit pay for teachers, merit awards
for schools that perform well, and a variety of plans emphasizing
choices among educational institutions. Essentially, the common ingre
dient of such plans is that resources are directly related to performance:
if performance is high, resources are high; if performance is low,
resources are commensurately low. For example, merit pay for teach
ers operates by increasing salaries of those who perform well and not
of those who perform poorly. Similarly, choice plans, which operate by
allowing students and parents to choose among alternative schools,
work by reinforcing parental judgments about quality schools, with
suitable flows of resources to the schools that attract students.
The orientation of these policies is based on finding the correct
incentives. If tangible incentives for improved performance are
offered, most decision making can be expected to improve. Actual
operations of hiring, promotion, curriculum, student placement, and
the like—while not specified or regulated by a central authority—can
be expected to respond to incentives. This has been demonstrated by
wide-ranging research, both in education and elsewhere. Determining
effective incentives, however, will take experimentation, bargaining,
and evaluation.
There are many different versions of these performance-based
plans, particularly of the choice plans. Commonly discussed choice
plans range from magnet or special schools (which are fairly wide-
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spread in some urban districts) to full vouchers, which provide parents
with funds to pay tuition at either public or private schools of their
choice. Between these extremes are free choice within public school
districts, open enrollment in any public school in the state, and tuition
tax credits to rebate a portion of any tuition payments to the parents.
Performance-based options have been discussed widely and will not
be reviewed here (see Chubb and Hanushek 1990). Instead I will
merely highlight two features. Each option has conceptually appealing
elements. And there is little historical evidence for each option that
would provide details of either how it should be implemented or the
magnitude of gains that might be expected. In other words, there is also
considerable uncertainty, particularly about details of implementation,
because these approaches are largely untried. The uncertainty should
not, however, be taken as a reason for avoiding them but should dictate
a more interactive approach to policy making instead. Moreover, as
indicated, each performance-based option has considerable appeal,
especially as an option to the almost universally employed input poli
cies that have had such a dismal record.
The performance-based view of educational policy is very different
from the current view of how to make policy. It also is not very amena
ble to the simple remedies and simple tracking of responses so appeal
ing within a court context. Nevertheless, for all its messiness and
uncertainty, it offers some realistic hopes for improvement—some
thing that is absent from narrow decisions on expenditure and other
inputs.
The use of performance-based plans is supported by the research
into educational performance reviewed above. This research indicated
extremely large and significant variations in the performance of indi
vidual teachers and schools. It is also very important to reiterate here
that research has concentrated on the value-added of teachers and not
on absolute performance levels of students. The research demonstrates
that there can be low value-added in a "good" suburban school where
the absolute level of achievement is quite high. Similarly, there can be
high value-added within "bad" central city schools where students
come to school quite unprepared but leave with marked increases in
their achievement (see, for example, Hanushek 1992). While research
cannot identify the components of successful and unsuccessful teach
ing, it supports the simple but powerful notion that good performance
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can be identified by school administrators (see Murnane 1975 and
Armor et al. 1976). Further, if this capacity can be extended to individ
ual parents—who frequently at least act as if they can tell the differ
ence between good and bad teachers—the groundwork for
performance-based policies is established.
The overall point is straightforward: a range of effective policies
appears to be available. They are, however, almost certainly very dif
ferent from the traditional policy focus and the orientation of tradi
tional school finance "reform" efforts. Moreover, instituting some of
these fundamental reforms might take added funds, particularly in the
implementation and learning phases. There is a huge difference, as
should be clear, between expenditures directly linked to improved
incentives and student performance and expenditures made in the
hopes that something good will happen.
Finally, the restructuring of incentives in schools appears to be the
only feasible answer to dealing with the gloomy record schools have in
improving the performance of educationally and economically disadvantaged youth. Various input-oriented programs have been mounted
to deal with the disadvantaged, including a large portion of all federal
spending on schools, but there is little evidence that this has had much
impact. The alternative to restructuring incentives as proposed here is
to continue to expand the programs that have thus far been unsuccessfiil.
The evidence from past analyses demonstrates that good teachers
exist in what are commonly thought to be bad urban districts. Their
existence, however, is masked by generally low achievement levels;
that is, even though an individual teacher may elicit more than one
year of achievement growth within a one-year period, low absolute
levels of performance could hide it. The policy problem is that we have
not been able to attract, to identify, and retain sufficiently large num
bers of such good teachers so as to have the kind of influence that is
needed. This is just the appeal of performance-based incentive
schemes. They are designed to reinforce good performance. We
should, at the same time, not have overly optimistic expectations. As
has been thoroughly documented, family influences are very powerful
in determining achievement levels; so while specific teachers might
have a substantial influence on achievement, they might not immedi
ately overcome the deficits arising from factors outside the schools.
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Indeed, it may take the continued efforts of many good teachers over
the course of the student's school career. This reality, however, should
not deter our efforts to provide the best possible education.

Conclusions
School finance reform, as commonly espoused in courts and legisla
tures across the country, is likely to work against the very improve
ments most needed in public schools. By its nature, emphasizing
primarily the distribution of expenditure per student, financing reform
is almost certain to exacerbate existing problems of inefficiency in
school operation.
Discussions of school finance reform typically attempt to separate
considerations of efficiency from issues of "equity." Such a distinction
is impossible, however, if the definition of equity involves the learning
of children, which depends directly on the ability of school districts to
translate resources into student achievement. If schools are ineffective
at this task, little can be done to improve equity in student performance
by simply heaping more resources on poorly performing districts.
Research into the relationship between resources and student perfor
mance, conducted over the past quarter century, has demonstrated con
clusively that, within the current organization and operation of
schools, there is no consistent relationship between resources and stu
dent performance. Common policy proposals—ones that are used to
justify pleas for added resources to school districts—simply are not
supported by evidence about their performance within schools.
Ignoring the evidence on performance is likely to worsen the prob
lems of performance and inefficiency. The current incentive structure
in schools does not promote efficient use of resources. Therefore, while
additional funds might be used effectively by some districts, other dis
tricts will probably use them ineffectively—which, if past history is a
guide, leads to no aggregate improvement in performance from
increased funds.
Large differences in performance exist among teachers and schools.
Past evidence further indicates that parents and administrators can
identify the best and worst among these. What is missing is an effec-
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live structure for channeling knowledge about performance into over
all improvement in the schools. A variety of mechanisms for this have
been proposed; although there is little operational experience with
them, the key to each is that resources are more directly linked to per
formance of the schools. This is an entirely different perspective from
what has been found in most discussions of school finance reform,
which gives no weight to student performance in making resource allo
cations.
NOTES
1. See, for example, Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970) or Wise (1968).
2. The term "efficient" here is used in the economist's sense of obtaining the maximum possi
ble performance from any given expenditure of resources. This definition is very different from
that which appears to have been employed in a number of legal arguments emanating from state
constitutional requirements to provide an efficient system of public schools.
3. See, for example. Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970, p. 29) where they discuss Ribich
(1968). They state, "Ribich's painstaking analyses suggest, if anything, a variety of sometimes
conflicting relationships between cost and purely economic benefits from added dollar incre
ments." They go on to indicate, "There are similar studies suggesting stronger positive conse
quences from dollar increments, and there are others suggesting only trivial consequences, but the
basic lesson to be drawn from the experts at this point is the current inadequacy of social science
to delineate with any clarity the relation between cost and quality. We are unwilling to postpone
reform while we await the hoped-for refinements in methodology which will settle the issue" (p.
30).
4. For example, after discussing the difficulty of employing alternative measures of real
resource differences (such as education levels of teachers), Coons, Clune, and Sugarman (1970, p.
26) state: "We have no stomach for such an imbroglio. Ultimately we will need a standard appro
priate to the rigors of judicial proof, and the only convincingly quantifiable item in the spectrum is
money available for the general task of education in each district."
5. This section draws extensively on the presentation in Hanushek (1989) which in turn
updates previous analyses in Hanushek (1981, 1986).
6. Current expenditures per student are deflated by the consumer price index. See Digest of
Education Statistics, 1989, tables 88 and 114, and updates.
7. On the other hand, evidence from international tests in 1964 suggest that U.S. students have
historically done relatively poorly (Husen 1967).

8. Digest of Education Statistics, 1988, table 51.
9. Moreover, only 3 percent of teachers in 1986 were in their first year of teaching (Digest of
Education Statistics, 1988, table 54). The aging and stagnation of the teaching force have, how
ever, been the subject of separate concerns.
10. The teacher salary data over time that are normally cited are provided by the National
Education Association, and the sample and reliability of these are unknown (Digest of Education
Statistics, 1988, table 57). An alternative source, the decennial population censuses, indicates
smooth increases in salaries of teachers by decade, but these fall relative to annual earnings of all
college graduates. See Hanushek, Rivkin, and Jamison (1992).
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11. There were also extensive analyses of the report's methodology and of the validity of its
inferences. See, for example, Bowles and Levin (1968), Cain and Watts (1970), and Hanushek
and Kain (1972).
12. A qualified study was defined as a production function estimate that: (1) is published in a
book or refereed journal; (2) relates some objective measure of student output to characteristics of
the family and the schools attended; and (3) provides information about the statistical significance
of estimated relationships. Note that a given publication can contain more than one estimated pro
duction function by considering different measures of output, different grade levels, or different
samples of students (but different specifications of the same basic sample and outcome measure
count as only one study). Search procedures for articles involved using the national educational
data base (ERIC), searching the bibliographies of included and related articles, and scanning the
tables of content of likely journals. No articles uncovered in this search and meeting the above cri
teria were excluded, but inevitably some were missed. Articles from this time period that were
overlooked in the search process but that have subsequently been discovered include Brown
(1972). Walberg and Rasher (1974). Wendling and Cohen (1981). and Walberg and Fowler
(1987). And, of course, there have been publications subsequent to construction of this table. The
inclusion of these articles does not change the weight of the evidence or the substantive conclu
sions reached.
13. The tabulations, when stratified by grade level, by whether individual or aggregate data
were used, by output measure, and by value-added or level forms of estimation, yield the same
qualitative conclusions.
14. Tabulated results are adjusted for variables being measured in the opposite direction; for
example, the sign for estimated relationships including student-teacher ratios, instead of teacherstudent ratios, is reversed.
15. Teacher-pupil ratios are treated here as synonymous with class sizes. This is not strictly
the case and, in fact, could be misleading today. Several changes in schools, most prominently the
introduction of extensive requirements for dealing with handicapped children in the mid-1970s,
have led to new instructional personnel without large changes in typical classes. Since much of
the evidence here refers to the situation before such legislation and restrictions, it is reasonable to
interpret the evidence as relating to class sizes.
16. In any statistical analysis, which necessarily relies on a sample of all possible students and
classroom environments, an estimated relationship may not be real but only perceived to be so
because of the specific sample. Standard regression techniques provide ways of estimating the
likelihood of being fooled by the sampling into thinking there is a relationship when in fact there
is not. The shorthand term, "statistical significance," implies that less than 5 percent of the time
when there is really no relationship would we get an estimate as large as the one obtained. In other
words, when the estimate is "statistically significant," we are quite confident that some relation
ship does indeed exist. In all cases, however, the estimates of statistical significance assume that
the "correct" relationship is being estimated; that is, that the model of achievement is properly
specified to include the relevant factors determining performance.
17. Note that not all studies report the sign of insignificant coefficients. For example, 45 stud
ies report insignificant estimated coefficients for teacher-student ratios but do not report any fur
ther information.
18. Note that only 113 studies report evidence about teacher education. Since data on teacher
education are so readily available, it seems likely that a number of additional studies investigated
teacher education effects but discarded the results without reporting them after finding negative or
insignificant effects.
19. Information on each of these is less frequently available. This is partially explained by
common reliance on administrative records which do not record them (except perhaps teacher sal-
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aries). The level of the analysis and sampling frame for some studies offer another explanation;
for example, since expenditures per student are generally measured for districts, the analyses that
rely on individual student data for a single district would find no variation in this input and thus
could not include it. More recent studies have generally concentrated on the analysis of individual
student and classroom data and thus have not considered aggregate expenditure effects.
20. The interpretation of expenditure and salary estimates is sometimes clouded by including
them in addition to teacher experience, education, and class size. Because multiple regression
coefficients indicate the effect of a specific variable when all other variables are held constant,
direct measures of expenditure, for example, in models also including the prime determinants of
instructional spending would be interpreted as the effect of noninstructional expenditures on
achievement. Also, because prices can vary across the samples in the separate studies, it is more
difficult to interpret dollar measures than real input measures. Finally, eight of the thirteen signifi
cant positive expenditure results in table 1 come from the different estimates of Sebold and Dato
(1981). In this study, imprecise measurement of family inputs suggests that school expenditures
may in fact mainly be a proxy for family background.
21. There are several obvious reasons for caution in interpreting this evidence. For any indi
vidual study, incomplete information, poor quality data, or faulty research could distort the statis
tical results. Even without such problems, the actions of school administrators could mask any
relationship. For example, if the most difficult students to teach were consistently put in smaller
classes, any independent effect of class size could be difficult to disentangle from the mismeasurement of a students' characteristics. Finally, the statistical insignificance of estimates can
reflect no relationship, but it also can reflect a variety of data problems, including high correla
tions among the different measured inputs. In other words, as in most research, virtually any of
the studies is open to some sort of challenge.
22. This issue is discussed in Hedges (1990). "The published literature is particularly suscepti
ble to the claim that it is unrepresentative of all studies that may have been conducted (the socalled publication bias problem). There is considerable empirical evidence that the published lit
erature contains fewer statistically insignificant results than would be expected from the complete
collection of all studies actually conducted. . .. There is also direct evidence that journal editors
and reviewers intentionally include statistical significance among their criteria for selecting
manuscripts for publications.... The tendency of the published literature to overrepresent statisti
cally significant findings leads to biased overestimates of effect magnitudes from published litera
ture. ..." (p. 19, listed references omitted).
23. These studies are analyses of covariance or, equivalently, regression analysis using indi
vidual teacher (or school) dummy variables in addition to measures of prior student achievement,
family background factors, and other explicitly identified inputs in a regression format. See
Hanushek (1971,1992); Murnane (1975); Armor et al.(1976); and Murnane and Phillips (1981).
24. Perhaps the closest thing to a consistent conclusion across the studies is that "smarter"
teachers, ones who perform well on verbal ability or achievement tests, do better in the classroom.
Nonetheless, while plausible, there remains mixed evidence on how good teacher tests are at indi
cating teaching ability. Tabulations similar to those in table 1 indicate thirty-one studies that have
analyzed teacher verbal scores. Of these, eight find positive and significant relationships, and
another ten find positive but insignificant relationships. These overall findings have been extended
by a recent study by Ronald Ferguson (1991), which finds teacher ability as measured by scores
on the Texas teacher test to be related to student performance, although that study is insufficient to
change the weight of the evidence.
25. The idea of skill differences among teachers is not the only possible interpretation of the
data. Differences in achievement across classrooms could reflect differences in teachers, in other
classroom-specific factors, or a combination of both. The teacher skill interpretation is suggested
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by the fact that principals' ratings of teachers are correlated with the covariance estimates of class
room differences; see Murnane (1975) and Armor et al. (1976). Evidence on the stability of
teacher effects across grades, test area, and years for individual teachers further supports the inter
pretation based on teacher skill; see Hanushek (1992). A discussion of skill differences in the pro
duction function context can be found in Hanushek (1986).
26. School finance court cases have typically contained two elements. First, an equal protec
tion argument is employed, which asserts that school expenditure differences related to variations
in the local property tax base are discriminatory. Second, the "education clause" usually found in
the state constitution is used to back an assertion that large variations in expenditures are imper
missible. In both instances, the direct evidence provided for the alleged wrong involves variations
in expenditures (sometimes linked to other things such as property tax wealth).
27. See New York State Office of the Comptroller, Financial Data for School Districts, 1982
and U.S. Bureau of the Census, County and City Data Book, 1983 (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov°ernment Printing Office, 1983), tables A and C.
28. The argument of municipal overburden is that excessive demands for nonschool expendi
tures faced by urban districts subtract from what otherwise would be available for schools. There
fore, the state funding formula should recognize these other expenditures in allocating school
support. See the arguments in Levittown. For an economic analysis, see Brazer and McCarty
(1987).
29. As described, there is considerable variation in tax bases and poverty rates within a state.
Thus, for example, Albany had a property tax base per student that was 34 percent above the state
average, and yet it also had a poverty rate above the state average. Cutting back on funds for this
"wealthy" district would potentially harm sizable numbers of poor children.
30. For example, in the situation in New York State, each of the six large districts except New
York City had expenditures per student above the state average. See Financial Data for School
Districts, 1982.
31. This situation, known to economists as "compensating differentials," can exist whenever
jobs or job locations include different attributes such as riskiness, opportunities for learning, or, in
the case of cities, favorable living conditions. For a general description, see Ehrenberg and Smith
(1991) or Hamermesh and Rees (1988). In the context of teachers, see Toder (1972), Antos and
Rosen (1975), and Kenny and Denslow (1980). Differences in the attractiveness of areas can also
lead to differences in housing and land prices, thus affecting other inputs to education. See, for
example, Roback (1982).
32. These calculations rely on estimates of the relationship between expenditures per student
and wealth per student in districts in these states. The R2 of simple regression in each state was
less than .20, indicating that one-fifth would be an estimate of the upper bound on the potential for
equating spending by eliminating property tax base differences.
33. This study is entitled "Education Resources and Student Achievement: Good News for
Schools," presumably because it was one of the few studies that ever found statistically significant
relationships between expenditure and policy.
34. The basic regression models estimated include median years of schooling and percent
below poverty in the district, percent minority students, district size, and pupil/teacher ratio in
addition to expenditure. Expenditure is measured in several alternative ways, and some formula
tions include treatment of geographic location of districts.
35. Approved operating expenditure excludes certain categories included in total current
expenditure, such as some transportation, employee benefits, etc. The average approved expendi
ture in 1978 for the sampled schools was $2,064, compared to an average total current expendi
ture for the state of $2,527.
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36. The results are unchanged in a qualitative sense if performance is measured by average
scores in the district as opposed to the percentage of students passing the BCT examinations. The
magnitude of changes in average scores is somewhat less than of the changes in pass rates pre
dicted for spending changes, a finding that is consistent with the notion that the average perfor
mance is relatively close to the established passing score on most of the separate BCTs.
37. Family background is measured according to the percentage of students receiving free or
reduced lunch and to what percentage is nonwhite. In 1990-91, there are 129 separate school dis
tricts of which 67 serve countywide populations (outside of city districts), while the remaining 62
serve individual cities. The estimates are weighted by the number of students in average daily
attendance, in order to deal with the heteroscedasticity introduced by averaging performance
across populations of different sizes.
38. The estimates presented exclude two districts (Hoover and Mt. Brook) that are significant
"outliers in terms of expenditure levels. Because they are noticeably distant from most other dis
tricts they have an undue influence on the estimated expenditure effects. Including these districts
yields somewhat larger expenditure effects (ranging from 1.0 to 3.7 percent passing per $1,000 as
opposed to -.1 to 2.7 percent passing per $1,000 in table 2). Three of the nine estimated coeffi
cients are significant at the 5 percent level when the two outliers are included. These estimates do
not, however, provide reliable information about the effects of increasing expenditure because
there is little or no pattern to expenditures for the remaining 127 districts included in the analysis.
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Can Schools Be Held Accountable
for Good Performance?
A Critique of Common
Educational Performance Indicators
Robert H. Meyer
University of Chicago
Educational indicators are increasingly being used to assess the effi
cacy of American education. Local newspapers regularly report how
students in local schools perform on nationally standardized tests, and
a growing number of states publish formal school report cards that pro
vide an assortment of student outcome, enrollment, and financial indi
cators. In April 1991, President Bush elevated the discussion of
educational indicators to the national level with "America 2000," a
proposal to establish a national examination system, complete with
school district, state, and national report cards (U.S. Department of
Education 1991).
The growing demand for educational performance indicators has
been motivated in large part by a growing demand for public account
ability defined in terms of hard outcomes, such as standardized test
scores, rather than inputs, such as teacher qualifications, class size, and
course requirements. Demands for public accountability have been
particularly strong in states that have dramatically increased expendi
tures on education and in states that have launched major school
improvement efforts. The increased demand for public accountability
in elementary and secondary education has paralleled similar demands
for increased accountability in other public sector activities, for exam
ple, the Job Training Partnership Act and the new JOBS program,
enacted as part of the Family Support Act.
"This research has been supported by the La Follette Institute of Public Affairs and the Insti
tute for Research on Poverty, University of Wisconsin-Madison. The author has benefited enor
mously from discussions with Bill Qune, Jeff Dorrunitz, and Andy Porter and from comments by
Ken Bickers, Mike Wiseman, and participants in the LaFollette Institute public affairs workshop.
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Despite the groundswell of interest in data on school performance,
many educators and scholars fear that poorly implemented perfor
mance indicators could ultimately be worse than no indicators at all.
These fears are not groundless. As will be discussed in this paper, per
formance indicators based on achievement tests could be flawed in two
major ways. First, the achievement test underlying a performance indi
cator could be susceptible to "narrow" teaching to the test or could fail
to reflect a school's true educational objectives. Second, a performance
indicator constructed from a simplistic or otherwise inappropriate sta
tistical model could fail to reflect the true contribution of a school to
growth in measured student achievement. Under these conditions, a
high stakes system of educational performance indicators could
severely distort the behavior of educators and students.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the statistical adequacy of the
most commonly used educational performance indicators. One of the
major conclusions of the analysis is that the typical indicators used to
assess school performance—average and median test scores—are
highly flawed as measures of school performance. As a result, they are
of limited value, if not useless, for evaluating relative school perfor
mance or school performance over time. Indeed, simulation results
indicate that changes over time in average test scores could very well
be negatively correlated with actual changes in school performance.
The analysis also demonstrates that the typical indicators used to
assess school performance are likely to provide schools with the per
verse incentive to "cream," that is, to raise measured school perfor
mance by educating only those students who tend to have high test
scores. The potential for creaming is apt to be particularly strong in
environments characterized by selective admissions. However, cream
ing could also exist in more subtle, but no less harmful, forms. For
example, schools could create an environment that is relatively unsupportive for potential dropouts, academically disadvantaged students,
and special education students, thereby encouraging these students to
drop out or transfer to another school. Alternatively, high-quality
teachers and administrators could gravitate to neighborhood schools
that predominantly serve high-scoring students.
The paper is .organized in nine major sections, the first of which is
this introduction. The second section is a discussion of the problems
that exist with traditional standardized tests; the third presents an
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assessment of the validity of the average test score. I demonstrate that
this commonly used indicator is highly flawed as an indicator of school
performance. In the fourth section, I demonstrate that an alternative
indicator, the gain indicator, avoids all but one of the major flaws asso
ciated with the average test score. In particular, the gain indicator fails
to measure the value-added contributions of schools to growth in aca
demic achievement. The seventh and eighth sections draw on simu
lated and actual data to illustrate the advantages of gain indicators over
average summary scores. I first investigate value-added indicators, and
then consider the consequences of evaluating schools on the basis of
incomplete indicators. Finally, I present recommendations for the
phased-in development of valid educational performance indicators.
An appendix provides technical information concerning the simula
tions reported in the fifth section.
The Problems With Traditional Standardized Tests
Many educators and testing experts believe that there is a great need
for new and improved ways of testing student achievement. A major
problem with national standardized tests is that they are designed to
appeal to all schools regardless of their educational objectives. These
tests, if used in a high stakes indicator system, could drive teachers and
administrators to focus almost exclusively on low-level academic con
tent (Smith and O'Day 1990; Clune 1991). The achievement tests used
as the basis for a performance indicator system should ideally reflect a
balance of low- and high-end content so that the performance of
schools that serve low- and/or high-achieving students can adequately
be measured. This implies that a minimum competency test is unlikely
to be satisfactory as the basis for measuring school performance. The
problem with minimum competency exams is that many students
receive a perfect score year after year. If the tests differ from one grade
to the next, the recorded gain for these students is totally artificial. If
the tests do not differ, their recorded gain is zero—in most cases, a vast
understatement of their true gain in achievement. The simple achieve
ment models presented later in this paper are not really appropriate for
tests that exhibit low ceilings and/or high floors. However, the models
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could be extended to allow for the "censoring" of test scores at the high
and low extremes of the test score distribution.
Critics of standardized tests also argue that conventional multiple
choice tests are not well suited to assessing skills involving higher
order thinking and problem solving, the kinds of skills that are increas
ingly valued in our economy. They argue that the multiple choice for
mat is generally limited to asking simple questions that have definite
answers. As a result, a history exam is reduced to questions about dates
and events, rather than the causes of the Civil War; a mathematics
exam is reduced to a long series of addition and multiplication prob
lems, rather than questions involving the application of mathematics to
solving real-world problems. It is feared that a system of performance
indicators based on such tests is likely to encourage teachers and
administrators to focus their teaching on repetitive, rote learning.
These criticisms have stimulated a number of states to begin devel
oping new, performance-based tests (Dominitz and Meyer 1991). One
commonplace example of an authentic performance-based test is the
field portion of a driving test. A driving test assesses, more or less,
what a driver needs to know to drive on city streets. Indeed, the best
way to pass a driving test is to practice driving. In contrast, typical
standardized math tests fail to assess what most students need to know
about mathematics, the capacity to tackle extended real-world prob
lems calling for the application of diverse mathematics skills. Advo
cates of performance-based tests argue that these tests will be
relatively immune to the phenomenon of narrow teaching to the test
and more congruent with state educational curriculum goals.

Level Indicators

Standardized student testing is conducted for a variety of different
reasons: to provide information on individual students and obtain
aggregate school-level indicators. At the student level, for example,
standardized test scores may be used to diagnose student strengths and
weaknesses in subskill areas, 1 to guide teachers in providing instruc
tion that matches the needs of individual students, to guide students in
making curriculum and career choices, to determine, in states that have

Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance? 79

minimum competency examinations, whether students are eligible for
graduation, and to guide postsecondary institutions and employers in
making admissions and hiring decisions, respectively.
These data, if aggregated to the classroom or school level, yield
educational indicators that measure, for example, the share of students
scoring above or below certain thresholds or the average level of
achievement. I refer generally to statistics of this kind as level indica
tors. As previously mentioned, level indicators are widely reported by
schools. Indeed, they are calculated and readily made available by the
companies that provide testing services to schools throughout the
nation (Goldman 1990). They are also reported at the national level by
the National Assessment of Educational Progress. Unfortunately, some
of the level indicators reported by schools and states are subject to
obvious statistical flaws. Well-known examples include average SAT
and ACT scores. The problem with these indicators is that they are
based on nonrandomly selected groups of students—in particular,
those students who aspire to attend selective colleges or universities.
As discussed by Hanushek and Taylor (1990), Powell and Steelman
(1984), and Wainer (1986), these indicators tend to be highly unreli
able as measures of the true level of achievement in schools and states.
In this paper, I limit my analysis to level indicators that are not subject
to these problems.
If correctly constructed and based on appropriate tests, level indica
tors convey potentially useful descriptive information concerning the
proficiency levels of students in particular classrooms or schools.
Indeed, they could sensibly be used to target assistance (financial or
otherwise) to schools that serve students with low test scores. The crit
ical question for the present discussion is whether such indicators are
valid and useful measures of school or classroom performance. The
answer to this question is no. School performance indicators, by defini
tion, must validly measure the contribution of schools to growth in stu
dent achievement for students in particular grades or sequence of
grades.
Average (or median test) scores fail to do this for four reasons. First,
the average test score fails to localize school performance to a specific
classroom or grade level—the natural unit of accountability in a tradi
tional school.2 This lack of localization is, of course, most severe at the
highest grade levels. In my judgment, a performance indicator that
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fails to localize school performance to a specific grade level or class
room is likely to be a relatively weak instrument of public accountabil
ity.
Second, the average test score reflects information that is aggre
gated across time and grade levels and therefore tends to be grossly
out of date. For example, consider the average test score for a group of
high school seniors. The test scores for these students reflect learning
that occurred in kindergarten, roughly twelve-and-one-half years ear
lier, through the twelfth grade. Indeed, a twelfth-grade level indicator
could be dominated by information that is ten or more years old. 3 The
fact that average test scores reflect out-of-date information severely
weakens them as instruments of public accountability. In order to allow
educators to react in a timely and responsible fashion, performance
indicators must reflect information that is current.
Third, average test scores at the school, district, and state levels tend
to be highly contaminated due to student mobility in and out of differ
ent school systems. For example, the typical twelfth-grade student is
likely to attend several different schools over the period spanning kin
dergarten through twelfth grade. For this student, a test score reflects
the contributions of more than one and possibly many different
schools. The problem of contamination is compounded by the fact that
rates of student mobility tend to differ dramatically across schools.
Contamination is apt to be especially high in communities that undergo
rapid population growth or decline or experience significant changes in
their occupational and industrial structure. Contamination due to stu
dent mobility is probably a relatively minor problem at the national
level, since rates of in- and out-migration are low compared to rates of
mobility within the nation.
Fourth, the average test score is not a value-added indicator; that is,
it fails to measure the distinct contribution of a school to growth in
educational achievement. As a result it absorbs differences across
schools in student achievement levels that are due not to differences in
school productivity but rather to variations in student achievement
prior to entering school and to differences in growth in student
achievement that are systematically related to differences in student
and family background characteristics.
In summary, the average test score suffers from four major flaws,
any one of which could be sufficient to invalidate it as a measure of
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school performance. In the next section I therefore consider an alterna
tive indicator that largely avoids the problems of nonlocalization,
aggregation across time and grade levels, and contamination, namely,
the gain indicator. Immediately following is a series of simulations that
compare the average test score relative to the gain indicator.

Gain Indicators

The gain indicator measures the average growth (or gain) in
achievement from one point in time to another for a given cohort of
students. If students are tested at least once a year, the gain indicator
largely avoids three of the problems that seriously undermine the aver
age test score as a valid and up-to-date measure of school performance:
the problems of nonlocalization, aggregation across time and grade
levels, and contamination due to student mobility. However, the gain
indicator does not measure the value-added contribution of schools to
growth in student achievement, that is, it does not measure school per
formance. Rather, it measures the joint contributions of students, fami
lies, communities, and schools to growth in student achievement. As
such, it is an extremely informative descriptive indicator that should be
included, along with the value-added indicators introduced below, in a
comprehensive system of educational indicators.
The quality of the gain indicator depends critically on the frequency
of student testing. Annual (or more frequent) testing is ideal for several
reasons. First, performance is localized to single grade levels, the natu
ral unit of accountability. Second, the information reflected in the indi
cator is completely up to date. Third, contamination due to student
mobility is limited only to students who transfer schools during the
school year.
As the time interval between tests increases, the problems of local
ization, contamination, and aggregation over time and grade levels
become more acute. In fact, for time intervals of more than two years,
it could prove difficult to construct valid and reliable gain indicators
for schools with high mobility rates. There are two options in such
cases. First, mobile students could simply be excluded from the data
for a classroom or school. Dyer, Linn, and Patton (1969) refer to this as
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the "matched sample" approach. The problem with this approach is
that nonmobile students are apt to be unrepresentative of the school
population as a whole, both in terms of student characteristics and edu
cational experiences. Moreover, the number of nonmobile students in
such cases could be simply too small to yield reliable (statistically pre
cise) estimates of average student gain. The second option is to include
mobile students in the gain comparison for a given school even though
the students obtained part of their schooling from another school. Of
course, this option is feasible only if mobile students take the same
tests in different schools and if their test scores are made available to
the schools to which they move or exit. This clearly would be feasible
only in states that have mandated state assessment systems. Even so,
students who move across state lines would be lost unless the states
happen to use the same state tests and are prepared to exchange student
test data. A more fundamental problem with this approach is that the
contamination introduced by mobile students severely jeopardizes the
validity of the gain indicator if the mobility rate is high. The bottom
line is that infrequent testing seriously compromises the validity of the
gain indicator.
How Bad is the Average Test Score as a Measure of School
Performance? Simulation Results

This section presents a series of simulations designed to assess
whether the average test score has any value as a measure of educa
tional productivity. I consider the validity of the average test score for
comparisons across schools and for comparisons over time for the
same school. The second type of comparison is particularly relevant
for the purposes of evaluating the efficacy of school reform efforts.
Let L(c, g) represent the average level of achievement in a particular
school for cohort c at the end of grade g. Similarly, let G(c, g) represent
the average gain in achievement in a particular school for cohort c
from the end of grade (g-1) to grade g, that is,
-l).

(1)
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Equation (1) implies that, for a given cohort, the average level of
achievement at the end of a particular grade, say grade 10, is the sum
of prior gains in achievement plus the initial average level of achieve
ment, that is,
L(c, 10) = L(c, 0) + G(c, 1) + ... + G(c, 10).

(2)

Given alternative assumptions concerning initial achievement and the
pattern of gain values over time and across grade levels, I can compute
the average level of achievement at the end of grade 10 for each
cohort.
To emphasize the contrast between average achievement and the
gain in achievement, I assume that average initial achievement and
average student characteristics are identical for all schools at all points
in time.4 1 also assume, for simplicity, that all students begin first grade
at the same age and advance from one grade to the next each year. In
this case, a unique time index is implied by the cohort and grade, level
indices. The relationship between time, birth cohort, and grade level is
given by the formula5
/ = c + g + 6.
To facilitate comparisons across schools at the same grade level, I stan
dardize the school gain values so that the average gain for the entire
population at a given point in time is equal to zero at each grade level.
Average 10th grade achievement is similarly standardized to have
mean zero. Finally, I assume that the achievement test underlying this
analysis is scaled so that the standard deviation of school gain values is
approximately equal to 10 in the typical grade.6 To provide the reader
with some intuitive sense of the standardized gain values, table 1 lists
percentile values associated with a range of gain indicator values.
The first pair of simulations illustrate the failure of average test
scores to localize school performance to specific grade levels. Subse
quent simulations illustrate the consequences of contamination and
aggregation across time and grades. Technical details of the simula
tions are presented in the appendix.
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Table 1. Gain Percentile Values, Given the Assumption that Average
Gains are Normally Distributed
Gain indicator values, given zero
Gain percentile values, given the
mean and standard deviation
assumption that average gains are
equal to 10
normally distributed
30
9^9
20
97.9
10
84.1
5
69.2
0
50.0
-5
30.8
-10
15.9
-20
2.3

_________-30___________________(U_________

The first simulation, as summarized in table 2, contrasts three
schools that differ in terms of their patterns of (standardized) gain in
grades one through six and grades seven through ten, respectively. To
simplify the analysis I assume that these patterns persist over time and
that there is no student mobility. School 1 exhibits gain values of zero
(the average) at all grade levels. School 2 exhibits exceptionally high
gain values in the upper grades and exceptionally low gain values in
the lower grades. Finally, school 3 exhibits a pattern of gain values that
is exactly opposite to the pattern exhibited for school 2. As indicated,
the three schools differ fundamentally in terms of their gain values in
the early and late grades. Despite these differences, however, the
schools are indistinguishable in terms of their average level of achieve
ment at the end of tenth grade. The exceptionally high and the excep
tionally low gain values simply cancel out for schools 2 and 3.
A similar result is observed in the second simulation, as depicted in
figure 1. Figure 1 charts the average level of tenth-grade achievement
over time, prior to and after the implementation of hypothetical aca
demic reforms in 1992. The academic reforms are assumed to follow
an era of stable but average gains in achievement at all grade levels.
Panels A and B in figure 1 depict two different scenarios. In panel A
the average achievement gains at each grade level increase gradually
after 1991. In panel B, the average achievement gains also increase
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steadily, but they are limited to grades seven to ten. The gain values are
indicated on the graph by the solid gray lines. The tenth-grade achieve
ment levels are indicated on the graph by the solid black lines. As in
the previous simulation, the two schools differ substantially in terms of
their gain values at different grade levels. Despite these differences,
however, there is no perceptible difference between the two schools in
terms of average tenth-grade achievement. In short, these two simula
tions demonstrate that average test scores provide no information on
differences in productivity between different levels of a school system.
They do, however, suggest that average test scores provide at least a
rough indication of the productivity of the school system overall. In
fact, this is generally not true, as is demonstrated below.
Table 2. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement by School, Given
Alternative Patterns of Gain
Average gain per grade
Average
achievement at
Initial
Grades
Grades
the end of
School achievement
Ito5
6 to 10
tenth grade
1
0
0
0
0
-20
2
20
0
0

3

0

-20

20

0

The second set of simulations illustrates the problem of aggregation
across time and grade levels. These simulations demonstrate vividly
how average test scores are determined in large part by past gains in
achievement and hence are apt to be quite misleading as indicators of
current gains. To highlight the problem of aggregation across time and
grade levels I assume that achievement gains within a school are iden
tical at all grade levels and that there is no student mobility. Figure 2
charts average tenth-grade achievement and average achievement
gains over time, prior to and after the introduction of hypothetical aca
demic reforms in 1992. Panel A of figure 2 depicts a scenario in which
academic reforms reverse a trend of gradual deterioration in average
achievement gains across all grades and initiate a trend of gradual
improvement in average achievement gains across all grades. Panel B

Average gain

Average tenth-grade achievement

§ft

o

g

S

g

Average gain

§

8

Average tenth-grade achievement

'

3

E'

ff

<t

69
?+•

>

3

0
<*

O '*

?8
*- s

>4 ft

&•

3

5 s*
86J
ft ft

3 £

65

ff

87

Figure 2. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Alternative Patterns
of Gain Over Time
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of Figure 2 depicts a scenario in which academic reforms have abso
lutely no effect on average achievement gains. The reforms, however,
are preceded by an era of gradual deterioration in average achievement
gains across all grades, followed by a brief period (1987-1991) of
gradual improvement across all grades. As indicated in the graph, the
average tenth-grade test score provides a totally misleading view of the
effectiveness of the hypothetical academic reforms implemented in
1992. In panel A, the average 10th grade test score declines for five
years after the introduction of successful reforms. In panel B, the aver
age tenth-grade test score increases for a decade after the introduction
of reforms that have no effect on student achievement growth. These
results are admittedly somewhat counter intuitive. They arise from the
fact that 10th grade achievement is the product of gains in achievement
accumulated over a ten-year period.7 The noise introduced by this type
of aggregation is inevitable if school performance is at all variable over
time. (The interested reader may want to peruse appendix tables A-3
and A-4. These tables provide additional information concerning the
two simulations discussed above.)8
The problem of aggregation over time and grade levels also intro
duces noise into the comparisons of different schools at the same point
in time. The degree to which noise of this type affects the relative rank
ing of schools depends on whether the variance over time in average
achievement growth is large relative to the variance across schools in
achievement growth. To illustrate this point, figure 3 considers the con
sequences of aggregation over time and grade levels for two schools
that are identical in terms of average achievement gains over the long
term. In the short term, however, average achievement gains are
assumed to vary cyclically. For school 1, average gains alternate
between ten years of gradual decline and ten years of gradual recovery.
For school 2, average gains alternate between ten years of gradual
improvement and ten years of gradual decline. These patterns are
depicted in panel B of figure 3. The correct ranking of schools, based
on average achievement growth, is noted in the graph. Panel A depicts
the associated levels of average tenth-grade achievement for the two
schools. The ranking of schools based on this indicator is also noted.
The striking aspect of figure 3 is that the average tenth-grade test score
ranks the two schools incorrectly exactly 50 percent of the time. In
short, the noise introduced by aggregation over time and grade levels is
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Figure 3. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Alternative Cycles of
Decline and Recovery in Average Gain
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particularly troublesome if one is comparing schools that are roughly
comparable in terms of long-term average achievement growth. On the
other hand, this problem is less serious for schools that differ dramati
cally in terms of long-term average achievement growth. It is also less
serious if cycles of decline and improvement tend to be perfectly corre
lated. This seems unlikely as a general rule.
The third and final set of simulations illustrates the possible conse
quences of contamination due to student mobility. These simulations
illustrate the extreme sensitivity of average test scores to in-migration
of students. To highlight the consequences of student mobility I
assume that achievement gains within a school are identical at all grade
levels and over time. The first simulation envisions an environment in
which there are three types of schools that vary in terms of their aver
age achievement growth.9 Panel A of table 3 reports the effects on
average 10th grade achievement of alternative rates of student mobility
among the three schools. Panel B of table 3 reports the fraction of stu
dents who change schools, given alternative annual rates of student
mobility. Notice that student mobility causes average tenth-grade test
scores to collapse toward zero, the average level. For the high- and
low-gain schools, for example, an annual mobility rate of 20 percent
leads to a reduction in average test scores of over 70 percent. In other
words, the average test score is severely biased against high gain
schools that happen to serve highly mobile student populations. These
numbers suggest that average test scores are apt to be highly mislead
ing indicators of school quality for schools exposed to high rates of
student mobility.10
If rates and patterns of student mobility vary over time, average test
scores are also apt to provide a misleading picture of actual changes in
school quality over time. This point is illustrated in figure 4, which
simulates the effects on average tenth-grade achievement of an influx
of students from a low-quality to a high-quality school system. Events
of this kind undoubtedly occur frequently throughout the nation as
school systems merge, communities grow, and the occupational struc
ture of jobs evolve in a local labor market. Panel A of figure 4 simu
lates the effects of a gradual influx of students that takes place over a
ten-year period: 1992-2001. Panel B simulates the effects of an instant
influx of students in 1992. Despite the fact that average achievement
growth remains constant after the influx of students, average achieve-
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ment levels decline precipitously following the influx of students under
either scenario. In the case of the gradual influx of students, the aver
age level of achievement declines by as much as^SO percent. Moreover,
average achievement does not return to its 1991 level until the year
2010. In the case of the instant influx of students, the average level of
achievement falls instantly by 90 percent and is back to its 1991 level
within a decade. In short, idiosyncratic shifts in patterns of student
mobility have the potential to grossly contaminate the average test
score as an indicator of contemporaneous school performance.
Table 3. Consequences of Student Mobility
A. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement by School, Given Alternative Rates
of Student Mobility
Annual mobility rate (percent)
10
40
Gain value
0
2
5
20
74.9
High
86.9
56.7
26.8
13.4
100
4.4
3.4
0.3
-3.8
Medium
-2.3
0
-100
Low
-86.7
-69.3
-56.7
-28.1
-11.3
B. The Fraction of Students Who Change Schools while in Grades 1 through 10,
Given Alternative Rates of Student Mobility (percent)

One or more
changes
Two or more
changes

0

17.0

37.0

62.7

89.3

99.7

0

1.7

8.7

21.7

56.0

94.0

The simulations presented in this section demonstrate that average
test scores have the potential to provide a totally misleading portrait of
educational productivity, both over time and across schools. Indeed,
the simulations possibly understate the degree to which average test
scores are flawed as valid measures of school performance since they
address the problems of nonlocalization, aggregation, and contamina
tion one at a time, not simultaneously. Fortunately, gain indicators
largely avoid the three problems investigated in the above simulations.
Moreover, these indicators are generally easy to compute.
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Figure 4. Average Tenth-Grade Achievement Given Different Patterns of
Student Mobility
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An Example Based On National Data
The policy significance of the above discussion is aptly illustrated
using data on average mathematics scores from 1973 to 1986 from the
National Assessment of Education Progress (NAEP). As indicated in
panel A of table 4, NAEP scores for eleventh graders exhibit the bynow familiar pattern of sharp declines from 1973 to 1982 and then par
tial recovery between 1982 to 1986. The eleventh-grade data, by them
selves, are fully consistent with the premise that academic reforms in
the early and mid-1980s generated substantial gains in academic
achievement. In fact, an analysis of the data based on gain indicators
rather than average test scores suggests the opposite conclusion—see
panel B of table 4. Gain indicators were constructed in panel B by
computing the change in average test scores over time for given birth
cohorts." The gain indicators reveal that achievement growth during
the 1982 and 1986 period was actually no better than achievement
growth during the prior 1978 to 1982 period. In fact, gains from sev
enth to eleventh grade were actually slightly lower during the 1982 to
1986 period than in previous periods! The rise in eleventh-grade math
scores from 1982 to 1986 apparently stems from an earlier increase in
achievement growth for that cohort rather than from an increase in
achievement growth over grades seven to eleven. In short, these data
provide no support for the notion that high school academic reforms
generated significant increases in test scores during the mid-1980s.
These data also vividly confirm the general superiority of gain indica
tors, relative to level indicators, as measures of educational productiv
ity.
Value-Added Indicators
As discussed in the previous section, the gain indicator measures the
joint contribution of students, families, communities, and schools to
growth in student achievement. The problem is that a school may rate
highly in terms of a gain indicator primarily or solely because the
school serves students capable of rapid achievement growth. Unfortu-
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nately, failure to achieve a valid measurement of school performance
could provide schools with the incentive to improve "measured" per
formance simply by trying to control the types of students who attend
their schools.
Table 4. NAEP Mathematics Exam Data___________________
A. Average Test Scores
1973
1978

Grade/Age

3rd/9
7th/13
llth/17

3rd to 7th/9 to 13
7thtollth/13tol7

1982

219.1
218.6
219.0
266.0
264.1
268.6
304.4
300.4
298.5
B. Average Test Score Gains
1973 to 1978
1978 to 1982
45.0
50.0
34.4
34.4

1986

221.7
269.0
302.0
1982 to 1986
50.0
33.4

SOURCE: Dossey et al (1988).

In order to isolate the distinct contribution of a school to growth in
student achievement, a statistical model must be used. The statistical
model, if valid, allows one to estimate for each school or classroom the
expected (or average) gain in achievement that would be realized by a
given student. In this sense, the model estimates school performance
controlling for differences across schools in student characteristics and
perhaps school-level variables such as aggregate student and commu
nity characteristics. If these characteristics differ significantly across
schools or classrooms, value-added and gain indicators could differ
significantly. Dyer, Linn, and Patton (1969), Hanushek (1972), and
Murnane (1975) were among the first researchers to estimate valueadded indicators of school performance.
What variables should be included as control variables in a valueadded model of student achievement and school performance? From
the perspective of school accountability, it is important to control for
all factors external to schools, in particular, student and community
characteristics. Performance with respect to intrinsic school and class
room factors is what matters. In practice, most school districts have
ready access to some, but not all, of the student characteristics that are
likely to determine student achievement: (1) Is a student eligible for a
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free or reduced-price school lunch? (2) Is a student eligible for special
education services? (3) Does a student's family receive financial assis
tance from welfare programs? and (4) Is the student classified as being
at-risk? It is not well known whether these variables adequately control
for differences across schools in average student characteristics. If not,
value-added indicators, as implemented, might not fully eliminate the
distortions (see below) associated with level and, to a lesser extent,
gain indicators.
The exact relationship between a gain and value-added indicator is
as follows. For a given cohort at a given grade level, the average gain
in student achievement G is the sum of two terms: the value-added
contribution of a school to growth in student achievement P and the
average contribution of (external) student and community characteris
tics to growth in student achievement F(X), where X represents a set of
student and community characteristics, and the function F is estimated
from an appropriate statistical model of student achievement growth. 12
Similarly, a level indicator is the sum of three terms: P, F(X), and aver
age achievement prior to entering a given grade (see above section on
simulation results). From the perspective of measuring school perfor
mance, the term F(X) is a source of error in a gain and level indicator.
Prior average achievement is an additional source of error in a level
indicator.
The fact that gain and level indicators measure school performance
with error has important implications for the use of these indicators for
purposes of school choice and accountability. Because of the contami
nation due to these errors, level indicators, and to a lesser extent gain
indicators, are likely to give students the wrong signals about which
schools to attend. In practice, this means that prospective students,
both academically advantaged and disadvantaged, could be fooled into
abandoning an excellent neighborhood school simply because the
school served students that were disproportionately academically dis
advantaged. At the other extreme, these indicators could contribute to
complacency on the part of families whose children attend schools that
disproportionately serve academically advantaged students. In fact,
these schools could be adding relatively little to the achievement
growth of their students. In short, indicators other than the value-added
performance indicator convey potentially inaccurate information about
school quality and therefore are likely to distort the school choices of
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students and families. As a result, student achievement is apt to be
lower than it would otherwise be.
The consequences of using invalid performance indicators for pur
poses of public accountability are if anything potentially much worse
than in the case of school choice. This stems from the fact that the indi
cators used for purposes of public accountability have the potential to
influence, if not determine, the objectives of teachers and administra
tors. Indeed, if teachers and administrators are in any way rewarded or
penalized on the basis of their performance with respect to a given
indicator, they are likely to respond to these incentives by trying to
improve their measured performance. In other words, they will have an
incentive to "teach to the test." More to the point, they will have an
incentive to "teach to the indicator derived from the test."
This phenomenon is the key to understanding why valid perfor
mance indicators are potentially capable of generating substantial gen
uine improvements in school quality. However, it is also the key to
understanding how statistically invalid indicators could severely dis
tort the behavior of teachers and administrators. Consider, for example,
the consequences of using a level indicator to evaluate school perfor
mance. A level indicator is the sum of school performance and two
error components that are determined by average student characteris
tics, average prior achievement, and community characteristics. If this
indicator is used to evaluate school performance, it provides teachers
and administrators with the incentive to raise measured school perfor
mance by teaching only those students who rate highly in terms of
average student characteristics, average prior achievement, and com
munity characteristics. In general, these students will be high socioeconomic status, academically advantaged students. This is the
phenomenon referred to earlier as "creaming".
The potential for creaming is apt to be particularly strong in envi
ronments where schools have the authority to admit or reject prospec
tive students and to expel already enrolled students. However, the
problem could also exist in more subtle but no less harmful forms. For
example, schools could: (1) create an environment that is relatively
inhospitable to academically disadvantaged students, (2) provide
course offerings that predominantly address the needs of academically
advantaged students, (3) fail to work aggressively to prevent students
from dropping out of high school, (4) err on the side of referring "prob-
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lem" students to alternative schools, (5) err on the side of classifying
students as special education students (if these students are exempted
from statewide testing), and (6) make it difficult for low-scoring stu
dents to participate in statewide examinations. These activities are all
designed to improve average test scores in a school, not by improving
school quality but by selecting high-scoring students.
As an alternative to trying to select high-scoring students, highquality teachers and administrators could gravitate to neighborhood
schools that predominantly serve high-scoring students. Hence, using
the average test score as a high-stakes performance indicator could
trigger an exodus of highly skilled educators from schools that dispro
portionately serve academically disadvantaged students.
One final problem with the average test score is that teachers,
administrators, and the public are apt to correctly perceive it as an
unfair measure of school performance, thereby undermining the legiti
macy of the entire indicator system. Indeed, there is some evidence
that this has occurred in one of the states studied by Dominitz and
Meyer(1991).
The criticisms discussed above apply equally, although with less
force, to the gain indicator, since it is subject to a single source of error,
F(X).
Multiple Dimensions Of Performance
Thus far, I have ignored the fact that schools typically have multiple
objectives, both academic and nonacademic. Several issues that arise
in the context of multiple objectives need to be addressed at this point.
First, it seems likely that an ideal performance indicator system would
include separate indicators designed to match each and all of the objec
tives adopted by a school. Such a system would probably include indi
cators designed to measure school performance in conventional
academic subjects, possibly mathematics, science, literature, history,
reading, and writing; but it could also include indicators of school per
formance in other areas, for example, citizenship, employment readi
ness, and fine arts. The problem is that it could prove technically
difficult, burdensome, and expensive to measure outcomes in all of
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these areas. If indicators are available for only a subset of objectives,
however, it is possible, even likely, that those objectives would effec
tively dominate all other objectives. This could distort the behavior of
teachers and administrators by giving them the incentives to devote
most of their instructional time to the subjects covered by performance
indicators.
One solution to this dilemma is to measure school performance in
the areas that are considered to be central to the missions of schools.
Indeed, there could be advantages to adopting a more limited set of
educational objectives than currently exists. The adoption of perfor
mance indicators could conceivably force parents and educators to
decide what educational objectives are really important.
It seems inevitable, though, that some important educational objec
tives could be too difficult to measure. If so, one alternative is to mea
sure the inputs (instructional time and resources) devoted to these
activities. This could counteract the incentives to limit instruction in
these activities in order to devote more time to activities that are evalu
ated. On the other hand, the absence of performance indicators in par
ticular areas eliminates the opportunity to hold schools accountable for
their performance in these areas.
Second, it seems likely that some educational objectives could be
more important than others. How can priorities of this nature be incor
porated into an indicator system? One possibility is to construct an
overall performance indicator that reflects the preferences of an indi
vidual, community, or state. A linear, weighted average of individual
performance indicators is one particularly simple example of a prefer
ence function. Such a system has recently been adopted in California
(Dominitz and Meyer 1991). One potential weakness of the linear pref
erence function is that it allows high performance in one dimension to
substitute fully for low performance in another. In fact, most students
and parents are likely to prefer schools that are very good in many
dimensions, as opposed to schools that are excellent in some areas,
poor in others. If so, states and communities could adopt preference
functions that limit the degree of substitutability between competing
objectives. Examples of such functions include the Cobb-Douglas and
constant elasticity of substitution (CES) functions (Henderson and
Quandt 1971). This is clearly an area for further research.
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Conclusions and Recommendations
The average test score, one of the most commonly used indicators in
American education, is highly suspect as an indicator of school perfor
mance. 13 This indicator suffers from four major deficiencies: it fails to
localize school performance to the classroom or grade level; it aggre
gates information on school performance across time and grade levels;
it is contaminated by student mobility; and it fails to measure the dis
tinct contribution of schools to growth in student achievement. As a
result, the average test score is a weak, if not counterproductive, instru
ment of public accountability. The gain indicator, on the other hand,
avoids three of the four problems that plague the average test score. As
such, it is a very useful descriptive indicator. The value-added indica
tor has the major advantage that it avoids all four of the problems that
affect level indicators. In particular, it eliminates the incentive for
schools to cream.
The value-added approach to measuring school performance relies
on a statistical model to identify the distinct contributions made by
schools to growth in student achievement. The quality of a value-added
indicator is determined by four factors: the frequency with which stu
dents are tested, the quality and appropriateness of the tests that under
lie the indicators, the adequacy of the control variables included in the
appropriate statistical models, and the technical quality of the statisti
cal models used to construct the indicators.
In terms of the first issue, I believe that states need to seriously con
sider testing students at every grade level, as is currently done in South
Carolina (Dominitz and Meyer 1991), or at least at every other grade
level, beginning with kindergarten. Annual testing maximizes account
ability by localizing school performance to the most natural unit of
accountability, the grade level or classroom. It also limits the contami
nation caused by student mobility and yields up-to-date information on
school performance. Less frequent testing, for example, testing at
grades kindergarten, four, eight, and twelve, might be acceptable for
national purposes, since student mobility is not really at issue at the
national level. 14 For purposes of evaluating local school performance,
however, the problems created by student mobility argue strongly for
frequent testing. To limit the costs and burden imposed by frequent stu-
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dent tests, however, it might be sensible to vary the frequency of test
ing across schools. Annual testing could be implemented only in
schools or school districts where student mobility is high. In addition,
annual testing could be implemented in areas with limited enrollments
in order to improve the reliability of estimates in these areas, and in
schools with low measured performance in order to monitor these
schools with greater vigilance.
With respect to the second and third issues, it is important that states
make it a major priority to collect extensive and reliable information
on student and family characteristics and to develop state tests that are
technically sound and fully attuned to their educational goals. Finally,
further research is needed to assess the sensitivity of estimates of
school performance indicators to alternative statistical models.
NOTES
1. For diagnostic purposes student test scores are often reported separately by subskill areas.
2. This point also applies to classrooms that serve students in more than one grade and
ungraded classrooms.
3. This would occur, for example, if the variability over time of school performance is higher
in elementary school than in middle or high school.
4. This assumption guarantees that differences across schools in average gain reflect differ
ences in school performance rather than differences in student characteristics.
5. For example, the cohort born in 1980 entered first grade in 1986 and is expected to com
plete twelfth grade in 1998. Note that the concept of the birth cohort needs to be modified slightly
to accommodate school districts that require first graders to be six years old prior to beginning
school.
6. To further facilitate comparisons across schools at the same grade level, gain values could
be standardized so that the standard deviation is equal to ten for every grade in every year. The
disadvantage of this approach is that gain indicators constructed in this fashion are not compara
ble across grades or over time.
7. In the simulations discussed in the text, the average tenth-grade test score is, in fact, exactly
equal to a ten-year moving average of average achievement gains. This stems from the simple
assumption that achievement gains are identical at different grade levels in the same year.
8. The appendix tables report achievement gams by grade level and cohort. As indicated in the
text, achievement gains change from year to year but are always identical across different grade
levels in the same year. This shows up in appendix tables A-3 and A-4 as gain values that are
equal on diagonal lines that run from the bottom left to the top right of the tables.
9. Average growth is assumed to be equal to 10, 0, and -10, respectively, in the three types of
schools. See appendix A for additional details.
10. This conclusion is based on the assumption that at least some student mobility occurs
across schools of different quality, a reasonable supposition, we think, in the absence of contrary
data.

Can Schools Be Held Accountable for Good Performance?

101

11. NAEP was originally designed to permit this type of analysis. In mathematics, the tests
have generally been given every four years at grade levels spaced four years apart. For this illus
trative analysis, I assume that average test scores in 1973 are comparable to the unknown 1974
scores.
12. For concreteness, consider the following statistical mode of achievement growth for stu
dents in a given grade:

where i and j index individuals and schools respectively, Y represents growth in student
achievement, X represents a set of student and community characteristics (indexed by k), a(j)
represents a school-specific intercept, b represents a set of coefficients (indexed by k), and e
represents a random error term. The gain indicator for school j is given by G = I Y(i,j)/n(j), where
n(f) = the number of students in school j. The value-added performance indicator for school j is
given by P = a(j). The average contribution of external characteristics in school j is given by
F(X)=ZI.b(k)X(i,j,k)/n<j).
ik
13. Other level indicators, such as the median test score, are similarly suspect.
14. A kindergarten test is needed so that the growth in student achievement in grades one
through four can be monitored. In our view, the National Assessment of Educational Progress and
recent proposals for national testing in grades four, eight, and twelve are seriously flawed by their
failure to include a test at the kindergarten or first-grade level. I suspect that one reason for this
omission is that both enterprises are insufficiently aware of the flaws of level indicators and insuf
ficiently aware of the advantages of gain and value-added indicators.

Appendix
Descriptions Of Reported Simulations

This appendix presents results for the simulations presented in the text.
Each simulation is defined in terms of the gain in achievement accrued by a
student at a particular school in a given grade at a given point in time. The
birth cohort subscript is implied by the grade and time subscripts, as discussed
in the text. It is given by c = t - g - 6. For simplicity, I assume that students
begin first grade at age six and advance to subsequent grades one year at a
time. Gains in achievement are reported by grade and cohort and tenth-grade
achievement for some of the simulations. Gains in achievement for a given
year are reported on diagonal lines that run from the bottom left to the top
right of the tables.
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Appendix Table A-1. Data for Figure 1A
Average gain by grade
Year
cohort
completes
5
6
grade 10
2
3
4
7
1
0
0
1987
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1988
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1989
0
0
0
1990
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1991
0
0
1992
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1993
0
0
1994
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
1995
1
0
1996
0
0
0
0
1 2
0
0
0
1 2 3
1997
0
0
1998
0
0
1 2 3 4
0
1999
0
1 2 3 4 5
2000
0
1 2 3 4 5 6
2001
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Appendix Table
Year
cohort
completes
grade 10
1
0
1987
1988
0
1989
0
1990
0
1991
0
1992
0
0
1993
1994
0
1995
0
1996
0
1997
0
1998
0
1999
0
2000
0
0
2001

8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
0
0
0
0
0
0

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

10
0
0
0
0
0

1

2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Average
achievement
in grade 10
0
0
0
0
0

1

3
6
10
15
21
28
36
45
55

A-2. Data for Figure IB
Average gain by grade
2
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

3
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

5
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

6
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

7
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14

8
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16

9
0
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18

10
0
0
0
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20

Average
achievement
in grade 10
0
0
0
0
0
2
6
12
20
28
36
44
52
60
68
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Appendix Table A-3. Data for Figure 2A
Year
Average gain by grade
cohort
completes
7
6
5
4
3
grade 10
2
1
1981
19 18 17 16 15 14 13
18 17 16 15 14 13 12
1982
17 16 15 14 13 12 11
1983
16 15 14 13 12 11 10
1984
9
1985
15 14 13 12 11 10
8
14 13 12 11 10
9
1986
7
8
9
13 12 11 10
1987
7
8
6
1988
9
12 11 10
7
5
6
8
9
11 10
1989
6
7
4
1990
8
9
10
5
7
4
5
6
3
1991
8
9
4
7
1992
5
6
8
2
3
4
1
1993
3
5
6
7
2
4
1994
2
3
5
6
0
1
1
4
1
0
1995
2
3
5
1996
0
1
2
3
4
2
1
1
3
2
1997
0
1
2
3
4
1998
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
3
2
1
0
1
5
1999
4
6
2000
3
2
1
0
5
7
6
2001
5
4
3
2
1

8
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

9
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Average
achievement
10 in grade 10
10
145
135
9
8
125
7
115
6
105
5
95
4
85
75
3
65
2
1
55
45
0
37
1
2
31
27
3
4
25
5
25
27
6
7
31
37
8
45
9
10
55
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Appendix Table A-4. Data for Figure 2B
Year
Average gain by grade
cohort
completes
7
6
3
2
1
grade 10
5
4
1981
19 18 17 16 15 14 13
18 17 16 15 14 13 12
1982
17 16 15 14 13 12 11
1983
1984
16 15 14 13 12 11 10
9
15 14 13 12 11 10
1985
8
9
14 13 12 11 10
1986
7
1987
8
13 12 11 10
9
7
1988
6
8
12 11 10
9
5
6
7
8
11 10
1989
9
7
6
8
10
1990
5
6
9
7
6
7
1991
6
5
8
9
7
6
7
8
1992
8
6
5
6
9
8
7
5
6
7
1993
1994
7
6
5
6
9 10
8
7
1995
9 10 10
8
6
5
8
7
6
1996
9 10 10 10
1997
8
7
9 10 10 10 10
1998
9 10 10 10 10 10
8
1999
9 10 10 10 10 10 10
2000
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
10 10 10 10 10 10 10
2001

8
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

9
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10

10
10
9
8
7
6
5
6
7
8
9
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
10
9
10

Average
achievement
in grade 10
145
135
125
115
105
95
87
81
77
75
75
76
78
81
85
90
94
97
99
100
100
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Appendix Table A-5. Data for Figure 3, School 1
Year
Average gain by grade
cohort
completes
8
7
6
3
2
1
grade 10
5
4
6
4
8 10 12 14 16
2
1981
8 10 12 14 16 18
6
4
1982
8 10 12 14 16 18 20
6
1983
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 18
1984
10 12 14 16 18 20 18 16
1985
1986
12 14 16 18 20 18 16 14
1987
14 16 18 20 18 16 14 12
16 18 20 18 16 14 12 10
1988
18 20 18 16 14 12 10
1989
8
20 18 16 14 12 10
1990
6
8
4
18 16 14 12 10
1991
6
8
4
6
8
16 14 12 10
1992
2
14 12 10
1993
0
4
6
8
2
4
8
12 10
1994
2
0
2
6
4
6
8
10
1995
2
0
2
4
4
6
6
4
8
1996
2
0
2
4
1997
4
2
6
8
6
2
0
4
4
0
2
1998
8 10
6
2
1999
6
4
2
0
2
8 10 12
4
8 10 12 14
6
2
0
2000
6
4
2
2001
8 10 10 14 16

9 10
18 20
20 18
18 16
16 14
14 12
12 10
8
10
6
8
4
6
4
2
0
2
0
2
4
2
4
6
8
6
8 10
10 12
12 14
14 16
16 18
18 20

Average
achievement
in grade 10
110
126
138
146
150
150
146
138
126
110
90
74
62
54
50
50
54
62
74
90
110
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Appendix Table A-6. Data for Figure 3, School 2
Year
Average gain by grade
cohort
completes
8
6
5
4
3
2
1
grade 10
7
4
6
8
18 16 14 12 10
1981
4
6
8
16 14 12 10
1982
2
2
4
6
8
14 12 10
1983
0
0
2
4
6
8
12 10
1984
2
4
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
1985
4
6
2
0
2
4
6
1986
8
6
4
2
0
2
4
1987
8
6
8 10
6
4
1988
2
0
2
4
8 10 12
6
4
2
0
1989
2
8 10 12 14
6
4
2
0
1990
8 10 12 14 16
6
4
2
1991
4
8 10 12 14 16 18
6
1992
8 10 12 14 16 18 20
6
1993
1994
8 10 12 14 16 18 20 18
10 12 14 16 18 20 18 16
1995
12 14 16 18 20 18 16 14
1996
1997
14 16 18 20 18 16 14 12
16 18 20 18 16 14 12 10
1998
1999
8
18 20 18 16 14 12 10
8
2000
20 18 16 14 12 10
6
2001
6
8
18 16 14 12 10
4

9
2
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
18
16
14
12
10
8
6
4
2

Average
achievement
10 in grade 10
90
0
74
2
62
4
54
6
50
8
50
10
54
12
62
14
74
16
90
18
110
20
126
18
138
16
146
14
150
12
150
10
146
8
138
6
126
4
110
2
90
0
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A major issue in the literature on the economics of education is: Do
schools make a difference? Do different schools produce different out
comes, and if so, why? Numerous studies have analyzed this question
at the primary and secondary levels, usually using cognitive learning as
the output variable. Only a small number of studies have tackled this
issue at the college level, where the research interest has largely
focused on the returns to quantity rather than quality. These studies
have used future earnings or occupational status as the output variable,
consistent with the premise that an important function of education is
to improve one's position in the labor market. Colleges can enhance
productivity and earnings by imparting general or specific skills, or
information that helps students make good choices about their future
career directions. Studies of college quality, like those of the quality of
primary and secondary schools, have come up with ambiguous and
contradictory results.
For example, in his analysis of the NBER Thorndike earnings data
(for a group of World War II veterans whose earnings were measured
in 1969), Wales (1973) found that graduates of top colleges (as mea
sured by the Gourman rating, which is related to selectivity) received
significantly higher earnings. Using the same data, Wachtel (1976)
found that college expenditures per student exert a positive effect on
earnings, and Solmon and Wachtel (1975) found that college type, as
measured by Carnegie classification, also matters. According to Reed
and Miller (1970), college rank (as measured by the average verbal and

in
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mathematical aptitude of entering freshmen) had a positive effect on
the weekly earnings of a sample of men surveyed by the Census
Bureau in 1967. However, most of the students covered by these stud
ies were in college prior to the vast expansion of the 1960s, which
changed the nature of the higher education industry. In these regres
sions, usually only one college characteristic is specified as an indica
tor of quality. And only a small set of student background variables is
included. Astin and others have argued that the impact of college qual
ity is minimal once these are controlled (Astin 1968; Griffin and Alex
ander 1978). Indeed, a study by Alwin (1974) found only a small
relationship between occupational success and college characteristics,
after controlling for student composition.
One key problem encountered by all these studies has been the diffi
culty in obtaining detailed information about student characteristics, in
order to control for ability, family influence, and prior education,
which is essential if the purpose is to calculate the value added by the
school. Longitudinal data tracking the individuals in a cohort are par
ticularly scarce. Another problem has been the difficulty in obtaining
disaggregated information about schools. A final problem is that we
rarely have data about the student's college experience and academic
achievement, such as choice of courses, major and GPA, that may
influence earnings. (See Hanushek 1986, for a thorough analysis of
these and other problems that beset the "school effectiveness" and
"educational productivity" literature.)
In this paper we exploit a uniquely rich data set, the National Longi
tudinal Study of the High School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) and the Postsecondary Education Transcript Study (PETS), to overcome these
problems and answer the questions: Does it matter which college a stu
dent attends? If it matters, which college characteristics lead to higher
earnings? Do higher expenditures or a more selective student body
imply superior results? Which is better, a large research university or a
small liberal arts college? Does the public/private typology make a dif
ference, as some feel it does at the secondary level? We also examine
the impact on earnings of student behavior while at college. Are aca
demic achievement and curriculum choice harbingers of future
achievement? (For a preliminary analysis of these issues see James,
Alsalam, Conaty, and To 1989.)
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We begin by setting forth our methodology, including our model,
data sources, choice of variables, and statistical technique. In the sec
ond part of this paper we present our findings concerning the effects of
college characteristics, and in the third we give our results concerning
the effects of other aspects of the college experience, particularly
choice of major. The fourth section is a summary of our results and
their limitations.
Briefly, our fixed-effects model shows that the particular college
attended does indeed make a difference, explaining 17 to 29 percent of
the variance in earnings. However, we are unable to tie this college
effect down to observable college characteristics, which taken as a
group explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance in earnings. These
effects exist, but they are very small.
Moreover, whether fixed effects or observable characteristics are
measured, the college effect becomes statistically insignificant once
family background, labor market experience, and major are controlled.
To a large extent the world perceives a differential college effect
because it is perceiving "gross output" rather than "value-added" and
is not taking account of the many other factors that affect earnings,
some of which are correlated with choice of college.
In contrast to these negative findings about college effects, we find
that what a student does while in college strongly affects future earn
ings, even after all the other variables in our model are controlled.
Apparently, direct measures of skill acquisition matter more than indi
rect screening by college characteristics.

Methodology
The Model

As is well known, there are multiple outputs of higher education,
including knowledge gained, earning power enhanced, values formed,
amenities consumed, and research undertaken, all of which enter into
student and social utility functions. In this paper we concentrate on one
output of education—future earnings—as a function of all the jointly
supplied inputs.
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We model earnings (Y) as a function of four sets of variables:
Xj = a set of individual characteristics including family background
and prior academic achievement;
X2 = a set of institutional characteristics, including college expendi
tures, college organization, and student body composition, which
determine the value added by the college;
X3 = higher educational experience variables that are chosen by the
student but may be influenced by the college;
X4 = labor market variables, such as experience and weeks worked per
year.
Our focus here is on the impact on earnings of institutional characteris
tics and other aspects of the higher educational experience.
Before presenting our results we outline the data and expected
direction of causal relationships, and discuss our treatment of several
methodological problems.
Data Sources and Sample
Information about student characteristics, earnings, and other labor
market variables comes from the National Longitudinal Study of the
High School Senior Class of 1972, which follows this cohort through
further education and into the labor market. This survey gives detailed
information about family background, education, and academic
achievement prior to entering college, as well as subsequent labor mar
ket experience. The fifth follow-up in 1986 includes 12,841 men and
women. Two-thirds of the total had some postsecondary education and
one-fourth had received their college degree. We deal in this paper
with a subset of the latter group, the 1,321 males whose graduating
institution was identified, who took at least sixty credit hours in that
institution, and who worked for an employer at least twenty hours per
week in 1985. Most of them had been out of college for seven to nine
years.
There are 499 colleges and universities in our subsample. Over half
are Ph.D.-granting institutions, three-quarters are public, and enroll
ment size varies from 288 to 50,011. Many of the smaller colleges
enrolled only one member of our sample, but 285 institutions (typi-
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cally the larger ones) had two or more observations, totaling 1,107
male students; we used these as a subsample for the fixed-effects mod
els. We obtained most of our data about the characteristics of these col
leges and universities from the Higher Education General Information
Survey (HEGIS), which conducts annual surveys of postsecondary
four-year institutions; we chose 1975 as a representative year for our
cohort. This was supplemented by data from Cass and Birnbaum
(1975).
Finally, the Postsecondary Education Transcript Study gave us the
college transcripts of each student, from which we derived the college
experience variables. None of the previous studies on college quality
has had access to such detailed information about curriculum choices
and achievement in college. All financial data were inflated to 1986
prices using the Consumer Price Index.

Institutional Characteristics
We view the college consumer as purchasing a set of characteristics
that is experienced uniformly by all students at a given institution. In
our fixed-effects model we identify each college by a dummy variable
that captures all its observable plus unobservable characteristics. In our
ordinary least squares (OLS) models we examine the observable char
acteristics in greater detail. This section describes some of the observ
able variables we use.
The school effectiveness literature has been particularly interested
in the influence of "expenditures per student." If colleges were compet
itive, privately financed, profit-maximizing institutions, and if consum
ers cared primarily about future earnings and had full information
about educational production functions, higher costs would have to be
covered by higher prices which would be sustainable only if they led to
higher future earnings. However, the institutions in our sample are
public or nonprofit, much of their revenues coming from state legisla
tors or donors, and devices such as accreditation procedures and repu
tation limit entry. Under these circumstances, colleges may have
potential profits with which to pursue their own discretionary goals,
their nonconsumer funders may support multiple objectives, and stu
dents may be uninformed about college effects or may care about
many outputs of education besides future productivity. As a result of all
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these factors, we do not have a strong a priori reason to expect a sys
tematic relationship between college expenditures and future earnings.
To investigate the expenditure effect, we started with the idea of
decomposing college spending into its separate components—expendi
tures on instruction, research, institutional support services, and finan
cial aid. However, strong multi-collinearity precluded this strategy.
Therefore we used, alternatively, the most inclusive measure, logged
educational and general spending per student (LXPS); the most
directly relevant measure, logged instructional expenditures per stu
dent (LINSXPS); and a combination of inputs—the student-faculty
ratio (S/F) and average faculty salaries (FACSAL). Ideally, we would
have adjusted our measures of monetary inputs for regional cost differ
ences, but unfortunately we did not have access to the detailed city-bycity, education-relevant cost-of-living index that would be necessary to
convert these monetary inputs into real inputs. However, our experi
ments with S/F captured the basic idea. As it turned out, the results for
all the cost variables were very similar, and those with LXPS are pre
sented in this paper.
We wanted to investigate whether institutions under public versus
private control, with research versus teaching missions, and with pre
dominantly graduate versus undergraduate student bodies, behave dif
ferently. Theory suggests that such differences exist, but the direction
and magnitude are ambiguous. For example, private institutions may
utilize their resources more efficiently than public ones and may bene
fit from a halo effect in the labor market or on the other hand may have
to devote substantial resources to fundraising (see James 1989). The
presence of doctoral students may lead to a diversion of resources
away from undergraduates or conversely may add a pool of cheap
labor available to teach undergraduates. And similarly, research may
enhance or detract from the undergraduate teaching function (see
James 197$; James and Neuberger 1981). These possible effects were
captured by entering private colleges, Ph.D.-awarding institutions, and
Research Type I Universities (Carnegie classification) as dummies
(PRIV, PRIV*E, PHD, RES) or, alternatively, as interactions with
expenditures per student, and by including the percent of graduate stu
dents in total enrollment (PGRAD). The total number of FTE students
(LFTE) was entered to allow for economies or diseconomies of scale.
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Regional dummies were included to capture regional fixed effects.
Only East (E) had any impact and was left in the final regression.
We were particularly interested in the impact of the average SAT
score of entering freshmen as an index of institutional selectivity
(SEL). Selectivity may influence earnings in several ways: it may raise
the amount of learning, hence the acquisition of general human capital
at the institution through the peer group effect; it may be an informa
tional signal to employers about the probable aptitude of individual
students (a version of the screening hypothesis); and students from a
more selective institution may benefit from its prestige or from the
social network that it generates.
Higher Educational Experience

While in college the student makes a number of choices—concern
ing major, curriculum, how hard to work to obtain a high GPA, and
whether to proceed to a postgraduate degree. How do these choices
influence future earnings? We examine the impact of choosing majors
in Engineering (ENG), Business (BUS), Humanities and Fine Arts
(HUM), Social Science (SOCSCI), Math plus Physical Science
(M&SCI), Biological Science (BIO), Health Professions (HEALTH),
and all others (OTHER), relative to education, the omitted category.
The choice of major influences the range of occupational options that
will be open to a student later in life; therefore we would expect some
of these dummies to be positive and others to be negative. We also
included the number of college math credits and Math GPA; our final
specification uses the interaction of these two terms (MATH*GPA).
Finally, we introduce the college GPA as an independent variable, on
grounds that this may signal cognitive skills and traits such as disci
pline and perseverance, to the employer. Postgraduate degrees are bro
ken down into MA and all others (HIDEG); the latter, in particular, is
expected to have a positive effect.
Background Characteristics

A voluminous literature documents the fact that family background
and prior academic achievement strongly influence future earnings,
much of this operating through their impact on the choice of college
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and probability of completing college. We would expect background
effects on earnings to be much smaller in this study, where everyone
has a college degree and characteristics of the college are explicitly
included. However, some background variables may still be important,
in part because they serve as proxies for unobserved productivityenhancing student characteristics such as ambition, learning acquired
in the household, and access to labor market information. Including
these variables should therefore increase the explanatory power of our
model and reduce the potential bias in the estimated coefficients of the
college variables with which they may be correlated. Student back
ground variables included as controls were race or nationality
(BLACK, BLK-SOUTH, HISP), religion (CATH, JEW), parental
income (FAMINC), father's education (FAED), attendance at Catholic
high school (CATHHS) and other private high schools (OTHPVT),
percentile rank in high school (PRANK), a dummy for playing a lead
ership role in high school newspaper, student government, or athletics
(XCURR), and the individual's verbal plus mathematics SAT score or a
transformation of ACT scores into SAT (SAT). (For the method used to
convert ACT to SAT, see Astin 1971.)

Labor Market Experience
While our focus is on undergraduate education, in some equations
we control for a host of basic market variables that influence earnings:
total months of employment since degree (EXP), tenure on current job
(TEN), weeks worked in 1985 (LWW), hours worked per week (LHW,
which we treat as a two-part spline allowing for the possibility that
returns per hour may differ for hours worked under or over 35 per
week), and a dummy for career interruptions that exceeded one year
(INTERR). Marital status and number of children in 1985 were
included as variables that might influence unobservable labor market
choices such as effort.

Specification Problems and Alternative Models
A problem that always arises in the school effects literature con
cerns biases that may be introduced by unobserved elements of student
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and institutional characteristics, and by the endogeneity of elements of
some college and labor market variables. For example:
1. The omission of some institutional characteristics may understate
the total college effect. We deal with this problem by including a
dummy variable for each college, which captures its full observable
and unobservable characteristics in the fixed-effects model.
2. The correlation between unobserved student characteristics and
observed institutional characteristics may bias the college effect. Sup
pose that, as a result of student choice and college admissions proce
dures, ambitious, hard working students end up in colleges with a high
selectivity index and expenditure rate. These colleges would appear to
increase the earnings of their students, whereas actually they were sim
ply choosing students who would have earned a lot anyway due to their
ambition. We have tried to minimize this problem by including numer
ous observable student variables (such as high school rank and extra
curricular activities), and college experience variables (such as curricu
lum and GPA) that may be correlated with and therefore proxy the
unobserved characteristics. In some equations, we used instrumental
variables for SEL and LXPS.
3. Some colleges may have policies that induce their students to
enter remunerative majors and to acquire postgraduate degrees (for
example, these colleges may not offer low-paid education majors, may
require math, and may help their students gain entry to graduate and
professional schools). If so, controlling for the higher educational vari
ables understates the college effect. We deal with this problem, in part,
by running our regressions with and without the higher educational
variables. If college policies determine curriculum choice, the college
effect on earnings should decline when curriculum is controlled.
4. The effect of the higher educational experience variables may
also be biased by their correlation with unobserved student characteris
tics; e.g., students who choose to take math courses may be smart and
hard working and hence earn high wages because of these characteris
tics, not because of the skills they acquired while taking math. We con
sidered using two-stage techniques here, but it is difficult to find
instruments that are clearly exogenous, can confidently be excluded
from the wage equation, and are good predictors of curriculum choice.
Thus, we have not been able to eliminate the possibility that the large
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effects found for the college experience variables are due, in part, to
their correlation with unobserved student attributes.
5. Similar specification problems could be outlined with respect to
the labor market variables.
Despite all these limitations, we believe that a clear picture does
emerge of the impact of college characteristics and college experience
variables, since our basic results are robust with regard to the various
specifications explored.
College Effects
Tables 1 and 2 present our estimate of logged annual earnings for
1985 (LY 85) as a function of college characteristics (X2) and higher
educational experience (X3), in some cases controlling for student's
background (X,), which precedes college, and labor market choices
(XJ, which follow college. Lifetime earnings would obviously have
been a preferable but unavailable dependent variable. Our indicator of
earnings seven to nine years after college is a much better indicator
than starting wages, which have sometimes been used in studying
school effects.
We present a series of equations that starts with X2 and sequentially
adds Xi, X}, and X4. Table 1 uses fixed college effects and is based on a
subsample of 1,107 students in 285 colleges with two or more students.
Table 2 uses OLS with observable college characteristics in place of
the institutional dummies and is based on the full sample of 1321 stu
dents and 499 colleges. In addition to giving the individual variables,
we also calculate the proportion of variance explained by the individ
ual, institutional, higher educational experience, and labor market vari
ables as a group. When all the variables are included, we are able to
explain over half the variance in earnings of this cohort of college
graduates.
Fixed Effects
Column (1) of table 1 presents a "gross output" fixed-effects model
that replicates "what the world sees." Each college is represented by a
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Table 1.

R2

1985 Annual Earning Regressions for Males with Fixed College
Effects Explanatory Power of Groups of Variables
(2+ sample)
College +
College +
College
College + background + background +
dummies background
LM
LM + higher ed
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Entire model
College
dummies
Background
Labor market
Higher ed. exp.

.333a

,365a

.507a

.56a

.333a

.286b
.032a

.21 lc
.022b
.142a

.171
.015C
.124a
.053J

NOTES: Each regression is estimated for a sample of 1,107 males from the High School Class of
1972 who eventually received a bachelor's degree, from 285 colleges, each of which had two or
more students in our sample,
a. Significant at .1% level
b. Significant at 1% level
c. Significant at 5% level
Background variables that were significant in at least one equation in Tables 1 or 2 are family
income, SAT score. Black, Black*South interaction. Catholic, Catholic H.S., other private high
school. See text for other background variables that were included.
Labor Market variables are experience, tenure on current job, log weeks worked last year, hours
worked per week, marital status, number children, career interruption.
Higher Education variables are dummies for different majors (Business, Engineering, Math-Sci
ence, Humanities, Social Science, Biology, Health Science, Other, Education as omitted cate
gory), GPA, Math*GPA, MA degree, higher degree.
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Table 2. Annual Earnings Regressions for Males with Observable
College Characteristics (full sample)
College +
College +
College +
background background background
College
+ higher ed
+ LM
+ LM
characteristics
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)

College characteristics
.051
SEL
(2.93)b
LFTE
.08
(3.48)a
.004
PRIV
(.08)
EAST
-.025
(.55)
PRIV*E
.149
(2.1)c
PGRAD
-.001
(.5)
LXPS
.003
(.05)
LXPS*RES
-.003
(.62)

.026
(1.42)
.064
(2.74)b
-.029
(.54)
-.04
(.9)
.136
(1.94)c
-.002
(.81)
.011
(.21)
-.005
(.94)

.017
(1.06)
.048
(2.32)c
-.05
(1.04)
-.052
(1.3)
.182
(2.93)b
-.001
(.59)
.035
(.76)
-.003
(.6)

.012
(.8)
.037
(1.84)d
-.005
(.11)
-.008
(.20)
.106
(1.76)d
-.001
(.38)
-.009
(.21)
-.003
(.74)

Higher education experience

BUSMAJ
ENGMAJ
M&SCI
HUM
SOCSCI

.326
(6.89)a
.484
(7.75)a
.273
(4.05)a
.051
(.82)
.259
(5.32)a
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Table 2 (continued). Annual Earnings Regressions for Males with
Observable College Characteristics (full sample)
College +
College +
College +
background background background
College
characteristics
+ LM
+ LM
+ higher ed
(2)
(3)
(4)
0)
BIO
.238
(3.78)a
HEALTH
.243
(3.35)a
OTHER
.189
(3.83)a
GPA
.066
(2.0)c
MATH*GPA
.002
(3.45)a
MA
.05
(1.45)
HIDEG
.151
(2.59)b
-.67
Constant
9.013
-1.018
8.984
(20.96)a
(20.8)a
(.22)
(.83)
R2
.09a
Entire model
.038a
.301 a
.382a

College
characteristics
Background
Labor market
Higher ed. exp.

.038a

.014C
.039a

.013b
.03b

.005
.025b

.211 a

.202a
.079a

NOTES: Each regression is estimated for a sample of 1321 males from the High School Qass of
1972 who eventually received a bachelor's degree from 499 colleges. See Table 1 for significance
levels and other variables that were included in regressions.
a. Significant at .1% level
b. Significant at 1% level
c. Significant at 5% level
d. Significant at 10% level.

124

College Choice, Academic Achievement and Future Earnings

dummy that captures its fixed effect. Consistent with conventional wis
dom, the college that a student attends makes a significant difference in
this model, explaining 33 percent of the variance. This specification
maximizes the college effect, since it subsumes both observable and
unobservable college characteristics (including 285 dummy variables)
and does not control for anything else.
Of course, much of this effect stems from the background of the stu
dents, which is not randomly distributed across colleges. Thus, in col
umn (2) we include both institutional dummies and student
background, in an effort to measure "value added" by the college.
Although the proportion of variance explained by the college dummies
declines (to 29 percent), their effect remains highly significant. In col
umn (3) we enter the basic labor market variables, and column (4) adds
the higher educational experience variables. As discussed above, these
explanatory variables may in part be capturing college policies or cor
related student characteristics that determine earnings. Therefore, their
inclusion should increase the explanatory power of our model and at
the same time decrease the apparent college effects. Indeed this is what
happens. In the last equation, the fixed college effects as a group
explain only 16 to 17 percent of the variance in earnings, half of the
original amount, and given the large number of degrees of freedom
used up, this is no longer significant. For reasons given earlier, we
believe the "true" size of the effect is smaller than that in equation (1),
but larger than that in equation (4); i.e., it explains between 17 and 29
percent of the variance in earnings and is marginally significant.
Observable College Characteristics
Table 2 replicates these results using observable college characteris
tics in place of the separate dummy variables for each institution.
These equations attempt to ascertain where the college effect is coming
from. We are not very successful in that regard, since the observed
characteristics as a group explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance in
earnings, once other variables are controlled.
Column (1) includes college characteristics only, and column (2)
adds family background. Column (3) is closest in spirit to earlier esti
mations by Wachtel (1976), Solmon and Wachtel (1975), and Reed and
Miller (1970), and our results are similar (positive but small college
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effects)—increasing our confidence in these findings. The differences
in our overall conclusions, then, stem from the richer set of variables
we have been able to use. When both higher educational experience
and labor market variables are included, as in column (4), neither the
individual college characteristics nor their sum has a significant effect.
To the extent that observable college variables matter, it appears that
characteristics associated with size, control, and possibly student body
composition matter most. A doubling in enrollments increases earnings
4 to 6 percent, an indication of economies of scale in producing future
earnings that may stem from greater program variety (enabling better
student-major matches) or from greater visibility and access to labor
market information. We obtain ambiguous results on the advantages of
attending a private college, consistent with our ambiguous predictions:
this has a positive effect (of 10 to 13 percent) in the East (where private
colleges have long-standing labor market connections), but not in the
rest of the country. As expected, SEL has a positive effect in columns
(l)-(3)—a 100-point increase in SAT of freshman class increases earn
ings 3 to 5 percent)—but its size declines and significance disappears
when higher educational experience and labor market variables are in
the equation, as in column (4).
In contrast to the college variables that matter, expenditure per stu
dent (LXPS) has a small coefficient that is never close to significance.
This contradicts Wachtel's earlier finding but is consistent with Morgan
and Duncan's (1979) and with much of the literature on primary and
secondary school effectiveness.
We thought that the high-spending institutions might be universities
that allocate much of their resources to graduate programs and
research. To test this possibility, we tried specifications in which LXPS
was interacted with Ph.D.-granting or Research Type I universities
and/or dummies added for Ph.D.-granting institutions, research institu
tions, and percentage of graduate students. The interaction terms were
always negative, and the main LXPS effect became more positive (or
less negative), but nothing we did ever made it significant. Apparently
research and graduate programs do not increase or decrease future
undergraduate earnings, and they also do not explain the unimportance
of LXPS. We obtained similar results when instructional expenses, fac
ulty salaries, and S/F ratios were used instead of LXPS. Based on the

126

College Choice, Academic Achievement and Future Earnings

experience of this sample, it appears that attending a higher-spending
college is not the way to increase future earnings.
Alternative Specifications
Because these negative findings about selectivity and expenditures
per student run counter to the conventional wisdom, we explored alter
native specifications to see whether and under what conditions positive
effects might emerge (see table 3).
1. We attempted to deal with the endogeneity problem by using
instrumental variables to predict the selectivity of a student's college;
the predicted selectivity value was then used in place of the actual
value in column (1). We did the same for expenditures per student. The
coefficients on SEL and LXPS rise when instrumental variables are
used, but neither equation changes our basic conclusion that LXPS is
always insignificant, and SEL is insignificant when higher educational
experience and labor market variables are in the equation.
2. We considered the possibility that multi-collinearity among col
lege characteristics was hiding the true significant effect of SEL, so we
omitted all other institutional variables from the equation. We did the
same for LXPS. As expected, the size of the SEL and LXPS coeffi
cients increased in these specifications, but they remained insignificant
when higher educational experience and labor market variables were
both in the equation; and, of course, the total college effect declined.
3. Finally, we interacted SEL (and LXPS) with several student, col
lege, higher education, and occupational variables to ascertain whether
our uniform-effects model is understating the true effect (e.g., see
Summers and Wolfe 1977). Perhaps SEL (or LXPS) has a higher pay
off to students with higher SAT scores, or for those entering science
majors, professional or managerial occupations, or going on to higher
degrees. In general these interaction terms were insignificant. We con
clude that if an interactive model is appropriate, these data are simply
not strong enough to detect it.
Through all these specifications, our best estimate remains that the
college a student chooses does make a marginal difference, that this
difference becomes insignificant as additional explanatory variables
are added to the model, and that only a very small fraction can be
ascribed to college characteristics readily observed and measured.
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Table 3.

Alternative Specifications with SEL LXPS, and X3

R2
SEL
LFTE
PRIV
E
PRIV*E
PGRAD
LXPS
LXPS*RES

SEL
(1)
.383 a
.069
(1.48)
.037
(1.88)d
-.007
(.17)
-.049
(.97)
.116
(1.91)d
-.001
(.25)
.002
(.06)
-.004
(.84)

LXPS
(2)
.382a
.011
(.75)
.037
(1.83)d
-.007
(.16)
-.009
(.24)
.109
(1.79)d
-.001
(.43)
.043
(.28)
-.004
(-96)

SEL only
(3)
.378a
.017
(1.48)
-

LXPS only
(4)
.377a

.022
(.59)
-.001
(.21)

Notes! Columns (1) and (2) use instrumental variables to predict SEL and LXPS, respectively,
and then use the predicted values in place of the actual values. The full equation includes Col
lege Characteristics, Background, Labor Market, and Higher Education Experience, as in equa
tion (4), Tables 1 and 2. Columns 3 and 4 omit all college characteristics except SEL and LXPS,
respectively; full equation includes Background, Labor Market and Higher Education Experi
ence.
a. Significant at .1% level,
b. Significant at 1% level,
c. Significant at 5% level
d. Significant at 10% level.
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Table 4.

LY85

Means and Standard Deviations of Variables
Mean
Standard deviation
10.26
.52

Institutional variables
SEL
LFTE
PRIV
EAST
PRIV*E
PGRAD
LXPS
LXPS*RES

9.87
9.031
0.248
0.202
0.091
12.267
8.840
1.630

1.16
1.046

8.800
0.430
3.558

Higher educational experience
MATH*GPA
GPA
BUSMAJ
ENGMAJ
M&SCI
HUM
SOCSCI
BIO
HEALTH
OTHER
MA
HIDEG

23.785
2.914
0.230
0.103
0.058
0.061
0.178
0.062
0.027
0.166
0.140
0.054

33.444
0.464
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Explanatory Power
While institutional characteristics do not explain a large proportion
of the variance in earnings, other aspects of the higher educational
experience, such as choice of major, number of math credits taken,
GPA, and postgraduate degree matter a great deal. All of these vari
ables are highly significant, add substantially to the R2 of the model
and, as a group, explain 3 to 8 percent of the variance in earnings in the
OLS regressions, more than the observable college and student charac
teristics put together. They explain somewhat less—2 to 5 percent—in
the fixed-effects model, consistent with the hypothesis that the higher
education variables are determined, in part, by unobserved college pol
icies. (See tables 1 and 2.)
Students with a higher GPA have higher expected earnings; when
GPA increases from C to B or from B to A, annual earnings rise 7 to 8
percent. (Also see Wise 1975.) While GPA indicates, in part, that stu
dents have acquired specific knowledge, we prefer to think of it as a
proxy for unobservable characteristics such as ability combined with
inputs of time and effort, general human capital characteristics that
also lead to higher productivity in the labor market. This interpretation
is supported by the behavior of the student's SAT, which has a positive
effect in equations (2) and (3) that becomes negative when GPA enters
in equation (4). Suppose that the SAT is a proxy for academic ability or
potential achievement, which must be combined with inputs of time
and effort to produce actual achievement. If the combination is present
it produces achievement in college and thereafter; but if the input of
effort is not forthcoming in college, it probably will not be forthcoming
at work either. By this interpretation, ability alone does not generate
significantly higher grades or earnings; the payoff to GPA is a payoff to
the combination of ability and effort.
The positive return to college math is also noteworthy for educa
tional policy. Taking three additional math credits (usually one course)
and receiving an A increases earnings 1 to 2 percent. This is not sur
prising since math governs entry to certain highly-paid occupations
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such as engineering. (For a further discussion of the impact of math,
see Alsalam 1989a.)
A higher degree, particularly the Ph.D., LL.D or M.D., also has a
significantly positive effect, raising earnings 10 to 15 percent (and
probably more at a later point in the age-earnings life cycle).
This leads us to the important issue of returns to major. Which
majors are worth more in the marketplace—those imparting general or
specific skills? While there are large differences in the returns to differ
ent majors, in general we cannot say that either vocational or liberal
arts majors have an advantage. For example, Education (which is the
omitted category) is one of the least remunerative majors, but Engi
neering and Business, also vocational majors, are on top, 30 to 40 per
cent higher than Education. The Physical and Social Sciences are in
between, 20 to 30 percent higher than the other liberal arts subjects,
Humanities and Fine Arts.
Equilibrium Wage Differentials by Major and Social Efficiency
How are these differences in returns to majors sustainable, and
would society be better off if students were induced to move to the
higher-paying (and presumably higher-productivity) majors? The
answers to these two questions are interrelated.
One well-known explanation for why this can be an equilibrium sit
uation is that different majors lead to jobs with different combinations
of pecuniary and nonpecuniary benefits, and different students have
different preferences between these and hence make different choices.
(For example, this might explain the low return to Humanities majors
and the high return to Business majors who become managers.) In this
case the differential returns to majors reflect differential tastes, are sus
tainable in the long run, and as long as students have accurate informa
tion, it would not be efficient to shift more of them involuntarily into
higher-paying majors.
A second explanation is that students differ in innate ability and/or
work effort, that these differences lead them to choose "hard" or
"easy" majors and to earn high or low wages. (For example, the entry
and exit requirements are probably more demanding for Engineering
majors than Education majors.) As a variant on this explanation, some
majors may have "gatekeeping" courses, such as math, which some
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people find hard, others easy; those with math aptitude are more likely
to choose these majors and to earn a rent on their scarce aptitude.
According to this interpretation, we cannot assume that people who
choose different courses and majors are otherwise similar in ability or
effort or attribute their earnings differential to their choice of major or
to specific skills they have acquired in college; furthermore, if more
students entered higher-paying majors, they may well have lower pro
ductivity and earnings than current students.
A third explanation focuses on the reasons why some majors are
"hard" and others "easy" and interprets these differences as an institu
tional response to situations where large differences in the real cost of
training students exist across majors, and "society" believes that ability
or effort, rather than price, should be used to ration space in high-cost
fields in order to avoid myopic choices of majors and jobs. If price is
the same for all programs of study (as tends to be the case at the under
graduate level), but barriers to entry and exit vary, monetary returns
will also vary; and this may be both sustainable and efficient. Under
this scenario, we would expect majors with the highest training costs to
have the greatest restrictions and hence the highest private monetary
returns. Impressionistically, we seem to observe this relationship at the
extremes (for example, this may explain the entry and exit difference
between Engineering and Education), but there does not seem to be a
good fit among fields in the middle.

Conclusion

In conclusion, we have defined college quality as a multidimen
sional concept, and this paper has concentrated on one dimension—
value added to future earnings, a proxy for future labor market produc
tivity. Our rich longitudinal data source has allowed us to control for an
unusually wide range of incoming student characteristics, thereby
yielding better estimates than previously possible of the impact of col
lege and curriculum choice on future earnings.
Briefly, our fixed-effects model indicates that a student's choice of
college does make a difference, explaining 17 to 29 percent of the vari
ance in earnings. However, we are unable, using OLS, to tie this col-
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lege effect down to observable college characteristics, which, taken as
a group, explain only 1 to 2 percent of the variance. Thus, prospective
students and the families who make their decisions based on these
readily accessible indicators will not be getting much pecuniary return;
on the other hand, investing time and effort to collect information
about the "unobservable" characteristics of colleges may pay off.
The observable characteristics, as well as the total college fixed
effect, become insignificant once curriculum choice and labor market
experience are included in the equation. While controlling for all these
variables may lead us to underestimate the total college contribution,
omitted student variables may have the opposite effect. If the former
bias exceeds the latter, we may conclude that the true size of the col
lege effect is greater than that in column (4) of table 1 but less than that
in column (1) and is marginally significant. Experiments with randomeffects models and instrumental variables did not change this basic
conclusion.
In particular, expenditures per student never have a large or signifi
cant effect, and college selectivity, which is widely believed to predict
success, has effects that are both small and insignificant once other
variables are in the equation. Findings concerning college selectivity
cast some doubt on the screening hypothesis, since this is a logical can
didate for employers to use as a proxy for ability. According to these
results, they do not do so.
In contrast to the limited effects of college choice, what a student
does while in college (which is presumably related to the human capi
tal acquired there), strongly affects future earnings, even after all other
variables in our model are controlled. Grades, major, math courses, and
further degree are all highly significant and, taken as a group, explain 3
to 8 percent of the variance in earnings, more than measured college
and student characteristics put together. This finding casts further
doubt on the screening hypothesis.
Several caveats are in order at this point. First of all, part of the large
effect of the higher educational experience variables probably stems
from the unobservable productivity-enhancing student and college
characteristics with which they are correlated, but which we could not
capture. Second, the relative returns to different majors and occupa
tions may change through time as a function of supply and demand, so
it is impossible to generalize from this cohort to all cohorts. Third, the
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relative earnings of different majors and occupations may change over
the lifetime of this cohort as a function of their training and its returns.
For example, the doctors and lawyers in our sample had relatively little
experience and are probably at the start of a steeply rising age-earnings
profile, while the opposite is true for nurses and teachers.
Fourth, we have assumed uniform college effects; if a thoroughly
interactive model is more appropriate, we may have underestimated
college effects. (This sample is not suitable for analyzing such a
model.) Finally, these results apply to men only; a paper on women is
now in process, and the picture appears quite different. But at this
point, we would have to conclude that if quality and output are defined
in terms of future earnings and productivity, high inputs do not neces
sarily lead to high outputs, and indeed there is no easy way to identify
high-quality colleges.
Can it be inferred that students who spend long hours trying to get
accepted into selective colleges, that parents who pay high tuition, and
that colleges with large expenditures are all wasting their time and
money? Not necessarily. As we said at the beginning, colleges produce
many outputs, and higher future earnings is but one of them. Institu
tions may be interested in research as well as teaching, parents may be
interested in the cognitive development and/or value formation of their
children, students may be interested in the social ambience of their col
lege, and all of these may be important to society at large. Indeed,
much of the expenditures of higher-spending institutions may be
directed toward these other ends, some of which may have a diffuse
long-run impact on productivity. Therefore, it is imperative to under
take other studies with alternative output measures to get a complete
picture of the determinants and consequences of college quality.
NOTES
1. There may be substantial multi-collinearity among these variables. We did not consider this
a big problem since we are not trying in the paper to identify the separate effects of each student
background variable, but rather to control them to avoid overestimating the value added by the
college. We also included an Ftest for the joint significance of the group as a whole.
2. Switching to OLS in table 2 allows us to use the entire sample of colleges and students as
well as to weight student differentially in order to adjust for the stratified sample design used by
NLS and make them representative for the sample as a whole. Using the unweighted subsample to
replicate table 2 indicates that the coefficients and significance of our variable are largely
unchanged by the weighting procedure. We also used a random-effects or generalized least-
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squares model, to take account of the fact that all the people who attend the same school are sub
ject to a common component and therefore have less independent variation than OLS would pre
sume. It turned out that the variance component due to the unobserved college effect is negligible;
the size and significance levels of some variables increase, but most are unchanged. Therefore we
present the fixed effects and OLS results in this paper.
3. Economies of scale were also found in Cohn, Rhine, and Santos 1989, who used student
enrollments and research as outputs; i.e., average costs fall as a composite of these outputs rises.

List of Symbols and Data Sources
College Characteristics

SEL
LFTE
PRIV
EAST
PRIV*E
PGRAD
LXPS

LXPS*RES

Mean SAT Score of Incoming Freshman Class 1976.
The log of the full-time equivalent enrollment.
Dummy variable indicating private institutional control.
Dummy variable indicating attendance at a Northeastern
college.
Dummy variable indicating attendance at a Private
Northeastern college.
Proportion of full-time-equivalent students who are
graduate students.
The log of total educational and general expenditures per
full-time equivalent student, including expenditures on
instruction, research, public services, libraries, academic
support, student services, institutional support, operation
and maintenance of plant, scholarships and fellowships, and
educational and general mandatory transfers.
Interaction of LXPS and the Carnegie Classification of
Type 1 institutions. Carnegie Institution "A Classification
of Institutions of Higher Education." 1988 p. 1.

Higher Educational Experience

MATH*GPA

GPA
BUSMAJ
ENGMAJ

Total number of math, statistics, and computer science
credits earned in college multiplied by the grade point
average the student earned in these courses. Math credits
are calculus level and above; i.e., precollegiate and
collegiate math are excluded.
Grade point average at first undergraduate degree-granting
institution.
Dummy variable indicating business major.
Dummy variable indicating engineering major.

College Choice, Academic Achievement and Future Earnings

M&SCI
HUM
SOCSCI
BIO
HEALTH
OTHER
MA
HIDEG
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Dummy variable indicating a physical science or
mathematics major.
Dummy variable indicating humanities or fine arts major.
Dummy variable indicating social science major.
Dummy variable indicating a life science major.
Dummy variable indicating a health science major.
Dummy variable for all other major except education which
is the omitted category.
Dummy variable indicating receipt of a Master's degree.
Dummy variable indicating the receipt of a Ph.D. or
professional degree above the master's level, such as law or
medicine.

SOURCES: Riccobono, J., L. B. Henderson, G. J. Burkheimer, C. Place, J. R. Levinsohn
National Longitudinal Study: Base Year (1972) through Fourth Follow-Up (1979) Data File
Users Manual. Vols. 1-4 C. D. Carroll, et al., Tlie National Longitudinal Study of the High
School Class of 1972 (NLS-72) Fifth Follow-Up (1986) Data File User's Manual. Higher Educa
tion General Information Survey (HEGIS), 1975. Tuition and selectivity taken from Cass, James
and Max Birnbaum, Counselors' Comparative Guide to American Colleges: 1976 Edition (New
York: Harper and Row, 1975). Jones, C., R. Baker, and R. Borchers, National Longitudinal
Study of the High School Class of 1972: Postsecondary Education Transcript Study Data File
User's Manual, National Center for Educational Statistics, August 1986.
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The Financial Squeeze on Higher
Education Institutions and Students
The Balance Between Quality and Access
W. Lee Hansen
University of Wisconsin

This paper attempts to illuminate recent discussions about the tre
mendous financial pressures experienced by students, their parents,
and colleges and universities in paying the costs of higher education
(McPherson and Shapiro 1991). It does this by placing these develop
ments in the context of long-run pendulum-like swings in society's
interest in promoting greater access to higher education and enhancing
the quality of the higher education enterprise. These swings are made
apparent by using a new approach to organize and analyze the data on
higher education finance. 1
The conclusion that emerges from this analysis is that we are cur
rently in a transitional phase, following a thirty-year period of conflict
between proponents of access-equity and of instructional quality. This
shift in emphasis toward a joining of quality and access concerns is
accompanied by an intense struggle over how the costs of achieving
these objectives are to be shared among students, their parents, state
and local taxpayers, voluntary contributors, and in the case of student
financial aid, higher education institutions and the federal government
(Hauptman 1990a, 1990b).
We start by assuming that the goals of higher education are influ
enced by a wide variety of internal and external forces. Whatever these
aims may be, they do not emerge exclusively or even principally from
internal analysis, deliberation, and pressures. Rather they grow out of
external forces and events. This pattern is reflected in the common
practice among educators of moving toward new goals and pushing for
increased levels of funding in the wake of external events, such as
renewed pressure for increased institutional support after Sputnik, or
* This paper is part of a larger collaborative effort with my colleague Jacob O. Stampen.
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new student financial aid programs after the beginning of the War on
Poverty. Each episode is followed by some new event that sets off a
reaction in yet another direction, so that the process repeats itself.
Precedent for this view emerges from the research of historians as
well as scholars from other disciplines who have tried to capture alter
nating patterns of change in economics, history, politics, and the like.
These analyses use terms such as "tensions," "cycles," "pendulums,"
"spirals," and "dialectics" to describe the patterns that are uncovered. 2
Observers generally agree about the nature and identity of these cycles,
whose life spans average between twelve and seventeen years
(Schlesinger 1986, p. 24). They also agree that these cycles alternate
between emphasizing public action versus private interest. These oscil
lations have been described by Hirschman (1982) as the "frustrations
of public life" and by others as "liberal versus conservative" eras.
Whatever the term, the meaning is generally the same.
The most active exponent of the cycles view is Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., who notes that each cycle "must flow out of the conditions and con
tradictions of the phase before and then itself prepare the way for the
next recurrence."3 Schlesinger's analysis provides a useful framework
for sharpening our research questions concerning recent changes in
higher education goals and financing. The principal questions guiding
this analysis are: First, how have the goals of higher education changed
over the past half century? Second, does investment in higher educa
tion respond to changes in these goals? Third, how did changes in the
goals and investment in higher education affect quality and access, the
sharing of the costs of quality and access between students and society,
and the ability of students and their families to finance college atten
dance?
Two sources of information are at hand to help answer these ques
tions. One is the abundant literature on higher education. That litera
ture can be distilled to reveal broad trends and critical shifts that
illuminate the goals and direction of higher education. The results that
emerge from such an analysis are difficult to assess because of the
varying interpretations that can be given to them. The other is national
statistical data on higher education enrollments, expenditure patterns,
and the like. Such data reflect both the trends and responses to them
just mentioned. The statistical data available for identifying financerelated changes are not ideal. Routinely gathered federal statistics on
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higher education finance are incomplete, lack adequate detail, and suf
fer from definitional changes over time. These problems make it diffi
cult to document in consistent fashion the financial trends as well as
systematic changes in these trends.
However, even sometimes difficult to interpret information and
imperfect data can yield important insights when the patterns of
change can be related to the forces that underlie them. Only by trying
to establish such connections is it possible to say something useful
about the current policy debate on quality and access in higher educa
tion.

Cross Currents in Higher Education
American higher education over the past half century has been buf
feted by a combination of demographic, social, political, and economic
forces. Some of these forces are separable whereas others are closely
linked. The linking of these forces may have been most obvious in the
1930s and 1940s. During the depression of the 1930s, college enroll
ments grew more slowly than they had in the past, and with the begin
ning of World War II they dropped substantially. Immediately after the
war enrollments shot upward as a direct response to the GI Bill.
Another view is that much of this gain served to "make up" for the
slower enrollment growth of the 1930s and early 1940s.
After World War II, demographic factors emerged as a stronger ele
ment for change. By the early 1950s, most of the World War II veterans
had passed through the educational system. Enrollment levels
remained relatively stable until the late 1950s, due to the slow growth
in the size of the traditional college-age population, and gradually
increased into the early 1960s. An explosion of enrollments occurred in
the mid-1960s as the post-World War II "baby boom" population
reached maturity. Enrollments rose even more sharply, as interest
heightened about increasing the enrollment of previously under-repre
sented ethnic minorities as well as women. This increase continued
through the 1970s, although the rate of growth slowed considerably.
By the early to mid-1980s overall enrollment growth came to a virtual
halt, and remained relatively unchanged for a few years; recently it has
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renewed its upward climb. Enrollment declines attributable to the
declining size of the traditional college-age population were offset by
increased college attendance among people age twenty-five and above.
Meanwhile, college participation rates for most minority groups have
declined since the mid-1970s, as they have for males generally; at the
same time, significant gains occurred for females.
Political forces have also exerted a powerful influence on the
growth of higher education in the United States and are revealed most
immediately in governmental actions. Ultimately, however, these
actions reflect even more powerful forces, namely, the changing priori
ties of the citizenry who determine the focus of political action and
availability of resources for higher education. The need to compete
with the Soviets after Sputnik helped expand state and local resources
for higher education. The same was true of concerns about broadening
access for minorities and economically disadvantaged in the late 1960s
and early 1970s. These efforts proved effective in galvanizing public
opinion and bringing about the allocation of more federal resources to
higher education. The student unrest experienced by higher education
in the late 1960s and early 1970s probably had the opposite effect.
Whether the current view that higher education can be an effective
instrument for enhancing our international competitive situation—
which would thereby increase the resources allocated to higher educa
tion—is valid or not remains unclear.
The economic environment also plays a key role in the shaping of
higher education. Periodic wars and recessions have affected the tax
revenues of the federal as well as state and local governments and have
also had an impact on private contributions. As a consequence, the
resources available to higher education institutions have fluctuated in
often unpredictable ways. More important, competition from other
state and local programs has reduced the relative allocation of
resources to higher education. The productivity slowdown that began
in the early 1970s made conditions even worse.
Though external forces are critical, it is also apparent that higher
education has sought to chart its own course. Such efforts are reflected
in a long series of reports that articulate the goals and aspirations of
academic institutions.4 Closely related are the periodic attempts made
by economists, historians, and other social scientists to offer new ideas
and interpretations that stir the air and stimulate thinking about the
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course of higher education—among them the current debate about
diversity and cultural values.

Periods of Analysis

To facilitate this analysis we have defined four distinct periods
which emerge out of our review of the qualitative material. The first
period begins in the late 1930s and continues into the early 1950s. It
reflects growing concerns about access to college, culminating with the
GI Bill and its enormous impact on enrollment after World War II.
The second period begins in the mid-1950s and continues to the
mid-1960s, thus capturing the enormous expansion of the higher edu
cation sector. It also picks up the emphasis on the elusive dimension of
quality that was spurred by concern about America's lagging technol
ogy in the face of the Soviet launching of Sputnik. In addition, it
reflects the widely publicized studies by economists establishing the
link between investment in education and economic growth.
The third period, from the mid-1960s to 1980-81, embraces the
search for ways to expand opportunities for students to attend college.
The first phase began with the initiation of federal student aid pro
grams in 1965 and culminated with the federal decision in 1972 to
establish a national need-based student aid system. It was followed in
the late 1970s by what can best be described as a phase of consolidat
ing the financial aid system and confronting other equity-related prob
lems, as exemplified by the Middle Income Student Assistance Act of
1978.
The fourth period began in 1980-81 and continues to the present. It
represents the beginning of a sharp swing away from access to con
cerns about the quality of instruction, efficient use of resources, and
once again education's role in economic growth. At present we may be
entering a new phase, as concerns about access compete more actively
with the push to improve quality.
These periods and their alternating swings between quality and
access closely correspond to Schlesinger's pendulum-like political
cycles mentioned earlier. Since the late 1940s, when society promoted
increased college attendance, higher education sought to expand
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access. When society promoted economic development and national
security, higher education sought to improve quality.
The resulting swings do not necessarily emerge as sharply as the
political cycles approach would suggest. Thus, they cannot be pre
cisely dated in every case. Moreover, the data reflect the aggregation of
not only changes in societal attitudes and behavior but also the percep
tions of change emerging within higher education institutions and the
actions these perceptions generate. Here we must ignore these microlevel underpinnings of these changes, even though they constitute an
important part of the story.

Analytical Framework

With the time periods for this analysis established, we turn to the
data in hopes of learning whether changing political-social-economic
conditions and the accompanying societal mandates exerted any effect
on resource allocation in higher education. We begin by describing the
structure of the nation's investment in higher education institutions and
in student support. We then examine higher education expenditures
and revenues in an effort to highlight major trends and the interplay
between the external and internal forces affecting resource allocation
within the higher education sector. This information paves the way for
measuring the burden of higher education costs and how these costs
are shared among students/parents, state and local taxpayers/private
donors, and also federal taxpayers, through federal student financial
aid programs.
Our first task is to define proxy measures for the concepts of quality
and access in the context of higher education finance. For purposes of
this analysis, instruction-related costs are viewed as an indicator of
efforts to promote quality. Tuition and fees, less student financial aid
funds, are viewed as an indicator of efforts to improve access.
We recognize that these magnitudes are at best crude proxies for
what we really want to measure. Rather than total student aid, we
would prefer to focus on the portion of aid that enables young people
from lower income families to undertake and continue with their
higher education; in the absence of such aid, they would not be able to
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do so. Similarly, rather than concentrating our analysis on all instruc
tion-related expenditures, we would prefer to focus on the portion of
those expenditures that "makes a difference" in quality (i.e., that pro
duce greater and more lasting increments of student learning).
Even more important is the extent to which changes in these catego
ries of expenditure affect quality and access. Spending more or less
would obviously change the dollar totals. Whether, for example, addi
tional expenditures would enhance quality or improve access is more
difficult to say, given the complexity of higher education management. 5
Nonetheless, for purposes of this analysis we shall take the dollar totals
and changes in them as crude indicators of the relative priority given to
quality and access in higher education.
If we are to determine who pays the instruction-related costs of
higher education, then it becomes essential to identify how these costs
are split between students and others. Thus, we must separate that por
tion of the costs paid by students through tuition and fees from that
paid by taxpayers and private donors. The portion of instructionrelated costs not paid by students is described as the nonstudent share,
i.e., total expenditures paid by taxpayers for public institutions, and by
voluntary contributions for private institutions. It should be obvious
that there is no fixed distribution of these costs; their sharing can easily
shift as conditions change.
The sharing of costs has still another dimension. It concerns the
extent to which the share of instruction-related costs paid by students is
offset by student financial aid. If we think of tuition and fees as the
gross share of institutional costs paid by students, we can describe the
net share as tuition and fees less student financial aid. The smaller the
net share of total instruction-related costs paid by students, the greater
the emphasis on access.

The Data
We rely heavily on official data from the Department of Education
and its predecessor, the U.S. Office of Education. Because of changes
in the data collection systems as well as periodic alterations in the defi
nitions of expenditures and revenues, the detailed data are not com-
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pletely comparable over the almost 50-year period under study.
Nonetheless, the broad categories employed here are generally consis
tent We caution readers that this analysis for all of higher education
obscures potentially important differences between public and privateindependent institutions; these differences will be examined in a subse
quent paper.
We also utilize data on student financial aid. With the development
of state-based student aid programs in the late 1950s, federal funding
under the National Defense Education Act of 1958, and the major
financial aid programs of the federal government beginning in the mid1960s, these additional resources, which for the most part go directly
to students, are not fully captured in the institutional data. To remedy
this defect, we draw upon data on student aid expenditures compiled
by the College Board beginning in the early 1970s. We have extended
these data back to the late 1930s, and in the case of veterans' benefits
provided through the GI Bill, back to the mid-1940s.
An unresolved problem with the financial aid data lies in figuring
out how to eliminate from the totals those funds distributed to students
attending proprietary schools. Such schools, and there are many more
of them than there are colleges, are not included in the institutional
data on expenditures and revenues. For this reason, the student finan
cial aid data overstate the resources devoted to broadening access. This
overstatement may have grown to as much as 15 percent of the total
since the 1970s, as eligibility for student aid was expanded beyond
higher education to include all of postsecondary education. (Work is
underway to separate out student aid expenditures for students attend
ing proprietary institutions).
The total value of resources for higher education is best captured by
institutional data on expenditures shown in table 1 and by the College
Board data on the amounts of aid provided to students shown in table
2. One difficulty arises with these data; serious overlap exists between
the "scholarships and fellowships" item in the institutional data and the
"institutional and other grants" item in the College Board data.
Because the data are not quite comparable, we proceed under the
assumption that the amounts of scholarships and fellowships shown in
the institutional data are correct, and that the College Board totals are
accurate. This requires subtracting the total of scholarships and fellow-
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ships from total institutional spending before attempting to aggregate
these two sources of data.
Table 1. Alternative Measures of Expenditures by Institutions of
______Higher Education, 1988-89 (in billions)______________
Current
Educational
InstructionType of expenditure
fund
and general
related
Instruction
$38.8
$38.8
$38.8
Academic support,
including libraries
8.9
8.9
8.9
Student support
5.8
5.8
5.9
Institutional support
11.5
11.5
11.5
Operation &
maintenance of plant
8.7
8.7
8.7
Mandatory transfers
1.5
1.5
1.5

Public service

4.2

4.2

Research

11.4

11.4

5.9

5.9

Scholarships &
fellowships
Auxiliary enterprises
Hospitals
Independent operations

12.3
11.8
3.0

Total____________$123.9_____$96.8_______$75.3
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Education, unpublished data.

Before continuing, it is helpful to know the overall level of
resources devoted to quality and access. In 1988-89 (the most recent
years for which complete institutional data are available) total current
fund expenditures reached $123.9 billion. Total expenditures on stu
dent financial aid reached $25.5 billion. The total resources devoted to
quality and access add up not to the sum of these two numbers, which

148

The Financial Squeeze on Higher Education Institutions and Students

is $149.4 billion, but rather to $143.5 billion; this makes allowance for
the $5.9 billion "overlap" mentioned above (see table 3). Overall, these
expenditures represent 2.93 percent of gross domestic product (GDP).
This figure is misleadingly high because total current fund expendi
tures include an array of activities that are not directly related to the
instructional activities of colleges and universities. A closer approxi
mation to the costs of interest for this analysis is provided by what are
called educational and general expenditures. This amount is arrived at
by subtracting from total current fund expenditures the costs of operat
ing auxiliary enterprises, hospitals, and independent operations, all of
which are activities bearing little or no direct relationship to the
instructional missions of colleges and universities. The result is that
educational and general expenditures, which in 1989-90 totaled $96.8
billion, are 22 percent lower than the total current fund expenditures
(see table 3).
Table 2. Financial Aid Expenditures for Postsecondary Education,
______1988-89 (in billions)_________________________
Type of student aid
Amount

Federal supported programs
Generally available aid
Grants, loans, work study, institutional aid
Specifically directed aid
Veterans, military, etc.
State grant programs
Institutional and other grants

$18.4
1.5
1.6
4.0

Total_______________________________$25.5

SOURCE: The College Board, Trends in Student Aid: 1981 to 1991, August 1991, Table 1.
NOTE: The amounts shown above include some aid awarded to students attending proprietary
schools which are not included in the data for institutions of higher education. Hence, the student
aid data overstate the amounts of aid available to college students. The magnitude of the over
statement is in the 15 percent range.

While educational and general expenditures come closer to the
mark, they still include activities that go well beyond instruction. Two
types of expenditures need to be excluded. One is for public service
activities directed to external audiences; included would be such things
as extension activities carried on by land-grant institutions. The other
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is for research, a central activity of major research universities and typ
ically carried out with the help of external funding. The fact that
research produces new knowledge, some of which filters back into
instruction through the teaching done by researchers and through the
professional journals and textbooks used by countless students across
all types of colleges and universities, suggests that some part of
research activity is instruction-related. Because it would be so difficult
to assess the impact of research on instruction for undergraduates in
particular, no attempt is made to allocate any part of research expendi
tures to instruction.
Table 3. Overall Institutional and Student Financial Aid Expenditures
on Higher Education, 1988-89 (in billions)

Expenditures
Current Fund
Education & general
Instruction-related

Institutional data
w/o SFA
Total
(2)
(1)
$118.0
$123.9
96.8
N/A

90.9
75.3

Total
Student
financial aid expenditures
expenditures unduplicated
(3)
(4)
$143.5
$25.5
116.4
25.5
100.8
25.5

Total
expend1 tures
as percent of
GDP
(5)
2.93%
2.38%
2.06%

SOURCE: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Educa
tion and the College Board.
NOTE: Column 4 is sum of columns 2 and 3.

After excluding expenditures on public service and research (see
table 1), we arrive at instruction-related expenditures (shown in line 3
of table 3) which in 1988-89 amounted to $75.3 billion. When com
bined with the student aid total, we find that expenditures of $100.8
billion on quality and access represent 2.06 percent of GDP (table 3),
To provide a point of comparison, total current expenditures on K-12
education accounted for 4.2 percent of GDP.
We also need to know the amount of tuition and fees paid by stu
dents. This information comes from the institutional revenue data. In
1988-89 tuition and fee revenue amounted to $30.8 billion. To the
extent that instruction-related expenditures amounted to $75.3 billion,
the tuition and fees component of revenue covered 40.9 percent of
these costs. The remaining revenue used to pay instruction-related
costs is provided largely by state and local governments in the case of
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public colleges and universities and by private donors in the case of
private institutions. While both instructional costs and tuition rates dif
fer appreciably among public and private institutions, these differences
are ignored here.

Normalizing the Data

Before moving ahead with the analysis, the data must be normalized
in order to facilitate comparisons over time. Instruction-related expen
ditures must be adjusted for changing enrollment levels. This is done
by constructing a new measure, instruction-related expenditures per
full-time equivalent (FTE) student. It is important to use FTE enroll
ment because of the sharp increase in the proportion of part-time stu
dents since the 1970s.
To assess the strength of efforts to enhance both quality and access
we need some standard against which to make comparisons. The ideal
would be a measure of changes in the relative capacity of the economy
to finance quality and access in higher education. Such a measure
makes it possible to avoid having to correct for price level changes
because it converts the data from nominal to relative values.
Since GDP provides such a convenient and well-understood mea
sure of aggregate output and hence aggregate capacity to pay, we uti
lize GDP per employed member of the civilian labor force (CLF) as an
indicator of the public's capacity to pay. GDP is preferable to other
widely used measures because it reflects the value of all goods and ser
vices produced in the economy; it can also be related more directly to
frequently made comparisons of higher education expenditures. Thus,
GDP per member of the CLF provides a rough measure of the ability
of the average worker to provide tax and nontax support for higher
education.
The final step requires us to express the various cost measures, such
as instruction-related cost per FEE student, as a percent of GDP per
member of the CLF. With these measures it becomes possible to high
light relationships among the level of instruction-related costs, who
pays for them, and how financial aid affects the student share of these
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costs. This information makes it possible to offer a preliminary assess
ment of society's efforts to promote quality and access simultaneously

The Results
The key measures needed for this analysis are expressed as a per
cent of GDP per member of the CLF and are presented in table 4. The
first column shows instruction-related costs per FTE as a percent of
GDP/CLF. These costs rose steadily from 1947^8 to 1972-73,
dropped in 1976-77, began increasing again after that, and by 1988-89
exceeded the previous high in 1972-73. Within the framework pre
sented here, it appears that investment in quality increased steadily
through the early 1970s, dropped off a bit later in the decade, and then
began rising again. The rise in the 1980s proved to be steep, when
emphasis once again shifted to improving the quality of higher educa
tion.
The access story is more difficult to follow because of its several
distinct components. The first is the pattern of change in tuition and
fees. The second is institutional aid, which colleges and universities
provide out of their own resources. The third is other student aid,
which comes largely from veterans' benefits, social security benefits
for eligible college students, and federal student aid programs.
Further clarification is necessary concerning these three sources of
other student aid. Veterans' benefits provided a major stimulus to col
lege attendance immediately after World War II, again but to a lesser
extent after the Korean War, and yet again but to an even smaller
degree after the Vietnam War. The benefits available to World War II
veterans included a monthly stipend plus government payment of all
tuition and fees. The fact that the "other aid" was so great right after
the end of World War II is not surprising; approximately half of all col
lege students at the time were veterans. Their benefits included govern
ment-paid tuition of up to $500 per year and a monthly allowance
which for a single veteran without dependents provided $65 per
month. The impact of veterans' benefits diminished through the 1950s
because fewer Korean War veterans attended college under a some
what different GI Bill set up to deal with this new group of veterans.
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Under this legislation veterans were not reimbursed for their tuition
and fees, though the monthly stipend for a single veteran had risen to
$105 per month. By the late 1950s the amount of funding provided
through such benefits had greatly diminished. This aid increased again
in the late 1960s and early 1970s as Vietnam War veterans enrolled and
was based on GI Bill benefits similar to those given to Korean War vet
erans.
Table 4.

Instruction-Related Costs, Tuition and Fees and Student
Financial Aid Per Full Time Equivalent (FTE) Student
Relative to Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Per Member of the
Civilian Labor Force (CLF) (in percent)
InstructionTotal
related
Tuition Institutional
Other
student
Academic
costs
and fees
aid
aid
aid
year
(3)
(4)
(5)
(1)
(2)
1947-48
13.2
12.5
13.0
3.5
0.5
1951-52
14.5
4.3
6.4
7.1
0.7
15.3
2.4
3.1
1957-58
0.7
5.3
16.8
1.0
1.8
1965-66
6.3
0.9
1972-73
18.4
6.2
1.4
4.9
6.2
1976-77
17.8
6.1
1.2
5.8
7.0
1980-81
18.1
1.1
6.3
6.5
7.6
1984-85
19.1
1.3
5.2
6.5
7.3
1988-89
20.1
8.2
1.6
5.2
6.8

SOURCES: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Edu
cation and the College Board. Data on GDP and CLF are from various issues of the Economic
Report of the President.
NOTE: Calculations for years prior to 1965-66 are based on GNP rather than GDP.

Since the shift to an all-volunteer army in the early 1970s, it has
been more difficult to view veterans' educational benefits as a form of
student financial aid. Instead, such benefits can be considered a part of
the military compensation package, a sort of deferred wage payment
granted in the form of educational benefits. Another argument for not
including veterans' benefits in student aid is that these benefits to vet
erans of World War II, Korea, and Vietnam represented an effort by
society to make up for the well-below market wages paid to the many
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men who had been drafted into military service. For the purpose of this
analysis, however, veterans' educational benefits are viewed, as they
are by the College Board, as a component of student financial aid.
Social security benefits for eligible dependents began in 1965 and
were finally phased out in the early 1980s. These benefits are more
problematic because they were confined to college students age eigh
teen to twenty-one. After the establishment of need-based Pell Grants
in 1972, the rationale for continuing social security benefits was seri
ously undermined. It took a decade before Congress finally voted to
eliminate them.
More important than the aid provided by institutions, at least since
the mid-1960s, is that offered by the federal government through
grants, loans, and work-study programs. The development of student
aid programs dates from 1964 when anti-poverty legislation estab
lished work-study programs, and a year later when the Higher Educa
tion Act of 1965 established the Guaranteed Student Loan program and
a series of related institution-based aid programs. This was followed by
another major initiative in 1972, when Congress passed legislation to
create what are now called Pell Grants.
The data on institutional student aid, other student aid, and total stu
dent aid appear in columns (3), (4), and (5) of table 4. The results are
expressed as aid per FTE student as a percent of GDP/CLF. Institu
tional aid grew sharply through the early 1970s. Thereafter, the per
centage remained roughly constant through the middle 1980s, when it
increased quite sharply. Other aid varied more widely in response to
changes in the level and mix of veteran's benefits and federal student
aid programs. The precipitous drop from 12.5 percent in 1947-^8 to
0.9 percent in 1965-66 is a result of the drying up of veterans' benefits.
So also is the sharp increase by 1972-73 as federal student aid pro
grams expanded and veterans' benefits expanded once again. Federal
aid continued increasing to 1980-81. Since then other aid declined,
falling back close to its 1972-73 level.
The pattern of change in total aid is dominated by movements in
other aid. Nonetheless, changes in institutional and other aid may
move together or in opposite directions. Since 1980-81 the decline in
other aid was partially offset by increased institutional aid. Some
would argue that the decline in other aid pushed institutions to provide
more aid from their own budgets. Another explanation is that increased
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student aid from institutions represented an effort to ameliorate the
sharp increases in tuition and fees that were then taking place.
The impact of student aid on access is revealed in table 5. Column
(2) shows tuition and fees that can be described as the gross student
share of instruction-related costs. Column (3) shows the net student
share, which is tuition and fees less institutionally-provided student
financial aid. Column (4) shows what can be called the net net student
share, which is tuition and fees after subtracting both institutional and
other student aid. Negative values in column (5) indicate that total stu
dent aid exceeded total tuition and fees paid by students, whereas posi
tive values indicate the opposite.
Table 5.

The Burden of the Costs of Higher Education; Based on Costs
Per Full-Time Equivalent (FIE) Student Relative to Gross
Domestic Product (GDP) Per Member of the Civilian Labor
Force (CLF) (in percent)
Gross
Net net
student
Net student
student
Instructionshare:
share, incl.
share, incl.
related
tuition
Academic
costs
and fees
inst. aid
all aid
year
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
-9.4
1947-48
13.2
3.5
3.0
-2.8
4.3
1951-52
14.5
3.6

1957-58
1965-66
1972-73
1976-77
1980-81
1984-85
1988-89

15.3
16.8
18.4
17.8
18.1
19.1
20.1

5.3
6.3
6.2
6.1
6.3
7.3
8.2

4.6
5.3
4.8
4.9
5.1
6.0
6.6

2.2
4.5
-0.0
-0.9
-1.3
0.8
1.4

SOURCES: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Edu
cation and the College Board. Data on GDP and CLF are from various issues of the Economic
Report of the President.

With this as background, we come back to the quality-access trade
off. With respect to quality, the increasing figures from 1947-48
through 1972-73 (column (1) of table 5) suggest that quality was ris-
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ing. This rise was followed by a decline that continued through the
early 1980s. However, the trend has been upward since the late 1970s.
Meanwhile, the focus on access was exceptionally strong in the late
1940s and early 1950s. It dropped off sharply through the late 1950s
and continued doing so into the middle 1960s. With passage of the
Higher Education Act of 1965, the pattern suddenly reversed itself, as
evidenced by a sharp fall in the net net-student share, to zero in 197273 and even lower through the remainder of the decade. Since 1980-81
the aggregate amounts invested in student aid have fallen short of total
tuition revenue.
The resulting pattern can be summarized as follows:
Periods
WW E to 1947^48
1947^8 through 1965-66
1947-48 through 1972-73
1965-456 through 1980-81
1972-73 to 1980-81
1980-81 to 1988-89
1976-77 to 1988-89

Quality
Presumably high

Access
Rising
Falling

Rising
Rising
Falling
Falling
Rising

In general, when the emphasis on access falls, the emphasis on quality
rises, and vice versa.

Sharing the Costs

How are the costs of achieving quality and access being shared?
Table 6 can help answer this question. One view of this sharing is pro
vided by columns (1) and (2), which indicate the division of instruc
tion-related costs between students and others—meaning mostly
taxpayers for public institutions and voluntary contributors for private
institutions. The student share rose steadily through 1965-66, dropped
off a bit and then remained relatively constant through 1980-81, and
afterward increased once again to its highest level ever. The magnitude
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of the increase rose from about one quarter to slightly more than 40
percent of instruction-related costs.
Table 6. Sharing the Costs of Higher Education, Based on Costs Per FuU
Time Equivalent (FTE) Student Relative to Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) Per Member of the Civilian Labor Force (CLF)
(in percent)
Gross
Non-student
student
share:
share
taxpayers
tuition
institutional
Other
Total
Academic and fees
and donors
aid
aid
Aid
year
(1)
(2)
(4)
(3)
(5)
1947-48
26.3
73.7
94.6
3.5
98.1
1951-52
29.7
70.3
4.7
43.9
48.7
1957-58
34.6
65.4
4.9
20.4
15.6
1965-66
62.4
37.5
5.8
5.2
10.9
1972-73
33.6
66.4
26.4
7.3
33.7
1976-77
34.2
65.8
32.5
6.7
39.2
1980-81
34.6
65.4
6.3
42.1
35.8
1984-85
38.0
62.0
6.6
27.3
33.9
1988-89
41.0
59.0
7.9
26.1
33.9
SOURCES: Calculated from published and unpublished data from the U.S. Department of Edu
cation and the College Board. Data on GDP and CLF are from various issues of the Economic
Report of the President.

The reasons why the student share increased so dramatically need to
be examined. Several explanations come to mind. One is that it may
have been politically more difficult to increase nonstudent assistance
than student contributions. When revenue is tight because of rising
demands for other publicly provided goods and services and the reluc
tance of taxpayers and donors to provide more funds, it is easier to
increase the tuition of already-enrolled students who, because of the
large economic benefits of college looming ahead, sense that they must
pay. Another plausible explanation is that because private benefits to
college attendance are so apparent while the social benefits are more
difficult to document, society has been moving to require students, the
most direct beneficiaries of college, to pay an ever larger share of the
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instructional costs. These and other possible rationales obviously
require more careful study.
Another way to examine the sharing of these costs is to compare
instruction-related expenditures with institutional and other aid, as
seen in table 6. Column (3) shows that institutional aid has always pro
vided a relatively small share of total instruction-related expenditures.
Interestingly, institutional aid increased steadily through 1972-73 and
then dropped off, no doubt because of the growth of federal student
aid. However, institutional aid resumed its steady increase from 198081 through 1988-89, as institutions allocated to student aid more of
their additional revenue from tuition and fees.
The patterns of change in other aid and total aid are similar to those
shown in tables 4 and 5. Total aid about equalled total instructional
costs in 1947-48 but then fell to almost nothing by 1965-66. With the
beginning of federal student aid programs in 1965-66 a sharp increase
occurred, which continued through the 1980s. Since then other aid
dropped, largely as a result of the slow growth of federal student aid
funds.

Interpretation/Summary and Discussion
In examining the goals and financing of higher education over the
past half century, we find cyclical patterns of change. These changes
reflect cycles similar to those noted by Schlesinger, cycles that may
also exist in other areas of economic activity. For higher education,
however, these cycles translate essentially into two alternating man
dates, one to improve quality and the other to improve access. Such
cycles can be viewed as representing normal variation within the sys
tem.
Over the period since World War II, the rate of investment in higher
education has risen considerably. As shown in table 7, investment rose
from less than 1 percent prior to the middle 1960s, when it first
exceeded 1 percent; since 1972-73 it has been stabilized at 1.5 percent.
Much of the increase came from the expansion of higher education
enrollments which more than quadrupled. As a percentage of the civil
ian labor force, the number of FTE students slightly more than dou-
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bled. Overall, quality increased as shown earlier in table 4, with
instructional costs rising from 13.2 to 20.1 percent. This is an impres
sive gain, occurring as it did when enrollment increased so dramati
cally. Thus, quality and access improved substantially over the period
as a whole.
Table 7.

Indicators of Expansion of Investment in Higher Education
Total
investment
InstructionAll
in higher
FTE
related
student aid
FTE
education enrollment
expenditures
as a
enrollment
as a
as a
as a percent percent of
(in
percent of percent of
Academic
ofGDP
millions)
GDP
GDP
CLF
year
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1947-48
0.49
0.48
0.07
2.3
3.7
1951-52
0.45
0.21
0.66
1.0
3.1
1957-58
0.60
0.12
0.72
2.6
3.9
1965-66
1.04
0.11
1.15
4.7
6.2
1972-73
1.49
0.50
1.99
8.1
7.3
1976-77
1.50
0.59
2.09
8.1
8.4
1980-81
1.47
0.62
2.09
8.8
8.1
1984-85
1.48
1.98
0.50
9.0
7.8
1988-89
1.54
0.53
2.07
9.5
7.7

SOURCES: Based on data from U.S. Department of Education and Economic Report of the Pres
ident.

What we find particularly interesting is how changes in the goals of
higher education affected quality, access, and the sharing of costs
between students and society. The relative constancy until recently in
the gross student share, represented by tuition and fees, and the sys
tematic changes in instruction-related costs and the net student share,
are remarkable. The fact that these latter two measures displayed such
variation is an interesting commentary on the changing priorities in
higher education finance. Equally surprising is the fact that total stu
dent financial aid exceeded combined tuition and fee revenues in two
quite different time periods—through most of the 1970s and also much
earlier, just after World War II.
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If the late 1960s and 1970s was a period of concern about access,
the concern of the 1980s was with quality. By the measures adopted for
this analysis, quality declined in the 1970s and increased in the 1980s,
whereas access increased in the 1970s and decreased in the 1980s. It
should be noted, however, that increased investment in quality in the
1980s was small relative to the increase in access from the mid-1960s
to the mid-to late-1970s. As a result, little has materialized in the way
of quality gains.
Throughout the 1970s the push for wider access through increased
student aid brought with it pressures to hold down tuition increases. As
a result, additional demand for higher education was stimulated, which
brought enrollments to even higher levels in a period when constrained
budgets made it increasingly difficult to hire additional faculty. As sup
port for instruction-related costs lagged, the principal casualty was fac
ulty salaries, which fell dramatically in real terms through the 1970s
and into the early 1980s (Hansen 1986).
By the early 1980s the results of this process were becoming more
evident. Though increased student aid may have helped stimulate
enrollments, it was not clear that it had done much to stimulate the
enrollment of young people from lower income families.6 Nonetheless,
institutions needed more resources to hire faculty in an ever tighter
labor market. As faculty salaries rose, instructional costs began to
climb. Simultaneously, student aid resources contracted in relative
terms.
The 1980s saw the absence of increases in traditional forms of
financial support, which meant that tuition and fees had to be raised. To
deal with the hardship created by this response, institutions began pro
viding additional financial aid out of their own resources. Increasingly,
however, the resolve to continue this practice appears to be weakening.
Despite the growing emphasis on quality, society's investment in it
increased only slightly in the 1980s because overall resources for
higher education remained tight.
During the 1980s, a shift in public and institutional priorities away
from access and toward quality appeared to be underway. This move
was financed largely by students through tuition increases rather than
by traditional sources of support, such as state and local taxpayers and
private donors. In an attempt to respond to the growing concern about
quality, institutions have been forced to find whatever financial support
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they could. In the absence of other support, tuition and fees were
raised.
An unresolved question is how much the emphasis on access in the
1970s contributed to the nation's goal of enhancing equal educational
opportunity. Indeed the net cost of college attendance declined sharply
for young people with incomes low enough to qualify for student aid;
this proved to be a major accomplishment. While college participation
rates for low-income students did not increase, evidence for the early
1980s shows that low family income was not by itself an important
determinant of whether students dropped out or completed college.
The growing availability of financial aid largely offset the effects of
low family incomes. Rather, weak academic preparation, as indicated
by mediocre performance in high school and low scores on standard
ized tests, constitutes the most important remaining barrier to expand
ing access to college.7 This suggests that access will be difficult to
increase without improving the quality of instruction at the secondary
level. In other words, current efforts to improve the quality of instruc
tion could be effective if in the process academic performance
improves among high school graduates from low-income families. As
larger proportions of better-prepared young people enter college, stu
dent financial aid may become even more effective as a means to
ensure greater equality of opportunity in higher education.
Still another question concerns the impact of current efforts to
improve the quality of education. The implicit argument is that tuition
increases have been required to improve the quality of the education.
By paying higher faculty salaries, increasing expenditures to update
equipment and facilities, and introducing new technology to the class
room, institutions believe they have been improving quality. Most
institutions would have preferred to find other ways of meeting these
increased costs; they would have liked to receive more state and local
revenue as well as larger voluntary contributions. Despite the muchpublicized fact that tuition and fees have increased sharply, public
reaction against these increases has not been noticeably strong. It has
certainly not been strong enough to elicit additional support from other
sources or to restore the real levels of faculty salaries. Whether these
changes have adversely affected quality remain to be determined.
The challenge now lies in finding better ways of using existing
resources, so as to continue to achieve increasing access and improving
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quality. If this can be done, the chances for obtaining additional
resources to broaden access and enrich quality should be greatly
enhanced.
NOTES
1. Most analyses of the higher education finance data show relatively little in the way of sys
tematic patterns of change.
2. The importance of cycles has been emphasized primarily by the Schlesingers: see Arthur M.
Schlesinger, Jr. (1986) and Arthur Schlesinger, Sr. (1949). Also see McClosky and Zaller (1984),
Kaestle (1972), Hirschman (1982), and Hegel (1817).
3. Schlesinger goes on to say that such cycles "cannot be determined, short of catastrophe by
external events. War, depressions, inflations may heighten and complicate moods, but the cycle
itself rolls on, self contained and self sufficient" (pp. 27-29). Hegel might have characterized a
cycle as a part of a dialectical process wherein each asserts a thesis which, as time passes, draws
opposition resulting in the formation of an antithesis, which causes the beginning of a new cycle.
However, surviving elements of a previous cycle's thesis become permanent parts of a presum
ably richer and more highly developed array of public policies.
4. Those reports include the President's Commission on Higher Education, Higher Education
for American Democracy (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1947); The Report of
the President's Commission on National Goals, Goals for Americans (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1960); Carnegie Commission on Higher Education, Quality and Equity: New Lev
els of Federal Responsibility for Higher Education (New York: McGraw Hill, 1968); National
Commission on Excellence in Education, A Nation at Risk: The Imperative for Educational
Reform (Washington, DC, Government Printing Office, 1983); Association of American Colleges,
Integrity in the College Curriculum: A Report to the Academic Community (Washington, DC,
Association of American Colleges, 1984); and, Ernest L. Boyer, College: The Undergraduate
Experience in America (Princeton, NJ: Carnegie Foundation for the Advancement of Teaching,
1987).
5. The evidence indicates that over the past decade or more employment in higher education
has increased at a much faster pace for nonfacuity than faculty personnel. Whether this represents
an enhancement of instruction quality is doubtful. For more details, see Bergmann (1991).
6. For two different views, see McPherson and Shapiro (1991) and Hansen (1983).
7. These patterns are documented by Stampen and Cabrera (1986) and also Cabrera, Stampen,
and Hansen (1990).
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The Meanings and Scope of Education, Economics,
and Change in the Present Context

Central to any meaningful analysis of the economics of education is
the notion of change, an idea that I wish to explore in these pages. To
do so it is first necessary to bring some clarification to the meaning and
scope of the terms "education" and "economics of education." Only
then is it possible to determine what sorts of changes—societal, politi
cal, economic, or others—are indeed relevant to this context. I then
turn to the implications of change as it affects and is affected by educa
tion in industrialized societies. Although they merit their own study,
for want of space I refer only incidentally to common and distinctive
aspects of such change in less developed countries.
First, education is much more than schooling. It is all sorts of invest
ments in learning. This must be obvious as soon as one looks across
diverse societies and cultures around the world at any given time. Even
illiterate societies have educational systems. It is equally obvious if we
look over historic time in given societies, whether in the Eastern or the
Western hemisphere. Lawrence Cremin is well known for his broad
definition of education, which encompasses all investments of time in
learning. This notion, however, leaves open the question of how far
schools in fact educate, and whether education (in schools or else
where) is always a "good."
Second, economics is more than what money measures. If usually
we think of "education" in normative terms, what about "economics"?
Which type of economics—positive or negative—is primarily relevant
here, and to what extent can the positive and the normative be sepa
rated?
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This leads immediately to the question: Does the "economics of
education" encompass broader values, or is it concerned only with
monetary costs and returns? To be sure, most of the benefit-cost analy
ses of investments in education have been limited in this manner. So
limited too, have been treatments of education in aggregative analyses
of "national economic growth." But "human resources" are much
more, in both individual and societal perspective, than potentials for
contributing to monetary returns.
Third, societal change has many facets. We all experience change
over a life span, but this could be the situation even in an essentially
changeless, traditional society. Today's "world of change" has certain
unique features. Here societal traits, some of which may shift rapidly,
bring myriad changes that are manifest over a single life span of an
individual. Other changes become evident in their impacts over longer
periods.
Three societally relevant sorts of intra-cohort changes may be con
ceptually distinguished. (1) General economic cycles bring cyclical
changes in both investments in education and returns on such invest
ments. (2) Rapid, innovative changes can have immediate impacts on
the demands for services of skilled people. Such changes may be tech
nological or organizational or a combination of the two. (3) Finally,
there are education-induced societal changes within the adult life span
of a single cohort, which arise in response to changes in the distribu
tion of education among a population, whatever the shares of overlap
ping cohorts in such a change. Stated to include demographic changes
in age and sex distributions, they might better be termed changes in the
distribution and quantity of human capital.
In fact, changes of all three of these societal sorts can and often will
arise contemporaneously. Sorting out these components in changing
associations between education and earnings has been one of the
important endeavors in empirical studies of the economics of educa
tion in recent years.
Where change is so slow as to be barely perceptible within the span
of an individual life, the immediate consciousness of change over a
lifetime will reflect only age cycles that seem to repeat themselves.
However, when change is cumulative over extended periods, whether
slow or rapid, its analysis in relation to the economics of education has
often been characterized merely by comparisons between historic eras
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or sharply contrasting contemporary societies—relationships that are
usually simplified by disregarding societal intra-cohort shifts. Such
simplification can be well justified except in cases where rapid intracohort shifts constitute a major feature of an historical era or a particu
lar contemporaneous society. This exception, however, is extremely
important.

Change and the Economics of Education
in Industrialized Countries
Concentrating on change and education in industrialized countries,
five main subjects call for attention. First is the proposition that disequilibria drive modernization, and that human capital plays a major
part in that process. Second, uncertainty in the face of change has
implications of uncertainty for education, and in particular for the roles
of general education in a world of change. Third must come consider
ation of the ongoing debates concerning vocational, specialized, and
general education with rising affluence (pervasive in connection with
less developed as well as economically advanced nations). Fourth,
what may we have to say about the roles and distribution of postschool
training among members of a population in the face of dynamic
change? Finally, are those who drop out of school early irrational?
What about motives and incentives for educational decisions and con
cerning postschool behavior?
The argument that human capital and disequilibria constitute the
mainspring of growth is the theme of a 1990 book by T. W. Schultz,
entitled Restoring Economic Equilibrium. There he stresses three
"common omissions" in modern growth theory. These are (1) special
ization as a key to most modern increases in income; (2) disequilibria
as increasing incomes are realized from advances in technology, from
the proliferation of human capital, and from other sources; and (3)
entrepreneurs as agents in restoring equilibria. The emphasis on spe
cialization is not unique to Schultz. Indeed, this enlargement of Adam
Smith's division of labor has characterized a number of papers, pub
lished and unpublished, by other economists over the past decade. Nor
is a stress on entrepreneurship new; it was central to Schumpeter's the-
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ory of economic development eighty years ago, although it has
received little attention recently. What is distinctive in Schultz's recent
work is the extent to which he focuses on small entrepreneurs and the
nature of his treatment of "disequilibria." Criticizing economists in
general, he writes, "It has become an art to conceal economic disequi
libria that occur as a consequence of modern increases in income,"
whether such increases arise from technological change or from
growth in human capital. In Schultz's (1975) view, disequilibria caused
by modernization are seen as signals of income-increasing processes,
which in turn give rise to new opportunities—hence his emphasis on
the importance of "the ability to deal with disequilibria." That ability,
designated elsewhere as "allocative" versus "worker" ability, has been
shown to be associated with the completion of higher levels of school
ing in both the United States and India. 1 A partial appreciation of the
importance of this sort of entrepreneurial ability appears frequently
today in nonacademic publications—for example, in Forbes magazine
and the Wall Street Journal. But there is a paradox in all this. It would
seem that specialization yields progress, but that a general education
should provide the firmest base for dealing with and adapting to
change. Specialization precipitates the disequilibria that give rise to
economic progress; general education underlies abilities to remove
those disequilibria through their creative resolution.
Second, a society in which the unexpected is perceived as the norm
calls for "general education." Change breeds uncertainty, and a world
of dynamic change is inevitably characterized by doubts and questions
that affect the economic logic of choices in preparation for and in reac
tions to the unexpected. In addition, there are uncertainties for the indi
vidual in an advanced market economy that overlap with changes in
the societal environment. This raises the question: How far do individ
ual uncertainties inherent in a market system coincide in the nature of
their effects with the overlapping uncertainties associated with cyclical
or rapid technological or structural changes?
One essentially simple theme of this discussion is the importance of
ensuring flexibility in adaptation to changes in technologies and in skill
demands and supplies. This leads to a fundamental proposition regard
ing educational choices as viewed from both individual and societal
perspectives. In brief, a critical function of education in the early years
would seem to be "general" learning, in that it will provide a flexible
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foundation for future learning, whether in formal institutions or else
where.
But what is a "general education"? Most fundamental and most gen
eral of all is undoubtedly the learning of attitudes and behavior that
takes place (or fails to take place) in the home. This is why advanced
industrial societies have exerted ever increasing pressure to provide
formally for the education of children in the preschool years. It is a rea
son also for tendencies to ask ever more of the schools as socializing
agencies, demanding that they go far beyond their earlier roles (some
church or elite boarding schools aside). Moreover, work experience in
itself may provide elements of general education for future job success
in almost any vocation. All of these tendencies can have important eco
nomic effects, even if we define "economic" in the narrowest, mone
tary sense.
Beyond this, numeric and verbal literacy are undoubtedly among the
most elemental foundations of general education throughout the indus
trialized world. But definitions of "functional verbal literacy" change,
while numerical literacy tends to become less demanding on the one
hand (with the omnipresent cash register) and more demanding on the
other hand, in terms of mathematical literacy. Cutting across them all
now is the issue of computer literacy.
Meanwhile, "practical"—not to be confused with "vocational"—
learning has been coming in for more attention, along with estimates of
its costs even if not yet of its returns. What constitutes "generally prac
tical" learning will depend on environmental conditions.
It is evident that the more technologically advanced and diverse a
society, and the more rapid the pace of economic change, the greater
must be the demand for a general education that can foster adaptability,
whether from an individual or a societal perspective.
Third, where, then, does specialization come in? A fallacy that
remains common in some quarters, even today, is the notion that
schools should "turn out" students fully trained for particular interme
diate-level jobs. Usually this argument underlies demands for the vocationalization of secondary schools. But frequently it confounds the
vocational with the practical, which may be of general relevance to
most members of a population. Even if the "practical" skill is of gen
eral relevance, questions may still arise as to the cost and effectiveness
of providing it in schools or through other channels. This leads into the
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question, What level of general schooling should candidates attain
before vocational specialization? Cogent arguments for increased spe
cialization may well hold with reference to postcollege education, for
example, even while in a particular environment arguments for wide
spread vocational specialization during secondary school might attract
little support. What we have to remember is that the case for rising spe
cialization in advanced economies rests on two assumptions: (1) that
the students already will have attained high levels of general education,
and (2) that they are well prepared to deal with changes in future
knowledge and practice in the general area of their specialization.
Rapid change in an advanced society supports and depends upon both
high levels of training in general competence in a cluster of specialties
and increased high-level specialization.
It is in such a context that Rosen (1983) contributed his eminently
readable essay on specialization, the gist of which was that incentives
to specialize arise from increasing returns in utilization of human capi
tal. This comes about because of the indivisibility of human capital,
embodied as it is in the human being. In Rosen's words, "The return to
investment in a particular skill is increasing in its subsequent rate of
utilization because investment costs are independent of how acquired
skills are used" (p. 44). He illustrates the working of this principle by
pointing to the differences between men and women in incentives to
invest in human capital, and to the division of labor within households.
Decker and Murphy (1990), among others, have expanded on Rosen's
discussion to carry further the argument concerning the importance of
rising specialization. As an economy becomes technologically more
complex and the quantity of disembodied knowledge in a society
becomes progressively larger, no one person can contain more than a
minute fraction of the total. Limitations on the extent of specialization
go beyond Adam Smith's size of the market to include the costs of
coordination. In our day we are witnessing a multiplication and refine
ment of communication technologies that lowers coordination costs
and the barriers of distance, even as an increasingly complex market
economy takes over a major part of the task of coordinating the work
of ever more specialists.
An argument between T. W. Schultz and his Chicago colleagues per
sists with respect to the concept of disequilibria and the place that
Schultz has given to that concept. There is substantial agreement,
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nonetheless, with respect to the importance of high-level specialization
in the dynamics of an advanced economy.
Next is the question: How do the uncertainties of change and
postschool human investments interact? In an economically advanced
and dynamic society, continued learning over the adult years must be
important for almost everyone but will not be the same for all. For
some it may be in large part a process of recovery from earlier malallocation of time away from what should have been learned, even at
relatively low levels of both general capabilities and particular voca
tional skills. At the other extreme, manifest in most professions, con
tinuous intensive learning is required merely to keep up with rapid
increases in knowledge. At both extremes, and in between, postschool
learning is an essential ingredient in sustained productivity for both
individuals and society. Catching up and keeping up both are impor
tant, whether or not entrepreneurial in an innovative sense. Even if
catching up and keeping up are in themselves more reactive than cre
ative, both are essential in the processes of societal change.
Indeed, whether a society is characterized by dynamic change or
not, an examination of postschool learning is necessary in order to
identify returns on investments in schooling, insofar as the extent of
postschool investment in human capital is associated with the extent
and nature of prior schooling. Or to be more precise, such an investiga
tion is necessary unless one of two special situations prevails: either
(1) postschool learning is determined fully by the prior schooling with
out any further investment in human capital; or (2) rates of return to
schooling and postschool investments in learning are the same. But
these are very special situations. Even in an essentially static approach,
it becomes necessary to look further into what happens in the
postschool years. One of the most debated issues in the economics of
education centers around just this problem. Jacob Mincer (1993) has
pursued it empirically for the United States over some years, sorting
out what part of observed life-earning streams associated with different
levels of schooling are in fact attributable to postschool investments,
whether in direct outlays or in forgone earnings.
As soon as we shift to talk about change, further questions arise in
the interpretation of life-earnings paths constructed from cross-sec
tional age-earnings distributions. Only if there is no change across
cohorts in the forms of those paths will a construct based on age-earn-
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ings data at a given time give an unbiased picture of the experiences of
any real population cohort. If later cohorts have generally higher earn
ing streams, the cross-section data will understate the increases of
earnings over a life span. If there are inter-cohort declines, the steep
ness of intra-cohort earnings paths will be overstated.
As we should expect, this is one of the spheres in which there has
been a relatively active and pragmatic treatment of the three sorts of
societal change listed above as they pertain to the economics of educa
tion—cyclical shifts, innovative change as it affects demands for skills,
and changing relative skill supplies.
Finally it is necessary to treat some critical questions concerning
distributions of knowledge and incentives among a population. One of
the most important developments in microeconomic theory over the
past generation has been the evolution of the economics of informa
tion. I have already referred to this indirectly in earlier remarks con
cerning specialization. But it has much wider and more profound
implications for economic theory in so far as that theory is built on one
or another concept of "rationality" in human behavior. It calls on us to
reassess incentive structures. In the real world what may they imply for
the "rationality" of behavior with respect to educational decisions
made by individuals? And what about decisions in the use of whatever
human capital the individual may have acquired? At this point, where
incentives meet motivations, goals, and values, the economist's con
cerns must interact with the concerns of both psychologists and philos
ophers. That is a large order. Here I shall cut it down to just two
questions, centered primarily, in both cases, on what might be labeled
societally "perverse" incentives.
First is the problem of understanding decisions of educational lag
gards in an affluent society in which schooling is available to all. If the
importance of basic general education is so evident, why do many
youths remain virtually illiterate, as happens in the United States even
today? Does this come back to ignorance of the knowable, or to a lack
of economically rational motivation, or to both? For that matter, is a
negative educational motivation economically rational in a subsociety
that presents some youths with perverse economic incentives? Is the
problem one of short time horizons with heavy subjective discounting
of potential future returns? If so, why those high discount rates? Or are
immediate returns to time spent in criminal activities just too tempting
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relative to the risks, ethical values forfeited aside?2 These are critical
questions not only for sociologists and psychologists, but for econo
mists as well. There is a clear difference between the psychologist and
the economist in approaching this problem, however—a difference that
dictated use in the first sentence of this section of the word "incen
tives" rather than "motivations."
Or, to consider the issue from a different angle, what about the slow
reactions of educated people who resist or delay in responding to
changes in their future prospects that are relatively easy to predict? Is
this in fact an important phenomenon that slows progress for both soci
ety and the individual? Or is it bound up with a lack of readiness to
take the chances inherent in creative action? Can economists contrib
ute anything here? Perhaps so.
Some further light might be shed on such questions by taking
another look at a microeconomic theory of the firm in a world of uncer
tainty. Over many decades G. L. S. Shackle developed and honed a
theory of behavior of the firm in the face of uncertainty (not insurable
risk). He introduced the idea of "potential surprise," favorable or unfa
vorable, in focusing attention.3 Relatively small variations in likely
eventualities would not have such an effect. This proposition may have
both a psychological and an economic basis. Economically, the pursuit
of information and planning of changed actions or policies are costly,
both in direct outlays and in the value of forgone uses of time. Psycho
logically, there may also be a conservation of effort so long as motiva
tions to avoid potential surprise are not strong. This line of thought
brings us to two practical hypotheses with reference to those who drag
furthest behind and those who will lead in a changing environment,
respectively.
First, looking at educational decisions in this way should help us to
understand the seeming irrationality of the disinterest shown in even
elementary schooling among members of subpopulations whose entire
immediate environments are loaded with anti-education incentives.
Not only is the future heavily discounted; in addition any subjective
sense of favorable potential surprise associated with schooling is dis
tant. In such considerations, economics and psychology are joined.
Second, the lower the cost of expanding knowledge and the greater
the capability for involvement in directed change, the more economi
cally sound and pleasurable will be involvement in innovative actions.
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This is where contributions of education to entrepreneurial leadership
may come in. Unfortunately, however, incentives can be as perverse
among some of the presumably well educated as among the educa
tional laggards—perverse not so much in terms of individual financial
incentives as societal benefits and costs.

Conclusions

The bottom line is in the uses of time over and across time. In St.
Augustine's remarkable treatment, time is seen to exist only in retro
spect (as memory) and prospect (as expectation). The present is no
more than a transition from past to future. But past events make the
future, and today's future is tomorrow's past. Change is everywhere,
even in a society that is repetitive in the turnover of events and the
ways in which people make use of time as they move through their life
cycles. However, societal change today is much more than repetition as
successive cohorts pass through time. Education has played and con
tinues to play a significant part in that process, even as it is also a
response.
Conceptually static models of the economics of human resource
development and utilization are simplifications that provide a first step
toward understanding the decisions that make up economic life. But
these first steps can be misleading. Simple repetition in the purest form
is in fact an impossibility today, and what can be seen at any given
time is already the reflection of relevant recent and prospective
changes. Those changes include population growth, shifts in the skill
mix of the population (due both to schooling and out-of-school learn
ing), and technological innovations—all of these in both the recent
past and in expectations for the future. Any one of them might predict
at least directions of change in an otherwise static human investment
model, but it is humbling indeed to take all of them together along with
changes in the pace and mixes of change. To see this, consider what
might happen to human investments and indeed to economic life in
general, if the really big change came—a cessation of change! Can we
even imagine such a situation in the next generation, given what we
see around us and the very nature of human nature?
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And so I come to the fundamental generalization—that what we
observe is itself a function of change, and so is most of what we may
say in general terms concerning the economics of education. Despite
changes that will come (for better or for worse) in the educational
structures and contents of a future world, this much we can say with
assurance: education itself contributes to change. And a world of
change calls for learning both within and outside of schools. It calls for
general education as a preparation for future learning, for specializa
tions that can cope with change, and for both applied and theoretical
learning.
The empirical referents in even our static models of human invest
ment decisions and benefit-cost theory are built on expectations con
cerning a reality that is always changing. That reality is embedded in
the flow of time. And so it happens that we are facing and affecting
change, whether we see things that way or not. In the long run only a
conscious awareness of this fact can bring us closer to understanding
the events and the problems that surround us and in which we are inev
itably enmeshed.
Notice, however, that none of the relatively firm pronouncements
just set forth says anything about the underlying purposes of education,
nor do they take note of the origins of economics in moral philosophy,
so wisely stressed by Harry Johnson (1972) in his commentary at a
conference on "The Equity Efficiency Quandary in Education." Yet the
present paper was written to communicate with an essentially aca
demic audience from diverse disciplines, and on the same day I pre
sented to a group of economists a paper that I called 'The Day
Aristotle Visited an American School System." Both Harry Johnson in
the late twentieth century A.D. and Aristotle in the fourth century B.C.
stress the importance of reason, and both challenge us to look beyond
narrow boundaries in our thinking to ask what is really important: in
the present context, education for what? In Aristotle, this is lifelong
learning, from early upbringing of children (to "moral virtue" by incul
cation of good habits), on to an unending pursuit of wisdom, both theo
retical and practical. In Harry Johnson it is essentially the same, though
he too is a man of his own time. The twenty-first century will soon be
here. Perhaps it will call us to seek a wisdom less bounded by formal
academic disciplines and more alert to the human questions that are
already calling upon us to probe the roots of education in our day.
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NOTES
1. For early examples, see Chaudhri 1968, and especially, Welch 1970.
2. Richard Freeman (1992) has addressed this problem recently in a working paper for the
National Bureau of Economic Research.
3. For an applicadon of some of his ideas to investments in human beings, see Bowman 1972.
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The W.E. Upjohn Institute for Employment Research is a nonprofit
research organization devoted to finding and promoting solutions to
employment-related problems at the national, state, and local level. It is an
activity of the W.E. Upjohn Unemployment Trustee Corporation, which was
established in 1932 to administer a fund set aside by the late Dr. W.E. Upjohn,
founder of The Upjohn Company, to seek ways to counteract the loss of
employment income during economic downturns.
The Institute is funded largely by income from the W.E. Upjohn
Unemployment Trust, supplemented by outside grants, contracts, and sales of
publications. Activities of the Institute are comprised of the following
elements: (1) a research program conducted by a resident staff of professional
social scientists; (2) a competitive grant program, which expands and
complements the internal research program by providing financial support to
researchers outside the Institute; (3) a publications program, which provides
the major vehicle for the dissemination of research by staff and grantees, as
well as other selected work in the field; and (4) an Employment Management
Services division, which manages most of the publicly funded employment
and training programs in the local area.
The broad objectives of the Institute's research, grant, and publication
programs are to: (1) promote scholarship and experimentation on issues of
public and private employment and unemployment policy; and (2) make
knowledge and scholarship relevant and useful to policymakers in their
pursuit of solutions to employment and unemployment problems.
Current areas of concentration for these programs include: causes,
consequences, and measures to alleviate unemployment; social insurance and
income maintenance programs; compensation; workforce quality; work
arrangements; family labor issues; labor-management relations; and regional
economic development and local labor markets.
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